Multi-criteria decision-making for water resource management in the Berg Water management area by De Lange, Willem J.
  
 
 
 
 
 
MULTI-CRITERIA DECISION-MAKING FOR WATER 
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE BERG WATER 
MANAGEMENT AREA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Willem J de Lange 
 
 
Dissertation presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Agriculture)  
at the University of Stellenbosch. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Promotor:  Professor T.E. Kleynhans       December 2006 
 
 2 
DECLARATION 
 
 
I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this dissertation is my own original 
work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any university for a 
degree. 
 
 
 
Signature :   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   Date :   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
  W.J. de Lange 
 
 
 
 
 3 
ABSTRACT 
 
The concept of social welfare maximisation directs strategic decision-making within a milieu of 
integrated planning problems.  This study applies the aforementioned statement to decision-making 
regarding the long-term allocation of bulk-water resources in the Berg Water Management Area of 
South Africa.  Public goods, such as bulk water supply infrastructure, is vulnerable to failures in 
market and government allocation strategies because both fields are subjected to unaccounted costs 
and benefits.  This implies a measurement problem for the quantification of the total cost/benefit of 
management options and result in decision-making with incomplete information.  Legitimate 
decision-making depends on reliable and accurate information, and the measurement problem, 
therefore, poses an obstacle to better social welfare maximisation. 
 
A need has been identified to broaden the decision-making context in the Berg Water Management 
Area to promote the accommodation of unaccounted for costs and benefits in water resource 
allocation decision-making.  This study engaged this need by expanding the temporal and spatial 
dimensions of the decision-making context.  Accordingly, improved indecision-making information 
and decision-support processes is needed.  Spatial expansions manifested in physical expansions of 
the decision-making boundaries that led to expansions in representation in the decision-making 
process.  Temporal expansions manifested in the consideration of different sequences of bulk 
supply schemes over time instead of a selection of schemes at the same time.   
 
The study incorporated components of economic valuation theory, multi-criteria decision analysis, a 
public survey and a modified Delphi expert panel technique to account for the increased decision-
making information load.  The approach was applied in the Western Cape province of South Africa 
and specifically focused on a choice problem regarding different long-term bulk-water resource 
management options for the area.  Two surveys were completed to accommodate these expansions.  
The first focused on public preference in water allocation management and the second survey 
utilized a modified Delphi technique.  Questions regarding the extend of public participation in 
long-term water resource allocation decision-making came to the fore and the applicability of 
economic theory to accommodate public preference as a regulatory instrument, was questioned.  A 
willingness to pay for “greener” water was observed and may be used to motivate a paradigm shift 
from management’s perspective to consider, without fear of harming their own political position, 
“greener” water supply options more seriously even if these options imply higher direct costs. 
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UITTREKSEL 
 
Die konsep van sosiale welvaart maksimering rig strategiese besluitneming binne ‘n milieu van 
geintegreerde beplanningsprobleme.  Hierdie studie pas laasgenoemde stelling op langtermyn water 
allokasie besluitneming binne die Berg Waterbestuursarea van Suid Afrika toe.  Publieke goedere 
soos grootmaat watervoorsienningsinfrastruktuur, is kwesbaar vir mislukkings in mark- en 
gereguleerde allokasiestategieë, aangesien beide blootgestel is aan onberekenbare kostes en 
voordele.  Laasgenoemde weerspieël ‘n kwantifiseringsprobleem om totale kostes en voordele van 
verskillende bestuurstrategieë te beraam en lei tot besluitneming met onvolledige inligting.  
Geloofwaardige besluitneming steun egter op betroubare en akkurate inligting en die 
kwantifiseringsprobleem belemmer dus sosiale welvaart maksimering. 
 
Die behoefte om die besluitnemingskonteks in die Berg Water Bestuur Area te verbreed, het 
onstaan om sodoende onberekenbare kostes en voordele tot ‘n groter mate in waterhulpbron 
allokasie besluitneming te akkommodeer.  Hierdie studie fokus op laasgenoemde behoefte deur die 
temporale en ruimtelike dimensies van die besluitnemingskonteks verder te ontwikkel.  Sulke 
ontwikkeling vereis verbeterde besluitnemingsingsinligting en ondersteuningsprosesse.  Ruimtelike 
ontwikkeling is geakkommodeer deur die fisiese uitbreiding van die grootmaat water allokasie 
besluitnemingskonteks.  Temporale ontwikkeling manifesteer deur verskillende reekse van 
opeenvolgende grootmaat water skemas oor tyd te vergelyk, in plaas daarvan om individuele 
skemas op dieselfde tydstip met mekaar te vergelyk.   
 
Die studie het van ekonomiese waardasie teorie, multi-kriteria besluitneming analise, ‘n publieke 
opname en ‘n aangepaste Delphi ekspert paneel tegniek gebruik gemaak om die vergrote vraag in 
besluitnemingsinligting te hanteer.  Die benadering is in die Wes-Kaap provinsie van Suid-Afrika 
toegepas en het op ‘n keuse-probleem aangaande lang-termyn grootmaat water bestuur gefokus.  
Twee opnames is gedoen om die vergrote konteks te hanteer.  Die eerste het op publieke voorkeur 
in water allokasie bestuur gefokus terwyl die tweede opname ‘n aangepaste Delphi tegniek gebruik 
het.  Vrae aangaande publieke deelname in langtermyn water allokasie besluitneming het navore 
gekom, waarna die bevoegdheid van die ekonomiese teorie as reguleringsintrument om publieke 
voorkeur te hanteer, bevraagteken word.  ‘n Bereidwilligheid om vir “groener” water te betaal het 
na vore gekom.  Dit dien as motivering vir ‘n paradigmaskuif waar waterbestuurders sonder vrees 
vir bedreiging van hul eie politieke posisie, “groener” watervoorsienningsopsies ernstiger kan 
oorweeg, ten spyte van verhoogde direkte kostes. 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND ORIENTATION 
 
Since the 1980s, the world has seen massive reforms in economic institutions, i.e. communist 
regimes collapsed, trade barriers were reduced and the institutions of market capitalism have grown 
steadily.  Most reforms sought to reduce constraints on economic activity, increase market 
participation and make greater use of competitive markets as allocation mechanisms. These reforms 
trickled down to resource allocation policies and institutions governing the use of natural resources, 
including water resources.   
 
The political events during the last decade in South Africa have seen major objective-related 
adjustments leading to changes in the organisational structure of government.  Developments in 
South African water policy followed the above-mentioned trend with substantial institutional 
reform in water resource legislation after 1994 (Act 108 of 1997: Water Services Act) and 1998 
(Act 36 of 1998: National Water Act).  A thrust towards the decentralisation of management, aimed 
at efficiency increases, ensued mainly due to water resource scarcity increases, which led to greater 
competition for access and usage rights.  The development of an integrated approach to water 
resource allocation management emerged and, to some extent, anticipated a change of direction 
towards decentralisation and increased public participation in resource allocation.  The concepts of 
sustainability, efficiency and equity are central to this partly resolved management challenge. Inter-
relationships exist between nature and private and public interests, and the means for engaging in 
scarcity-related conflicts within such interrelationships, features prominently in the decision-making 
process.   
 
The political, socio-economic and natural contexts have become increasingly important in resource 
allocation decision-making.  Distributional features of different resource allocations needing to be 
accounted for included skewed distributions of income, wealth and power because the political 
reality in less developed countries is that allocation policies aimed at a stronger translation of 
sustainability (implying low economic growth approaches) are simply unacceptable.  On the other 
hand, policies that only target economic growth without regard for equity considerations may also 
encounter resistance, especially where there is a strong organised labour movement such as in the 
case of South Africa. 
 
A structured way of thinking complemented by an expanded decision-support context is needed.  
However, a resource base to develop such methodologies is also needed, and this study makes use 
of long-term water allocation management to provide this base.  It uses the Berg Water 
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Management Area (BWMA) in the Western Cape Province of South Africa as a regional framework 
with water resource allocation between different users as decision-making challenge.  Water 
resources were chosen because of its life-supporting character and different social and economic 
values attached to it.  It therefore creates a formidable platform for resource allocation issues to 
develop.  In addition, the BWMA and the adjacent rural areas in the Western Cape have came under 
increasing threat of water shortages during the past five years.  Climatic change, economic growth, 
pollution and population demographic variables could be put forward as the three main drivers of 
increased demand.  With new bulk supply sources becoming less accessible, more expensive and 
less environmentally acceptable, new and innovative water management strategies and policies are 
called for, making the BWMA a suitable study context. 
 
1.1 Research problem structuring 
 
The following section describes the basic theoretical research problem and also serves as an 
orientation and, therefore, reference for the rest of the dissertation.  A thorough understanding of 
this problem is, therefore, essential to understand the context of the rest of the dissertation. 
 
The study assumes a water resource scarcity situation within the BWMA.  Preference is given to the 
“highest and best use” argument in resource scarcity situations (maximising marginal benefit).  
Given that the perceived value of water use in urban areas exceed rural use, a gradual re-allocation 
of water from rural to urban areas is expected.  Unfortunately, the difference in perceived value are 
not fully quantifiable and therefore not fully accounted for in market-driven allocation systems (due 
to a measurement problem). 
 
Within the BWMA the future bulk augmentation infrastructure will increasingly result in re-
allocations of water between different uses and users and often from adjacent rural areas to 
predominantly urban areas.  Such re-allocations are often primarily motivated by price elasticity of 
demand differentiations between users. In the process, too much emphasis is placed on the 
financial, political and technological impacts and too little emphasis is placed on the socio-
economic and environmental impacts of allocation decisions.  This leads to ignorance of some of 
the spatial and temporal dimensions of resource allocation decision-making leading to a serious 
measurement problem (see Figure 1) with regard to measuring cost and benefits in resource 
allocation decision-making.  From a cost perspective the measurement problem holds that current 
cost estimation methodologies cannot fully account for the total cost of different resource 
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allocations, thereby assuming the risk of choosing a “more expensive” option (i.e. option A) above 
a “less expensive” option (option B) if all (total) costs could be taken into account.     
 
Option A
Total 
cost/benefit
Total 
cost/benefit
Measurable Measurable
Not 
measurable Not 
measurable
Option B
 
Figure 1:  A measurement problem 
 
Since different supply augmentation schemes have different proportions of measurable and non-
measurable costs/benefits, the establishment of decisions predominantly on the “measurable” part of 
costs and benefits (see Figure 1) leads to resource allocations that are often contrary to broad 
government policies of efficient, but sustainable resource utilisation.  As such, social welfare is 
unwittingly threatened.  It could, therefore, be argued that the measurement problem narrows the 
allocation decision-making context.  Allocation decisions are taken with incomplete information – a 
familiar scenario in the decision-making environment.  However, the risk of ignoring the 
measurement problem results in unsustainable water resource utilisation, implying that management 
will realise their error (particularly adverse environmental effects) when it is too late or costly to 
reverse with negative social welfare impacts in the long-term.  The need has, therefore, been 
identified to make resource allocation decision-making more sensitive to this measurement problem 
with the BWMA as a study area. 
 
1.2 Orientation and context setting of research problem 
 
The essence of this research is to embrace the measurement problem in long-term water resource 
allocation management in a politically sensitive way.  The study assumes a water resource scarcity 
situation and that market and government allocation mechanisms are not completely satisfactory in 
terms of natural resource allocation because of the measurement problem.  Government intervention 
 17 
is guided by resource allocation legislation with constant striving towards sustainability, efficiency, 
equity, and ultimately, social welfare maximisation1.  Within such intervention, principal-agent 
relationships2 emerge between the public (principal) and resource management authorities (agent).   
 
Agents are confronted with the measurement problem, hampering their ability to account for all 
costs and benefits associated with different resource allocation options, i.e. a scenario of decision-
making with incomplete information.  User preferences account for part of such incomplete 
information, and the accommodation of public preference, therefore, forms a part of this study.  The 
question could be asked that if consumers in sufficient numbers are willing to pay the premium for 
“greener” water, could this be presented as legitimate reason to opt for “greener” supply options.  
The purpose of the study is more fundamental, i.e. can economics accommodate public preferences 
as a regulatory instrument?  For example, if “green” preferences for water management options are 
exogenously given, to what extent can or should agents make use of such preferences?  
Applications of the study are not limited to the field of natural resource management but apply to all 
fields where a principal-agent relationship is present (e.g. the medical aid and general insurance 
industries).   
 
It should be noted that “green” preferences also impose social costs that could have a negative 
impact on social welfare maximisation.  “Green” preferences as a regulatory policy instrument 
would make sense if the benchmark of “sustainable” resource allocation management were based 
on value judgments that differ from consumer preferences.  Then, optimal environmental protection 
would be defined by reference to ethics, or, worse, by prescriptions from policy activists who 
promote their own preferences (by allocating greater weights to such criteria promoting their 
preferences) while giving those of the public at large (and the costs they bear) smaller weights. 
 
Table 1 presents a conceptual layout of the above-mentioned argument presented in three columns.  
The first column contains the “problem statement” and point of departure for the second column, 
which presents relevant arguments for the problem.  The third column proposes a “remedy” for the 
stated problem and leads to the subsequent problem statement. 
 
 
                                                
1
 In the broader sense of which the state of the environment also forms a part.   
2
 The problem of resource allocation that arises because contracts that will induce agents to act in their principals’ best interset are generally 
impossible to write or too costly to monitor (Lipsey and Courant, 1996:29). 
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Table 1: Conceptual layout of the study 
Problem Reasoning Solution/Outcome 
1 
Market failure in water 
resource allocation 
2 
Bulk water infrastructure has a public-
good nature 
3 
Government interference promotes social welfare 
maximisation. 
 
4 
Government failure in 
water resource 
allocation 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
• Lobby groups  
• Public choice theory holds that 
hidden agendas and opportunity for 
own discretion of bureaucrats often 
leads to misuse of power. 
• Narrow decision-making context 
because of under-representation in 
management committee leading to 
“unsustainable” resource utilisation. 
6 
• Control the controller – engage in principal- 
agent problem 
• Expand the decision-making context: 
o Expand physical boundaries of the 
decision-making context 
o Expand representation in terms of 
decision-makers and public 
preference 
o Expand decision-support 
mechanisms 
 
7 
Uncertainty whether 
public should 
participate in long-term 
strategic water 
management 
8 
• Public compliance 
• Risk of  “dictatorship of the 
uninformed” 
 
9 
• Investigate public participation in long-term 
water resource management. 
 
 
10 
Uncertain how public 
should participate in 
water resource 
management 
11 
• Risk of low response rates. 
• Objective public enquiry 
 
12 
• Promote simple communication of a complex 
problem. 
• Transparency of the process will avoid 
expert and political critique regarding bias 
and rejection based on perceived bias in 
modus operandi of obtaining public opinion. 
 
The market as allocation mechanism for natural resources does suffice for individual allocation 
decision-making, but cannot account for bulk resource allocation while simultaneously promoting 
social welfare maximisation (Block 1).  One of the main reasons for this is that bulk-water 
infrastructure, as a public good, is often an example of market failure (Block 2) because market 
solutions to the allocation problem are the summation of the outcome of individual preference 
orderings (refer to the work of Kennith Arrow and the “impossibility theorem” (Arrow, 1951; 
Arrow, 1984a; Arrow, 1984b)).  To present such an allocation as an optimal social allocation would 
be wrong since the individual market player did not aim his participatory behaviour towards social 
welfare but merely towards promoting his own.  The market solution to the allocation problem is, 
therefore, merely an alternative allocation and cannot claim to maximise social welfare.  Even if 
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some altruistic behaviour is allowed, the market will still not promote social welfare because the 
individual decision-maker (market participant) is inherently limited by his personal preference 
ordering.  This implies a faulty, telescopic view of resource allocation from the individual’s 
perspective, which consequently, does not promote social welfare maximisation.  A need, therefore, 
emerges for government interference (Block 3) in accounting for market failures in the case of 
public goods to maximise social welfare. 
 
However, government failures in terms of resource allocation can and do occur (Block 4), amongst 
others due to hidden agendas and the admissibility of own discretion, often leading to the misuse of 
power.  A narrow decision-making context owing to the measurement problem and under-
representation in management committees could also be put forward (Block 5) for such failures.  A 
need is, therefore, created to “control the controller” (Block 6) in order to ensure that government 
intervention promotes social welfare maximisation.  This study suggests broadening the decision-
making context in terms of temporal and spatial dimensions to partially satisfy this need.  
Consequently, decision-support techniques also need to be expanded.  Temporal expansion could be 
implemented by considering sequences of supply augmentation schemes over time instead of 
different schemes at the same time.  Spatial expansions could be implemented by expanding the 
physical decision-making boundary to include rural areas adjacent to the CCT and the BWMA.  
Expansion of this nature implies an expansion in representation from management and the public, 
leading to greater accommodation of public preferences. (i.e. these parties’ preferences need to be 
consulted and not assumed).  Expansions as contemplated above, thus, have significant impacts on 
the information load of decision-making and the decision-making criteria used in the process. 
 
It is, however, uncertain whether the public should indeed be consulted with regard to long-term 
strategic water management issues (Block 7).  Long-term water resource management has become a 
specialized and complex field, and the relative legitimacy of involving the general public in this 
type of situation becomes questionable (Block 8).  However, upon investigation of the impacts of 
accommodating public preferences in strategic decision-making, evidence from the literature 
suggests tapping into public preference for water resource management (Block 9).  
 
The exact methodology of public enquiry to obtain a legitimate answer is still uncertain (Block 10).  
Uncertainty refers to the objective representation of management options and the achievement of 
acceptable response rates from public enquiry without attracting criticism regarding bias concerning 
management options.  The public is not an expert in long-term management, and care should, 
therefore, be taken not to lead public preferences (Block 11).  An acceptable response rate could be 
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achieved through simple communication of a complex problem.  However, this requires advanced 
insight in the management problem and a limitation of relevant information.  Transparency in the 
public enquiry process will avoid expert and political critique regarding bias.  This implies that 
politicians and experts should buy into the public enquiry process from the inception stage. 
 
The main objectives of the study could be summarised as follows: 
• Decision-support techniques need to be expanded, refined and applied in a broader context 
to safeguard against the measurement problem.   
• A need was identified to determine how and to what extent public opinion should be 
accommodated in long-term water resource management. This is because effective 
communication lies at the heart of successful contracting, and at present a reversed 
principal-agent relationship was found to exist between public and water management 
authorities in the BWMA. Questions regarding the rationale of simplifying complex 
problems, such as strategic water management, and presenting such questions to the public 
in order to obtain public preferences, came to the fore. 
• The importance of the political process running parallel to such exercises must be 
acknowledged and accommodated – it should be made as transparent and tangible as 
possible. 
 
To summarise, the measurement problem leads to market and government failures in managing the 
allocation of natural resources.  Decision-support techniques, including multi-criteria decision-
making (MCDM), are employed to aid in this regard, but they need to be refined to allow the 
confident capturing of longer-term management impacts in the broader decision-making context.  
This study engages in such refinement, specifically in terms of the spatial and temporal dimensions 
of the resource allocation decision-making context.  Such expansions have direct impacts on the 
information load of resource allocation decision-making as well expansions of decision-support 
techniques.  It should be clear that a systems thinking approach is called for, with MCDM being 
only part of an integrated management approach to long-term water allocation management.  
MCDM should certainly not be seen as a fail-safe method to ensure that all parties’ welfare will be 
maximised, but rather as a method of making the water management process more tangible through 
making risks and uncertainties more explicit.   
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1.3 Chapter layout 
 
The dissertation is presented in six chapters, a list of references and six annexures.  The first chapter 
served as a general introduction and as a structuring and orientation of the research problem.  It is 
followed by Chapter 2, which is a discussion of water resource management in the BWMA with 
regard to important demographics, water balance and future augmentation options for the area.  The 
chapter also applies the research problem to the BWMA and discusses water management in the 
BWMA.  Chapter 3 provides the theoretical foundation of the research problem.  Short overviews 
of market and government resource allocation structures are given, followed by a discussion on 
public participation and decision-support techniques in resource allocation management.  Chapter 4 
develops the proposed expansions to decision-support techniques to account to a greater extent for 
the research problem.  Expansions in the temporal and spatial dimensions of the decision-making 
context are discussed in detail as are details regarding two surveys, which played an important role 
in such expansions.  Chapter 5 presents the outcomes of the two enquiry processes as well as the 
main contributions of the process.  The last chapter consists of the conclusions, summary and 
recommendations for future research. 
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2. WATER MANAGEMENT IN THE BWMA 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 1 structured the research problem and provided the theoretical line of logic for application 
in the remainder of the study.  However, the problem needs to be “grounded” or contextualised in 
physical terms to provide a framework for its application; failure to do this would cause the problem 
to “hang in the air” and would prevent generalised conclusions from being drawn from the 
outcomes. 
 
This chapter fulfils the aforesaid requirement by describing the basics of bulk-water resource 
management in the BWMA.  Section 2.2 presents the relevant demographics of the BWMA while 
Section 2.3 describes the water balance situation consisting of a detailed breakdown of current 
supply infrastructure (Western Cape Supply System – WCSS) and demand figures.  Future demand 
estimations are discussed as well as possible augmentation schemes to meet growing demand.  
Section 2.4 applies the measurement problem to the BWMA, and Section 2.5 discusses the current 
management of the area in terms of allocation management, the rationale of following an integrated 
approach and the political process of water management in the BWMA. 
 
2.2 Demographic orientation 
 
South Africa has an uneven spatial distribution and significant inter- and intra-seasonal variations of 
rainfall over almost the entire country.  With an average rainfall of only 450 mm per year, the 
country falls well short of the 860mm world average (Western Cape Department of Agriculture, 
2005:110-113).  The country could therefore be seen as a water-scarce region with 10 of the 19 
water management areas (see Figure 2) facing water deficits (Department of Water Affairs and 
Forestry, 2004c:3).  The population distribution of South Africa does not correlate with the 
distribution of water, mostly because of historical motivations (for example, the discovery of gold).  
The water requirements of urban and densely populated regions tend to exceed the supply of water, 
although a small surplus still exists for the country as a whole.  Surface water features as the main 
source of water in South Africa with a combined discharge of approximately 49000 million cubic 
metres per year (Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 2004c:20), which is approximately 141 
times smaller (in terms of its mean annual discharge) compared to the Amazon river. 
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Figure 2:  Water management areas and provincial boundaries of South Africa 
Source:  (Western Cape Department of Agriculture, 2005) 
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The BWMA is water management area number 19 in South Africa (see Figure 2) and is situated in 
the Western-Cape Province of South Africa (see Figure 3 more detail on the Western Cape).   
 
 
 
Figure 3:  District municipal boundaries in the Western Cape province 
Source:  (Western Cape Department of Agriculture, 2005) 
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The BWMA is presented in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4:  The Berg Water Management Area 
Source:  (Basson and Rossouw, 2003) 
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The BWMA is sub-divided into eight smaller management areas (see Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5:  Eight sub-areas of the BWMA 
Source:  (Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 2004b) 
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The BWMA is characterized by a Mediterranean climate and historically strong deterministic water 
supply (winter rainfall) from April to August.  The average rainfall is 348mm per year, which is 
lower than the average of 450mm per year for the whole of South Africa.  The area is, therefore, 
prone to seasonal droughts.  Geographic variation in rainfall is significant, ranging between 3000 
mm per year in the mountainous areas of Stellenbosch to less than 300 mm per year in the 
northwest of the area (see Figure 6).  The BWMA has a MAR of 1429 million cubic metres per 
annum (see Table 2), the bulk of which (see Figure 6) derives from the mountainous east and 
southeast areas.  Most of the inflows to bulk storage dams take place during winter when 90 percent 
of the annual runoff occurs, and water demands comprise only 30 percent of the annual demand 
(Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 2004a).  The summer months of November to February, 
are warm and dry, and are characterized by high evaporation losses, increased irrigation demands 
and small inflows.  Approximately half of the storage capacity is required to meet the high summer 
demand with the difference remaining for long-term carry over storage.  The area is, therefore, 
prone to water restrictions with storage levels dropping to the minimum during March/April.  An 
annual water audit is done during November when decisions regarding the alleviation of water 
restrictions are taken. 
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Figure 6:  Mean annual precipitation in the Western Cape 
Source:  (Western Cape Department of Agriculture, 2005) 
 
Table 2:  Natural MAR and ecological reserve for the BWMA  
 Natural MAR (Mkl/a) Reserve (Mkl/a) 
CCT 373 61 
Upper Berg 849 124 
Lower Berg 207 32 
Total BWA 1429 217 
 
Source:  (Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 2004a) 
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A strong and diversified economy exists in the BWMA.  The economy is dominated by the 
manufacturing, transport and service sectors, which are mainly situated in the CCT, but with close 
linkages particularly to agriculture (see Figure 7).  The region has a population of approximately 3 
482 000 people and accounts for approximately 86 percent of the provincial gross regional product 
(Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 2004a; Statistics South Africa, 2005).   
 
The CCT, which is one of the major metropolitan cities and tourist destinations in South Africa, is 
the main water-user in the BWMA.  The city comprises an area of approximately 2 500 km2 with a 
population estimated at 2,6 million (Statistics South Africa, 2005).  The deciduous fruit and 
viticulture industries are the main irrigated agricultural activities in the mountainous east and 
southeast areas.  Moving to the central regions northwest of Paarl, Malmesbury and Moorreesburg 
this shifts to extensive rain-fed wheat cultivation (see Figure 7). 
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Figure 7:  CCT land cover, Western Cape 
Source:  (Basson and Rossouw, 2003) 
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2.3 Water balance in the BWMA 
 
The water balance of the region is determined by the difference between the supply and the demand 
for the resource.  Numerous factors, which are mainly derived from the determinants of supply and 
demand, can influence the water balance.  The following section discusses water balance as well as 
future augmentation options in the BWMA. 
 
2.3.1 Supply in the BWMA 
 
One of the most important motivations of water distribution infrastructure development is supplying 
water and securing an acceptably high level of assurance of its supply.  Maintaining a high level of 
surety of water supply is also enforced by law in South Africa (National Water Act, 1998:33).  The 
economic development of a city depends on the adequate supply of safe water for industry and 
agricultural production in the surrounding areas.  A lack of, or inadequate provision of, safe water 
and sanitation services results in poor living conditions, which significantly increases the risk of 
poor health among the rural and urban poor.   
 
The bulk-water supply infrastructure in the BWMA is called the Western Cape Supply System 
(WCSS) (see Figure 8).  Apart from numerous smaller rural and on-farm storage dams, this is the 
main system supplying the BWMA with serviced water. It is jointly owned by the local Department 
of Water Affairs and Forestry, the CCT and various district municipalities.  All serviced water is 
bought in bulk from the local Department of Water Affairs and Forestry.  It should be made clear 
that almost all urban demand in the BWMA is serviced by the Western Cape Supply System, while 
agricultural irrigation demand is supplied by irrigation boards (linked to the WCSS) and 
supplemented by privately owned dams or own on-farm supplies. 
 
Surface water comprises 57 percent (404 Mkl/a) of total annual supply (approximately 709 Mkl/a) 
to the BWMA.  Large quantities (up to 27 percent of total annual supply or 191 Mkl/a) of water are 
transferred to the BWMA from the adjacent Breede Water Management Area via the 
Riviersonderend/Berg River Scheme (Theewaterskloof dam) and the Palmiet Pumped Storage 
Scheme (see Steenbras dam) (see Figure 8).  Ground-water supplies, abstracted mainly in the 
central and western parts of the water management area, account for 8 percent (57 Mkl/a) of total 
annual supply (Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 2004d:96).  The remainder consists of 
useable return flows and estimated potential gains from alien removal. 
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Figure 8:  The Western Cape Supply System 
Source: (Ninham Shand, 2002; Shand et al., 2003) 
 
The main storage schemes in the Western Cape Supply System are the Theewaterskloof scheme, 
Voëlvlei scheme, Wemmershoek scheme, Upper- and Lower- Steenbras schemes and the Berg 
Water Project (currently under construction).  These schemes are operated in an integrated manner 
to maximise available storage for use in times of drought.  This is made possible through linking the 
schemes to mitigate the effects of droughts by minimising spillages and wastages during the wet 
season and by restricting the supply for less essential uses during droughts (Department of Water 
Affairs and Forestry, 2004d).  The storage capacity and ownership of the Western Cape Water 
Supply System is summarised in Table 3.  It is important to differentiate between capacity and yield 
of the schemes; capacity refers to the gross capacity before spillage, while yield refers to the 
determined average total volume obtained/used from the particular scheme during one season.  
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Table 3:  The main water supply schemes of the WCSS 
Scheme Gross 
Capacity 
(Mm3) 
Net System 
1:50 Year 
Yield (Mm3/a) 
Owner User 
Palmiet 
Kogelberg 
Rockview 
 
17 
17 
 
22 
 
DWAF; 
ESKOM 
 
CCT; ESKOM 
Upper Steenbras  32 
Lower Steenbras  34 
40 CCT CCT 
Wemmershoek 59 54 CCT CCT; Drakenstein 
Voëlvlei 172 105 DWAF CCT; West Coast; 
Irrigators 
Theewaterskloof 480 219 DWAF CCT; Stellenbosch; 
Irrigators 
TOTAL EXISTING 811 440   
Berg Water Project 
Supplement 
127 56 
25 
TCTA CCT; Irrigators; 
Overberg 
TOTAL 938 521   
Source:  (Kleynhans, 2002a; Ninham Shand, 2002; Shand et al., 2003) 
 
The latest addition to the WCSS is the Berg Water Project (BWP) which is a R1878 M (2005) 
project with the Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority (TCTA) appointed as management authority 
(Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 1997; Trans Caledon Tunnel Authority, 2005).  It is 
estimated that the project will be completed in time to receive 2007 inflows (see Figure 7).  Various 
other smaller schemes supply the CCT area (refer to Table 4).  Their combined yield is estimated at 
13 Mm3/a. 
 
Table 4:  Small water supply schemes in the CCT 
Scheme Catchment Capacity Treatment plant 
Hely Hutchinson Dam Disa River, Table Mountain 0,95 Mm3 Kloofnek plant 
Woodhead Dam Disa River, Table Mountain 0,93 Mm3 Kloofnek plant 
Victoria Dam Disa River, Table Mountain 0,13 Mm3 Constantianek plant 
Alexandra Dam Disa River, Table Mountain 0,13 Mm3 Constantianek plant 
De Villiers Dam Disa River, Table Mountain 0,24 Mm3 Constantianek plant 
Kleinplaas Dam Woel River, Simons Town 1,36 Mm3 Brooklands plant 
Lewis Gay Dam Woel River, Simons Town 0,18 Mm3 Brooklands plant 
Land-en-Zeezicht Dam Lourens River 0,45 Mm3 Somerset West 
Nantes Dam Paarl Mountain 0,82 Mm3 Paarl 
Bethel Dam Paarl Mountain 0,54 Mm3 Paarl 
Idas Valley Dam Eerste River 1,8 Mm3 Stellenbosch 
Source:  (Kleynhans, 2002a) 
 
Table 4 and Table 5 display raw-water supply to the WCSS.  Table 5 displays the treatment work 
capacities of the WCSS. 
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Table 5:  Main water treatment works of the WCSS 
Treatment works Source Capacity (Ml/day) 
Blackheath Riviersonderend inter-basin transfer scheme 400 
Faure Lower Steenbras Dam; Theewaterskloof Dam and Palmiet 
pumping scheme 
500 
Steenbras Lower Steenbras Dam 150 
Voëlvlei Voëlvlei Dam 273 
Wemmershoek Wemmershoek Dam 275 
Total capacity 1598 
Source:  (Kleynhans, 2002a) 
 
Table 6 summarises the WCSS and its wastewater infrastructure. 
 
Table 6:  Summary of the WCSS and wastewater infrastructure 
Supply infrastructure: Number Capacity/quantity Estimated replacement 
value (R million) 
Water treatment plants 13 1672 Ml/d 697 
Storage reservoirs 131 3539 Ml 887 
Pump stations 367 Unknown 234 
Pipe lines  9058 km 5459 
Major storage dams (excluding BWP) 5 780 Mm3 Unknown 
Sub total   7277 
Wastewater infrastructure    
Wastewater treatment plants 20 620 Ml/d 620 
Pump stations 320 190 kW 536 
Pipe lines  8549 km 2498 
Sub total   3655 
Total   10932 
Source:  (Ninham Shand, 2001) 
 
2.3.2 Demand in the BWMA 
 
Demand for water in the WCSS is similar to numerous other African cities, where demand exceeds 
water availability (Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 2003).  With the CCT being one of 
the main growth centres in South Africa, its strong economic and population growth is projected to 
continue, and this will affect future requirements for serviced water.  Historical and projected future 
water demands for the WCSS are shown in Table 7.  The projections are based on the following: 
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Economic growth and water demand growth are positively correlated, and given that the Western 
Cape province is one of the fastest growing economies in South Africa, it is expected that future 
water demands will increase. 
 
Water demand management will have significant impacts on water demand.  A saving of up to 20 
percent of current usage (2005) could be achieved within 10 years in accordance with the CCT’s 
water demand management policy and strategy (Sparks, 2001).  However, a diminishing marginal 
gain will be experienced as supply efficiency increases.  Demand management strategies have 
therefore an inherent limited ability to accommodate future demand.  Decreasing growth in 
irrigation demand will start to emerge as allocations from existing government water schemes 
become fully utilised.  Urban and industrial growth along the West Coast will drive the growth in 
urban demand in spite of the implementation of various water demand management options.  
Additional supply will therefore be needed. 
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Table 7:  Water demand estimation for the WCSS rationing-run July 20033 
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WRPM DC 51 68 272 39 70 273 10 271 27 49 47
Yield 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
1995 300 -15 285 4 10 2 25 9 20 2 9 0 31 38 17 54 2 9 8 223 78 301 114 415 -36 379 301 78 379
1996 297 -15 282 4 10 2 19 8 20 2 7 0 30 34 17 51 2 9 3 220 77 298 102 399 -36 363 297 71 368
1997 307 -19 288 5 10 1 23 10 20 2 4 0 27 20 17 36 1 5 5 225 79 304 84 388 -36 352 305 52 357
1998 313 -15 298 5 12 1 22 23 27 2 14 0 44 36 17 52 1 9 4 235 82 317 133 450 -36 414 321 101 422
1999 328 -10 318 6 13 4 18 20 21 2 16 1 41 43 17 59 2 17 3 252 89 341 142 483 -36 447 344 111 455
2000 332 -10 323 7 15 4 21 41 15 3 10 0 28 43 17 59 2 17 3 258 91 348 151 499 -36 463 347 129 476
2001 287 -10 277 5 13 2 19 28 31 3 11 1 46 49 17 65 2 21 3 220 77 298 165 463 -36 427 354 132 486
2002 295 -10 285 5 11 1 18 28 26 3 9 2 39 27 17 43 2 14 2 224 79 303 128 431 -36 395 356 134 490
Max over 2001/03 7 15 4 21 41 31 3 11 2 46 49 17 65 2 21 3
2002/3 Allocations 6 22 3 20 18 31 4 13 2 50 49 17 65 2 18 4
Growth Rate 2% 6% 6% 2% 0% 0% 2% 2% 0% 0% 2% 2% 0% 2% 0% 2% 0%
Capping Value 999 99 99 99 20 18 32 99 13 2 145 59 17 75 2 24 4
2003 Projection 315 -14 301 6 22 3 20 18 31 4 13 2 50 49 17 65 2 18 4 245 86 331 156 488 -36 452 351 137 489
2003 Estimate 300? 5? 13? 3? ? 21? ? ? ? ? ? 49? 16?
2003 Selection 315 -14 301 5 14 3 20 21 31 4 13 2 50 49 17 66 2 18 4 239 84 323 160 483 -36 447 356 134 490
2005 321 -14 307 6 15 3 20 21 31 4 13 2 50 50 17 66 2 18 4 245 86 331 162 493 -36 457 351 140 491
2006 328 -14 314 6 16 3 20 21 32 4 13 2 50 51 17 67 2 19 4 250 88 338 163 502 -36 466 351 140 491
2007 334 -14 320 6 17 3 20 21 32 4 13 2 50 52 17 68 2 19 4 256 90 346 165 511 -36 475 351 140 491
2008 341 -14 327 7 18 3 20 21 32 4 13 2 51 53 17 70 2 19 4 262 92 355 166 521 -36 485 351 140 491
2009 348 -14 334 7 19 3 20 21 32 4 13 2 51 54 17 71 2 20 4 269 94 363 168 531 -36 495 351 140 491
2010 355 -14 341 8 20 3 20 21 32 5 13 2 51 55 17 72 2 20 4 275 97 371 170 541 -36 505 351 140 491
2011 362 -14 348 8 21 3 20 21 32 5 13 2 51 56 17 73 2 21 4 281 99 380 171 551 -36 515 351 140 491
2012 369 -14 355 9 22 4 20 21 32 5 13 2 51 57 17 74 2 21 4 288 101 389 173 562 -36 526 351 140 491
2013 376 -14 362 9 24 4 20 21 32 5 13 2 51 59 17 75 2 22 4 295 104 399 174 573 -36 537 351 140 491
2014 384 -14 370 10 25 4 20 21 32 5 13 2 51 59 17 75 2 22 4 302 106 408 175 583 -36 547 351 140 491
2015 392 -14 378 10 26 4 20 21 32 5 13 2 51 59 17 75 2 22 4 309 109 418 176 593 -36 557 351 140 491
2016 399 -14 385 11 28 4 20 21 32 5 13 2 51 59 17 75 2 23 4 317 111 428 176 604 -36 568 351 140 491
2017 407 -14 393 11 30 4 20 21 32 5 13 2 51 59 17 75 2 23 4 324 114 438 177 615 -36 579 351 140 491
2018 416 -14 402 12 31 4 20 21 32 5 13 2 51 59 17 75 2 24 4 332 117 449 177 626 -36 590 351 140 491
2019 424 -14 410 13 33 4 20 21 32 5 13 2 52 59 17 75 2 24 4 341 120 460 178 638 -36 602 351 140 491
2020 432 -14 418 14 35 4 20 21 32 5 13 2 52 59 17 75 2 24 4 349 123 471 178 649 -36 613 351 140 491
2021 441 -14 427 14 37 4 20 21 32 6 13 2 52 59 17 75 2 24 4 358 126 483 178 661 -36 625 351 140 491
2022 450 -14 436 15 40 4 20 21 32 6 13 2 52 59 17 75 2 24 4 366 129 495 178 673 -36 637 351 140 491
2023 459 -14 445 16 42 4 20 21 32 6 13 2 52 59 17 75 2 24 4 376 132 508 178 686 -36 650 351 140 491
2024 468 -14 454 17 45 4 20 21 32 6 13 2 52 59 17 75 2 24 4 385 135 520 178 699 -36 663 351 140 491
2025 477 -14 463 18 47 5 20 21 32 6 13 2 52 59 17 75 2 24 4 395 139 533 178 712 -36 676 351 140 491
2026 487 -14 473 19 50 5 20 21 32 6 13 2 52 59 17 75 2 24 4 405 142 547 178 725 -36 689 351 140 491
2027 497 -14 483 20 53 5 20 21 32 6 13 2 53 59 17 75 2 24 4 415 146 561 179 740 -36 704 351 140 491
2028 507 -14 493 22 56 5 20 21 32 6 13 2 53 59 17 75 2 24 4 426 150 575 179 754 -36 718 351 140 491
Other scenarios
Metro (note 1) Other Urban Voelvlei Riviersonderend Urban + Agric WDM (Note 7)  Berg Eerste Urban
Year ending 31st 
Oct
Urban Largely Agricultural Selected Totals
Ag
ric
u
ltu
ra
l
 
Source:  (Sparks, 2003; Sparks, 2005) 
 
Annexure 1 displays an example of water demand estimations done for the WCSS.  It should be 
noted that urban demand is significantly greater than agricultural demand.  Similar estimations are 
done on a regular basis.  A clear distinction should also be made between water usage in the WCSS 
water service area and total water usage in the BWMA, since not all irrigation usage is distributed 
through the WCSS, while all water supplied to urban areas in the BWMA is distributed through the 
WCSS.  It is estimated that up to 74 percent of the WCSS goes to urban use, while the difference 
(26 percent) is allocated to agricultural use (see Table 7). 
                                                
3
 Note 1: Metro includes treated water supplied to Paarl and Wellington. 
Note 2:  Riviersonderend IB releases includes 3,18 Mkl/a compensation and losses. 
Note 3: Withoogte abstraction at Misverstand assumed 21,75 = 17,4*0,75(exclude 3 months winter flow)/0,75(25 percent losses) + 17,4 *0,25(winter 
component from run of river). 
Note 4: Historical supply to Berg River Irrigators was 27 Mkl/a which is greater than their 18,1 allocation. 
Note 5: Eerste River IB releases include 1,5 Mkl/a compensation. 
Note 6: Comprising compensations of 31,8 Mkl/a + 4 million m3/a of run of river water abstracted from Misverstand Dam during winter. 
Note 7: See (Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 1991; Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 1994; Louw and Kassier, 2002; Shand et 
al., 2003; Sparks, 2001) 
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Figure 9 presents the expected long-term growth in demand for the WCSS.  It assumes a less than 
0.5 percent growth in demand for agricultural use, while a 2 percent growth rate for urban demand 
is used (Killick, 2006; Kleynhans, 2002a; Sparks, 2003; Sparks, 2005).  Stabilisation in demand 
after 1999 was the result of strict water demand management, which came into being during the 
commencement of the Integrated Water Resource Planning (IWRP) study (Du Plessis et al., 2001). 
Water restrictions, (although strictly speaking not a water demand management strategy), in 
particular, decreased demand.  Even though the BWMA features as one of the more efficient water 
management areas in the Western Cape, a significant margin for efficiency gains still exists in 
irrigated agriculture, especially with regard to the maintenance and operational management of 
irrigation systems (Roux, 2005a; Roux, 2005b).  Demand management strategies will dampen 
increases in growth only temporarily because as demand grows over time (as a result of external 
drivers of demand) the initial gains of the demand management strategies are taken up.  
Consequently, alternative supplies will be needed to increase the total yield capacity of the system 
to ensure an acceptable level of assurance of supply. 
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Figure 9:  Water balance for the BWMA 
Source:  (Killick, 2006; Kleynhans, 2002a; Ninham Shand, 2001) 
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Figure 9 displays the supply capacity (yellow line) of the Western Cape System.  According to the 
projections, the addition of the BWP in 2007 will only realise a maximum of four to six years of 
surplus capacity after which additional supply will again be needed. 
 
Table 8 confirms that, even with effective water demand management, existing supplies to the 
region are likely to bring about an increasing need for restrictions until the BWP is completed and 
that additional sources of supply will be required as early as 2012 to 2013. 
 
Table 8:  Comparison of demand and supply in the WCSS 
Year Estimated demand 
(Mkl/a) 
Estimated supply 
(Mkl/a) 
Potential shortage 
(Mkl/a) 
2003 452 440 12 
2007 493 440 53 
2009 515 5214 Nil 
2020 641 521 120 
Source:  (Shand et al., 2003) 
 
The maintenance of a high level of assurance of supply level for urban use is the highest priority for 
all service providers in the BWMA.  Current resources struggle to meet the required 98 percent 
assurance of supply level implying that a need for the development of additional water resources 
will become a matter of urgency by 2012.  Since the implementation of bulk-water supply projects 
can take up to 10 years from feasibility study level to completion, it is essential that future supply 
projects be confirmed as soon as possible in order for the CCT and other water service providers to 
plan accordingly for the conveyance and treatment of water.     
 
2.3.3 Future augmentation schemes 
 
It has been shown that demand management strategies will not be able to cater for future increases 
in demand in the WCSS and that it will be necessary to augment supply capacity by developing 
additional water sources in the near future.  Increased demand is mainly due to the main drivers of 
demand (De Lange, 2005; Killick, 2006; Mostert, 2004; Sparks, 2005): 
 
• Population demographics (including urbanisation); 
                                                
4
 After the completion of the BWP. 
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• Economic growth demands more water; 
• Climatic changes in long-term rainfall patterns impact on surface flows and drainage; 
• Pollution decreases usable volumes. 
 
Numerous studies have been undertaken on developing future augmentation schemes for the 
WCSS.  The Western Cape Reconciliation Study (WCRS) is currently investigating the 
development of future strategies to reconcile projected water demands with supply from the WCSS 
(Thompson, 2005).  This study builds on the Western Cape System Analysis (WCSA) (Department 
of Water Affairs and Forestry, 1991; Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 1993), the IWRP 
study (Du Plessis et al., 2001) and the Cape Metropolitan Area Bulk Water Supply (CMABWS) 
study (Eberhard and Joubert, 2002; Kleynhans, 2002a; Kleynhans, 2002b) that were undertaken 
between 1989 and 2002, at which time various alternative methods of augmenting the water supply 
were investigated. 
 
These studies emphasized the use of a combination of demand and supply strategies for water 
management in the BWMA and the CCT.  Their recommendations concerning demand 
management options have been presented to the CCT city council. Subsequently, a number of these 
strategies have been incorporated into the Council’s water demand management strategy.  Various 
alternative supply augmentation schemes were analysed, some at feasibility level, but most at pre-
feasibility level (see Table 9). 
 
A decision to go ahead with a detailed design for the Voëlvlei augmentation scheme Phase 1 has 
been put on hold even though it was ranked quite high in Eberhard and Joubert (2002) and Joubert 
et al. (2003) pending further information on what allocations will be made to the CCT from the 
BWP.  A pilot project for the development of the Table Mountain Group Aquifer (TMGA) was also 
given the go-ahead in 2005.  This will involve the drilling of several test boreholes in order to better 
assess the true viability of the option (City of Cape Town Administration, 2003a; City of Cape 
Town Administration, 2003b; City of Cape Town Administration, 2004a; City of Cape Town 
Administration, 2004b; City of Cape Town Administration, 2004c).  A feasibility study on 
desalination as a supply option was also given the go-ahead, signalling the possibility of 
implementing this option in the near future (Kleynhans and Schutte, 2002; Thompson, 2005). 
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Table 9:  Future supply augmentation schemes in the WCSS 
Scheme Study 
Berg river project (Skuifraam dam) (Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 1997; 
Ninham Shand, 2001) 
Brandvlei transfer scheme (City of Cape Town, 2002; Joubert et al., 2003; 
Kleynhans, 2002a; Ninham Shand, 2001) 
Molenaars diversion (City of Cape Town, 2002; Kleynhans, 2002a) 
Table Mountain Group aquifer (City of Cape Town, 2003a; City of Cape Town, 
2003b; City of Cape Town, 2004a; City of Cape 
Town, 2004b; City of Cape Town, 2004c; 
Kleynhans, 2002a) 
Voëlvlei augmentation scheme Phase 1 (Kleynhans, 2002a; Ninham Shand, 2001) 
Voëlvlei augmentation scheme Phases 2 and 3 (City of Cape Town, 2002; Ninham Shand, 2001) 
Steenbras augmentation scheme (Kleynhans, 2002b; Ninham Shand, 2001) 
Eerste river diversion (City of Cape Town, 2002; Du Plessis et al., 2001; 
Ninham Shand, 2001) 
Lourens river diversion (Du Plessis et al., 2001; Kleynhans, 2002b) 
Cape Flats aquifer (Du Plessis et al., 2001; Kleynhans, 2002b) 
Desalination of seawater (Kleynhans, 2002a; Kleynhans and Schutte, 2002; 
Shand et al., 2003; Thompson, 2005) 
Treated wastewater for local irrigation and industrial use (Du Plessis et al., 2001; Kleynhans, 2002a) 
Treated wastewater for commercial irrigation (Du Plessis et al., 2001; Kleynhans, 2002a) 
Treatment of wastewater to potable standard (Du Plessis et al., 2001; Kleynhans, 2002a) 
 
Most of the above-mentioned projects are currently under review in the Western Cape 
Reconciliation Study (Thompson, 2005).  The yields and comparative unit reference values (URV5) 
of potential future supply schemes are shown in Table 10. 
 
                                                
5
 The URV is seen as the standard financial comparative variable for bulk supply schemes (Kleynhans, 2005; Shand, 2005). 
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Table 10:  Comparison of selected future water supply options 
Management options Potential yield 
(Mm3/a) 
URV 
(R/kl) 
Located 
outside CCT 
Water demand management options: 
             Pressure control 
             User education 
             Leakage repair 
             Tariff adjustments 
             Water efficient fittings 
 
17 
10 
16 
10 
10 
 
0,23 
0,5 
0,19 
N/A 
0,31 
 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
Surface water: 
 Lourens river 
 Voëlvlei Phase 1 
 Eerste river 
Raise Steenbras + Palmiet dams 
Voëlvlei Phase 2 
Voëlvlei Phase 3 
Raise Misverstand weir 
Upper Molenaars diversion 
Brandvlei –Theewaterskloof tunnel 
 
19 
35 
8 
45 
30 
125 
30 
27 
41 
 
0,46 
0,53 
1,06 
unknown 
unknown 
unknown 
unknown 
0,82 
1,14 
 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Groundwater: 
 Cape Flats aquifer 
 TMG aquifer 
 
18 
80 (exp) 
 
1,13 
1,00 
 
No 
Yes 
Effluent re-use: 
 Local irrigation and industrial 
 Commercial irrigation exchange 
 Potable standard 
 
11 
5 
46 
 
0,80 
1,62 
3,10 
 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
Desalination of seawater Unlimited 7,55 No 
Source:  Adapted from (Shand et al., 2003) 
 
Table 10 indicates that a number of the supply augmentation schemes will supply water from 
outside the CCT municipal boundaries to the city (see discussions on this issue in Sections 2.4 and 
2.5). 
 
Some of the most important conclusions of the IWRP and the CMABWS studies are listed below 
(Du Plessis et al., 2001:53-60; Kleynhans, 2002a): 
 
• Water demand management options, such as pressure management, user education, 
elimination of automatic flushing urinals, leakage repairs, tariff changes, metering and credit 
control, and water-efficient fittings are highly cost-effective and should be implemented. 
• The development of private boreholes and grey-water use by private individuals are less cost 
effective, and grey-water has potential health hazards, especially from the Cape Flats 
aquifer. 
• The raising of Lower Steenbras Dam will provide significant additional storage in the 
BWMA and some improvement in yield, but it is likely to be costly and will have some 
environmental impacts, particularly if additional water is abstracted from the Palmiet river. 
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• The raising of Misverstand weir will have an impact on the in-stream and estuarine flow 
requirements.  Water quality might also be compromised. 
• The Voëlvlei Phase 1 augmentation scheme appears to be a favourable option. 
• The Voëlvlei Phase 2 scheme will entail raising Voëlvlei dam and increasing diversions into 
the dam.  Also, potential algal problems might have an impact on the viability of this option. 
• The Cape Flats aquifer is sited in an urban area with concomitant pollution risks and 
operating problems. 
• The TMGA appears to have potential.  The main concern is that major abstractions will face 
resistance from environmental groups. 
• The diversion of Lourens river floodwater into Paardevlei and Faure water treatment works 
appears to be cost effective and viable. 
• The Eerste river flood diversion to the Faure water treatment works will be a less viable and 
cost-effective option. 
• The Upper Molenaars diversion, which will comprise a pump station adjacent to the 
Molenaars river at the Huguenot tunnel will utilise the existing pipeline laid through the 
tunnel.  Water will be delivered into the Berg river dam or Wemmershoek dam.  This 
scheme will be more expensive, but might still be viable. 
• The Brandvlei-Theewaterskloof transfer scheme will augment the inflow into Brandvlei dam 
by increasing the capacity of the existing Papenkuils pump station.  A canal, pipeline and 
pump stations will deliver the water into Theewaterskloof dam. 
• Three options for re-using treated wastewater were examined: 
o Re-use for local urban irrigation and industrial use is cost-effective and should be 
implemented; although, health issues are of concern. 
o Reclamation for potable standard would be relatively expensive.  Health risks are 
also a concern as well as possible social and religious objections. 
o The exchange of treated wastewater for freshwater from irrigators would be viable 
but would require a buy-in from irrigators and might pose health risks and cause 
adverse international perceptions.  It might also harm the soil in the long-term. 
• Desalination is still expensive relative to other options. 
• Integrated management of the existing water resources together with the BWP, when this is 
completed, is essential. 
• Urban demands are likely to continue to grow in the medium- to long-term even with 
intensive water demand management measures in place. 
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• Because it could take up to 10 years or more for studies, approvals and implementation of a 
new scheme, timely planning of future water schemes is essential to ensure that there is an 
adequate supply of water to sustain the economic hub of the Western Cape. 
 
Given the above-mentioned, future demands can probably be met as indicated in Table 11. 
 
Table 11:  Proposed future supply schemes for the WCSS 
 
 
 
 
Source:  (Shand, 2005; Shand et al., 2003) 
 
Apart from the expense of developing bulk-water supply schemes, additional expenses will be 
incurred in developing and maintaining the distribution network over the next 12 to 15 years (see 
Table 12). 
 
Table 12:  Additional outlays for the WCSS (excluding bulk storage schemes) 
Item Cost (R million) 
Raw water pipelines 47,4 
Additional water treatment plant capacity 140,2 
Bulk-system pipelines 678,2 
Additional pump capacity 34,4 
Additional storage capacity 213 
Other 29,8 
Water resource development costs (6 years) 115 
Total 1269,3 
Source:  (Kleynhans, 2002a; Kleynhans, 2002b) 
 
It should, thus, be clear that considerable capital outlays will be needed to safeguard a 98 percent 
assurance of supply level in the WCSS. 
 
2.4 Applying the measurement problem to the BWMA 
 
It has been indicated that the demand for water in the BWMA will grow in the long-term.  Limited 
conventional water supply alternatives combined with the impact of climate change places the 
2003 - 2008 Existing schemes, supplemented by water demand management 
2008 - 2010 Existing schemes plus BWP 
2010 - 2020 Introduction of a number of additional schemes, including grey-water re-
use, surface water and groundwater schemes (see Table 10)  
2030 Above plus desalination of seawater 
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WCSS at risk of experiencing serious water shortages in the longer term.  Such concern regarding 
the long-term impacts of supplying the WCSS from adjacent rural areas is by no means unique.  
Semi-arid urban areas throughout the world often face demand outstripping supply because of the 
external drivers of demand (population demographics, economic growth, climate change, pollution 
and also equity considerations).  In the Middle-East, for example, Jordan recently investigated the 
viability of seawater desalination as an alternative water supply solution for its Aqaba Special 
Economic Zone (Dweiri and Badran, 2003).  The Murray-Darling basin in Australia was subjected 
to an investigation regarding the potential socio-economic gains of additional in-stream flows 
(Pinge, 2002).  The American state Minnesota went through a long-term drought planning and 
water allocation exercise (Pirie et al., 2004).  Further examples of complexities regarding the 
impact of water management strategies in urban and rural areas may be found in New England 
(Massachusetts) (Ryan, 2002); Las Vegas (Stave, 2003); Pakistan (Van Steenbergen and Oliemans, 
2002) and Egypt (Wichelns, 2002) to name a few. 
 
Table 10 noted several bulk supply options lying outside of the municipal boundaries of the CCT 
and even outside the BWMA.  These options imply re-allocations of water resources from pre-
dominantly rural to urban areas. The measurement problem outlined in Section 1.1 suggests that re-
allocations are often done without acceptable consideration of the potential long-term impacts.  
Transfers could lead to resource allocations, which are contradictory to government policies of 
efficient but sustainable resource utilisation.  The tendency exists to first opt for “less expensive” 
supply options before considering “more expensive” options, such as desalination of seawater or 
recycling to potable standard (see Table 11).  Adopting a “less expensive” strategy could be 
justified by, firstly, avoiding the potential danger for decision-makers of making a politically 
unpopular decision (by opting for “more expensive” options), which would harm their own political 
positions, and secondly, by supporting the assumption that the current measuring techniques used 
yield a true and legitimate reflection of the total cost of proposed projects.  In the short-term, this 
strategy certainly seems rational from the decision maker’s perspective, but the question could be 
asked whether this is indeed an acceptable strategy in terms of social welfare maximisation and 
long-term sustainable resource utilisation.  Inadequate measuring techniques may be the cause of 
inaccurate information reaching decision makers, leading to faulty telescopic views and harming 
social welfare and sustainability on the long-term. 
 
Also, preference is given to the “highest and best use” argument in resource allocation decision-
making, especially in resource scarcity situations (maximising marginal benefit).  Given that the 
perceived value of water use in urban areas generally exceed rural use, a gradual re-allocation of 
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water from rural to urban areas is expected.  However, the difference in perceived value are not 
fully quantifiable and moslty not fully accounted.  Such a strategy, therefore, falls victim to the 
measurement problem as mentioned in Figure 1.  This is so because, although some developments 
in decision-support techniques focus on the valuation of long-term impacts of different schemes, 
such techniques are still unable to confidently quantify and draw all costs and benefits into project 
impact assessments.  The decision-making context is still too narrowly defined to account for all 
costs (and benefits) associated with bulk-allocation schemes.  For example, a significant number of 
schemes (see Table 10) lie outside the municipal boundaries of the CCT or even outside the 
BWMA.  Current decision support has too little appreciation of the socio-economic and 
environmental impacts of schemes that contain inter-municipal or inter-basin transfers.  It also does 
not satisfactorily account for considerations regarding the needed representation of such transfers – 
i.e. not all stakeholders are presented in the allocation decision-making process because the 
decision-making context is not defined broadly enough.  Associated difficulties regarding 
communication with stakeholders (e.g. the public) in rural areas also add to this problem.  
Numerous potential unaccounted for effects in water allocation decision-making are, therefore, 
currently a reality and could lead to negative impacts on adjacent regions of the CCT and even the 
BWMA. 
 
Decision support techniques, therefore, need to be refined and/or expanded to accommodate the 
measurement problem.  The problem at hand indicates complexity within a resource scarcity 
context. By adding the challenge of truly sustainable but equitable and efficient resource utilisation, 
the problem becomes even more complex.  Decision support techniques need to be adapted to 
capture considerations relevant in the broader decision-making environment.  Expansions and 
refinements in terms of spatial and time dimensions could aid in this regard (see Chapter 4). 
 
2.5 Managing the BWMA 
 
The question could be asked how management authorities accommodate the measurement problem 
as discussed in Section 2.4.  Water service authorities must promote an efficient but equitable and 
sustainable allocation of water in the BWMA (Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 2004c).  
Such an allocation is, for practical reasons, impossible to achieve but does, however, serve as a 
management guideline.  Given a budget constraint and the measurement problem, decision makers 
in the BWMA are challenged to opt for the water allocation option that will promote social welfare 
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maximisation (social welfare maximisation includes environmental conservation) without harming 
adjacent regions. 
 
Figure 10 presents a conceptual layout of broad bulk-water resource management strategies.  It 
holds that water resource management could be divided into allocation and quality management.  
Quality management focuses on the preservation of the inherent quality (usefulness) of the resource 
while allocation management manages the logistics of water – i.e. which water and how much of it 
should be allocated to which specific use at what time.   
 
Water allocation 
management
Market driven 
strategies
Water resource management
Command and 
control strategies
Water quality 
management
Demand 
management
Supply 
management
 
Figure 10:  A framework for bulk-water resource management 
Source:  (De Lange, 2005) 
 
Water resource managers apply marginal benefit and related concepts by turning to the market (see 
Figure 10) for water resource allocation, mistakenly seeing the competitive market as the ideal 
mechanism for allocating scarce water resources in the BWMA (Eberhard, 2003a:12-17; Pearce and 
Turner, 1991).  Neo-classical economics promote the market as allocation mechanism to resolve 
water allocation problems by leaning heavily on rationality6 (Pearce, 1993; Pearce and Turner, 
1991; Rosenhead and Mingers, 2002).  It holds that an efficient and equitable allocation of water 
                                                
6
 Contrasted by revealed preference theory (Mueller, 1997).  However, decision makers do not necessarily reveal their preferences through their 
choices (refer to the prisoner dilemma (Bergson, 1938; Bergson 1954; Little, 1949; Little, 1950), but also to the work of (Sen, 1977). 
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resources will be achieved if suitable market structures are in place (i.e. the assumptions of perfect 
competition).  However, frequent market failures occur in cases involving public goods, such as 
bulk-water supply infrastructures because market prices do not account for all the costs and benefits 
associated with such goods, especially not the benefits and costs related to socio-economics and the 
state of the environment.  High transaction costs, externalities and the faulty telescopic view of 
market participants also promote market failures (Blignaut and De Wit, 2004:55,66; Goodstein, 
1999:454).  The market also needs a large number of independent sellers and buyers, which is not 
always the case with tradable water use-rights in semi-arid areas like the BWMA.  The market is 
also criticised by theoretici like Arrow who has shown the impossibility of achieving an objective 
socially optimum allocation via any voting procedure (such as the market), because the individual 
vote/decision is a function of individual choices (Arrow, 1951; Arrow, 1984b).  To aggregate these 
choices to a social outcome, which was not evaluated by individuals in the first place may, 
therefore, be politically unpopular if tested.  The result is that no claims can be made that the market 
will realise a socially optimum water allocation. 
 
Market failures could, therefore, cause misallocations of water resources in terms of social welfare 
maximisation for the BWMA.  Proof can be found in the BWMA where the continuous approval of 
bulk-supply options outside the boundaries of the CCT (see Table 10) will re-allocate water from 
rural areas to the CCT, thereby disregarding the measurement problem as mentioned in Section 2.4.  
In such cases, re-allocations are promoted via a stronger effective demand of urban users. 
 
Indeed some margin is therefore created for government interference.  This implies that public trust 
is placed in bureaucrats and politicians to compensate for market failures (Buchanan and Tullock, 
1962; Mueller, 1997).  The bureaucracy of South Africa is used to motivate politicians to act in the 
best interests of the public.  This is based on the assumption that if elections are held with the risk 
of losing a parliamentary seat, politicians and service providers in the BWMA will indeed 
accommodate the needs of the public.  However, in order to serve social welfare maximisation, 
decision-makers need legitimate and objective information upon which to base management 
decisions.  Once again the measurement problem (see Section 2.4) comes to the fore because the 
quality of water-allocation decisions is a function of available decision-making information while 
the quality of the information is influenced by the measurement problem.  It is, therefore, 
imperative to address the measurement problem to enable decision-making that will promote social 
welfare in the BWMA (refer to Chapter 4 for engagement in the measurement problem). 
 
 48 
Apart from the measurement problem, government intervention leads to a need for detailed 
monitoring because problems regarding hidden incentives and different time-frames between 
principals and agents may influence decisions (Goodstein, 1999:215-225).  Incentive-related 
problems occur because of the separation of power and responsibility in government intervention 
(i.e. those having decision-making power in government agencies often do not bear the 
responsibilities of their decisions, at least not to the same extent as profit seeking entrepreneurs in a 
market setting do).  In addition, strategic decision-making in bulk-water supply management 
typically has a twenty-year planning horizon while the South African bureaucracy functions in four-
year terms.  Long-term bulk-water supply planning could, therefore, be hampered if politicians 
continuously opt for short-term water supply solutions to enhance their own positions. 
 
The next two sections discuss water allocation management for the BWMA in more detail. 
 
2.5.1 Water allocation management in the BWMA 
 
Figure 10 holds that allocation management could further be sub-divided into water supply and 
demand management.  In the past, the growing demand for water resources was mainly accounted 
for by following capacity expansion strategies.  This approach was costly in terms of capital 
investment and involved the development of a new water supply infrastructure to satisfy the 
growing demand for water with little emphasis placed on effective use of water.  The emphasis was 
on capacity expansion.  Following this approach unintentionally created the public perception of 
water not being a scarce and valuable resource.  Little incentive was created for the development of 
water saving technology because water was cheap and often subsidised.  Since water supply 
networks were not optimised for the efficient distribution of water, most countries in the world 
could not afford to continue on this path and started gradually, as water sources became scarcer, to 
implement water-demand management practices (Haddad and Lindner, 2001:143).  South Africa 
and the BWMA were no exception (Sparks, 2001).   
 
Although demand management is not the primary focus of this study, its importance is not 
diminished, neither does the study ignore this type of management.  It is assumed to be important 
part of water management running parallel to bulk-supply management in the long-term.  The 
following is a short discussion regarding the two types of water management. 
 
 49 
Water demand management could be defined as water management strategies specifically 
developed to influence the demand for water and therefore the efficiency of water usage 
(Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 1994:1; Kolokytha et al., 2002:392-393; Kumar and 
Singh, 2001:387; Louw and Kassier, 2002; Shand et al., 2003:7; Sparks, 2001; Van Zyl and 
Leiman, 2002:4).  Within the BWMA, the CCT engaged in water demand management by 
committing to realise a 10 percent saving on the 2010 demand estimations (Department of Water 
Affairs and Forestry, 1991; Kleynhans, 2002b).   
 
Demand management options specifically employed in the BWMA include: 
 
• Enhancements to dam flexibility operations (Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 
2004d); 
• Modifying tariff structures - care must be taken because water is the most basic of all needs, 
and water price increases will impact negatively on the poor.  It is, therefore, important that 
pricing policy be structured in such a way as not to deny access to clean sufficient water for 
basic survival and hygiene to the poorest of the poor (Eberhard, 2003b; Killick, 2004); 
• Upgraded maintenance of distribution infrastructure (Kleynhans, 2002b); 
• Use of advanced technology (low-pressure household appliances, irrigation, etc.) 
(Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 1994; Kleynhans, 2002a); 
• User education - the actions needed to achieve demand management objectives are not 
restricted to water authorities but often require a change in public consumption behaviour.  
User education is, therefore, an important aspect of successful water demand management 
(Kleynhans, 2002b); 
• More efficient metering (Eberhard and Joubert, 2002; Kleynhans, 2002b); and 
• Water markets - a great deal of demand management strategies entail taking into account the 
value of water in relation to its cost of provision, occasioning introducing measures that 
require consumers to relate their usage more closely to costs.  It entails treating water like a 
commodity, an economic good, rather than as an automatic public service (Hellegers and 
Perry, 2005:11; Rogers et al., 2002; Winpenny, 1994), thereby moving in the direction of 
water markets (Louw, 2001; Louw and Kassier, 2002:9; Mirrilees et al., 1994:2-3).  
Tradable water-use rights have been most appropriate in the BWMA for dealing with direct 
abstractions (particularly for irrigated agriculture) and in the allocation of water between 
local authorities.  Within such markets, users for whom water has low use-value will have 
an incentive to sell or lease their water-use rights while users with higher use-values will 
have an incentive to buy or lease water rights in order to expand their activities.  However, 
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markets do not have as much scope for application among individual urban users due to the 
complexity of the distribution system. 
 
Water demand management approaches in the BWMA concentrate on curtailing runaway growth in 
demand by implementing water saving strategies that increase the level of efficiency in water usage. 
 
The link between supply and demand management is to be found when water-use efficiency is 
realised in terms of water savings, i.e. additional water resources become available creating 
additional “supply”.  However, no water management system will ever operate perfectly efficiently.  
As a water distribution system becomes more efficient, the marginal gain in additional investments 
for efficiency gains will decrease.  This shows the inherent limitation of demand management 
strategies to accommodate a growing demand for water, such as the case of the BWMA where long-
term growth for the WCSS is estimated at 2 percent per annum (refer back to Figure 9).  Capacity 
expansion is, therefore, needed to keep up with growing demand in the BWMA. 
 
Water supply management focuses on the expansion of the existing supply capacity of the WCSS to 
provide for a growing demand in the BWMA (Eberhard and Joubert, 2001; Eberhard and Joubert, 
2002; Joubert et al., 2003; Kleynhans, 2002a; Kleynhans, 2002b).  Such strategies are normally 
associated with the construction of infrastructure (large storage dams or water production schemes 
like desalination plants or plants for recycling to potable standard) or the importation of water from 
neighbouring areas (inter-basin transfers), such as the Breede Water Management Area.  However, 
such transfers are only justified if long-term net social gains are being realised (Howe et al., 
1990:1200-1201; Mirrilees et al., 1994:2-4).   
 
Supply management strategies are more capital intensive than most demand management strategies 
with numerous uncertainties regarding the long-term implications of the construction and operation 
of bulk-supply schemes.  Normally (also in the BWMA), a combination of demand and supply 
management strategies are followed to ensure efficient and sustainable water resource management.  
Figure 11 illustrates the timing relationship between the two types of strategies (also refer back to 
Figure 9). 
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Figure 11:  Theoretical capacity expansion 
Source:  (De Lange, 2005) 
 
Capacity expansion paths have a typical step-wise expansion pattern because of the inability of 
most supply augmentation schemes to expand in a modular fashion with demand.  After the 
implementation of a given supply scheme (e.g. the BWP), a temporary surplus capacity will exist in 
the WCSS.  However, as demand increases, the surplus will start decreasing until demand equals 
supply.  When demand starts to exceed supply, additional demand management strategies should be 
used to dampen demand (not indicated in Figure 11) until the next supply expansion scheme can be 
developed.  This expansion pattern will continue until the growth in demand starts to stabilise as a 
result of stabilising impacts on the drivers of demand.  It should be clear that supply and demand 
strategies are inter-linked and should be followed along with each other and preferably in an 
integrated way. 
 
2.5.2 Integrated water management in the BWMA  
 
The development and implementation of supply augmentation projects is complex because of the 
different disciplines involved in these processes: water, environment, economy, finance, social, 
communication, technique and technology, legislation and geography.  The development of 
alternative water resources, therefore, needs to be made in a context of integrated water resource 
management.   
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Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) stated: “the entirety is greater than the sum of the individual components”. 
The word system was not mentioned, but the idea of unity and the interdependence of components 
was emphasized (Von Bertalanffy, 1968).  This idea originated in classic scientific thought.  
Complex phenomena were typically explained by following a reductionistic approach with such an 
approach explaining the relationship between components to explain phenomena as a whole.  
Analytic-reductionistic thought emphasises the essentials to clarify phenomena in terms of 
action/reaction relationships, and positivists were convinced that analytic-reductionistic thought 
would also apply to social problems.  However, such thought presents shortcomings in clarifying 
complex, value-laden and soft-structured (“messy”) social problems typically associated with 
resource allocation and long-term water resource management in particular.  The reason for such a 
shortcoming is that it fails to recognise the inherent potential of individuals to think freely, act 
creatively and to experience the consequences of their actions in a subjective way.  In trying to 
explain social development problems in terms of action/reaction relationships, the decision-maker 
assumes all inter-relationships between individuals and generalises from there.  This type of 
approach became progressively less competent in explaining the complex reality because this type 
of methodology ignores the potential negative effects on the socio-economic and/or eco-system 
factors of different allocation options.  More information is, therefore, needed in order to gain 
insight into the different facets and interactions between facets of a decision-making problem.  As a 
result, generalised systems theory caught on in biology, psychology, and economics (Boulding, 
1956; Von Bertalanffy, 1968).  A trans-disciplinary and interactive planning paradigm is called for 
with a systems approach replacing analytic-reductionistic thought.  Such an approach would serve 
as a more creative and suitable foundation to obtain insights into development planning in long-
term water resource allocation decision-making.     
 
Within a systems approach the emphasis falls on understanding the individual components of the 
system and along with it, the interaction between such components.  Systems thinking is at the core 
of an integrated approach to water resource management with multi-criteria decision-making 
forming part of the process as indicated in Figure 12.  
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Figure 12:  Integrated water resource planning in the BWMA 
Source:  (Du Plessis et al., 2001) 
 
Integrated water resource management for the BWMA may be considered in at least three ways 
(Belton and Stewart, 2002).  Firstly, it can imply the systematic consideration of the various 
dimensions regarding the water resource as a system per se.  Important here is the acceptance that 
water as a resource comprises a system formed by a number of independent components.  Each 
component (quantity and quality, surface and groundwater) may influence other components, and 
therefore, needs to be managed with regard to its inter-relationships.  At this level, management’s 
attention is directed to considering aspects, such as water supply and quality.  Secondly, integrated 
water management can imply that, while water management is a system, it is also a component that 
interacts with other systems.  This points to interactions between water, land, and the environment, 
recognising that changes in any one will influence the other.  At this level, management’s interest 
becomes focused on issues like floodplain management, erosion control, non-point pollution, 
agricultural drainage and recreational use of water.  A third and broader interpretation is to 
approach integrated water management via the interrelationships between water and the social and 
economic environments.  Here the concern is to determine the extent to which water is both an 
opportunity for and an obstacle to social welfare maximisation.  A sensitivity towards the 
interdependency among decision variables could be seen as the distinctive characteristic of 
integrated approaches.  However, if the promotion of social welfare is aimed at, following an 
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integrated approach should include running the political process parallel to resource allocation 
management. 
 
2.5.3 Politics of water resource management in the BWMA 
 
The final decision-making power regarding water allocation rests with politicians – also the case in 
the BWMA.  The importance of the political process in long-term water allocation decision-making 
should, therefore, be obvious.  The politics of water resource management can become extremely 
complex and often emotional because of the life-supporting functions it fulfils in daily life.  Policy-
makers in the BWMA face the challenge of accommodating a range of interests of different users 
against the background of a given set of policy objectives.  For example, it is a challenging task to 
increase water-use efficiency, equity and sustainability that is simultaneously socially acceptable.  
Utilitarian principles aimed at the maximisation of social welfare explain this (Hicks, 1939).   
 
Urban water users (domestic, commercial and industrial users) traditionally enjoy priority over rural 
users in decision-making regarding resource allocation.  The reason for this is once again grounded 
in the measurement problem as indicated in Section 2.4.  Urban users are in a position to dominate 
the planning process because of a better organisational structure, higher effective demand for water 
and locality concentration.  This could result in a narrowing of the strategic planning context for 
long-term water resource allocation decision-making in the BWMA.  Such narrowing could be in 
terms of temporal and spatial dimensions and could ultimately lead to negative impacts on social 
welfare.  It also leads to growing tension between urban and rural water users because water 
resources are re-allocated from rural to urban areas. 
 
Decision-makers cannot fully account for all costs and benefits (especially in the long-term) of 
different water management strategies in their decision-making.  The reason for this is that “softer” 
and less tangible impacts of re-allocations (mostly of socio-economic and environmental origin) 
cannot be defined in terms of easily quantifiable monetary variables.  Policy-makers, therefore, 
have little choice but to make use of the methodologies available to them.  For example, the re-
allocation of water based primarily on “best/highest value of use” grounds could be questioned 
because “efficiency” is mostly quantified in terms of volumetric or monetary variables.  Decision-
makers could not be certain that if it were possible to construct an aggregation model accounting for 
the total value of water for rural use, the re-allocation of water from rural areas to urban areas in the 
BWMA would still be justified.   
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In addition, the problem of different agendas and time horizons within the water management 
environment comes strongly to the fore within the politics of water allocation decision-making.  
Water service providers have a long-term attitude toward water-resource allocation management 
while politicians could have a short-term attitude toward serviced water because of the structure of 
the South African bureaucracy.  Bureaucrats could have hidden agendas including empire building 
and external career building (Goodstein, 1999:215-225).  Within these sometimes-conflicting 
interests, a long-term orientation towards water resource management is lost, leading to adverse 
impacts on social welfare.  It is, therefore, necessary for policy makers to translate the short-term 
attitudes of water users into long-term preferences in order to ensure the long-term sustainable use 
of the resource.   
 
The following points summarise the important problems water managers are facing from a political 
perspective: 
 
• Budget constraints with regard to different management options; 
• Implementation periods for bulk-water supply schemes are long (7-12years);  
• Numerous stakeholders are involved, all with different needs/agendas; 
• Different criteria in the decision-making process have different levels of importance; 
• The difference between rational theory and actual behaviour (i.e. people will not 
consistently chose the “best” management alternative based on the given criteria). 
 
It should be clear that politics contribute towards the complexity of water management, and 
decision-makers are in need of decision-support for long-term decision-making.  See Backeberg 
(Backeberg, 1994; Backeberg et al., 1996) for additional references regarding the politics of water 
resource management in South Africa. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter presented the BWMA as a physical setting for the research problem as discussed in 
Chapter 1.  Some demographics and the water balance were discussed.  Future augmentation 
schemes were presented from where the measurement problem, as presented in Chapter 1, was 
applied in the context of the BWMA.  The applied measurement problem was discussed in terms of 
water allocation management in the BWMA, and it became clear that the decision-making context 
is currently too narrowly defined and is in need of some expansion to accommodate unaccounted-
 56 
for long-term effects.  The aforesaid expansion should be undertaken in an integrated manner.  
Lastly, the politics of water resource management in the BWMA were acknowledged as having an 
important impact on the implementation phases of management strategies.  Politicians do, therefore, 
need to buy into the expansion of the decision-making context if long-term sustainable resource use 
is to be ensured.  The next chapter presents the background of the measurement problem from a 
theoretical point of view. 
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This literature review presents relevant literature consulted throughout the period of the research 
and is roughly structured according to Table 1.  The aim is to orientate the reader with the aid of 
relevant literature.  The review starts with Section 3.2, which covers the basics of the competitive 
market as resource allocation mechanism and explains why the market sometimes fails in the 
allocation of public goods such as bulk-water resource infrastructures.  Section 3.3 explains the 
rationale for government intervention in cases of market failures and also the problem of 
government failures in water resource allocation.  Section 3.4 discusses decision-support for 
resource allocation management and links with Section 3.5 which discusses the need for 
information regarding public participation in water resource allocation. 
 
3.2 The market as mechanism for natural resource allocation 
 
The 1992 Dublin Water Principles and the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development 
support the notion of water as an economic good, which should be managed accordingly to promote 
equity, efficiency and sustainability (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs: 
Division of Sustainable Development, 2004).  Inherent in this view is the use of water pricing with 
the aim of understanding the full cost of water supply and the full value of water.  The distinction 
between cost and value is of importance here, especially in the case of the non-market benefits of 
water.  Such a distinction is complex and has become a controversial, but popular topic for resource 
policy makers. 
 
There is a lack of insight into the strengths and limitations of economics to solve resource allocation 
challenges.  Mostly, problems are approached from a purely technical point of view; it is not clear 
what role economics can play and what the interlinkages are between economic and technical 
considerations in the decision-making process.  The question is not whether water is an economic 
good or not (it certainly is – see Hellegers (Hellegers and Perry, 2005:11), but rather the extent to 
which water allocation and use can be guided by market forces or whether it requires some extra 
management to serve social objectives (Robbins, 1952; Robbins, 1981).  Experiences from the 
BWMA will be used to clarify some of the uncertainties in this study. 
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Market mechanisms have become important resource allocation mechanisms (Arriaza et al., 
2002:21; Bateman et al., 2003; Brouwer and Pearce, 2005:237; Bush et al., 1987:617-618; Colby et 
al., 1993:1565; Dudley, 1992:757-759; Easter et al., 1998; Eberhard, 2003a:12-14; Fishelson, 
1994:321-323; Fisher et al., 2002:1-3; Keenan et al., 1999:279; Kloezen, 1998:437; Kumar and 
Singh, 2001:387; Louw, 2001; Louw, 2002; Louw and Kassier, 2002:18; Nieuwoudt, 2000:58-60).  
Market allocation theory states that an efficient and equitable allocation of resources will be made 
given that suitable market structures are in place (i.e. the assumptions of perfect competition) 
(Eberhard, 2003a:12-13; Pearce, 1993; Thrall, 1976).  Current measurement methodologies suggest 
that the economic value of water for urban use is higher than the economic value of rural use.  Price 
elasticity of demand favour urban use and the ability of urban users to pay will result in the 
systematic re-allocation of water from rural uses (irrigation use and in-stream flow requirements) to 
urban use (Alberini and Cooper, 2000; Brouwer and Pearce, 2005:51-52; Van Vuuren et al., 2004; 
Van Zyl et al., 2003; Veck and Bill, 2000:2-13).  This implies that market allocation mechanisms 
will in the event of water shortages, allocate water away from rural use in favour of urban use 
(Backeberg, 1994; Carmichael et al., 2001; Lutz et al., 1998).  To justify such re-allocation, the 
economic value gained should be equal to or greater than the economic value forgone in rural use to 
realise a net social welfare gain.  Unfortunately, these costs and benefits are not fully quantifiable 
and, therefore, are not accounted for in market-driven allocation systems resulting in a measurement 
problem.  Market failures, therefore, cause the market to misallocate resources in terms of social 
welfare maximisation - proof can be found by observing the re-allocation of water from rural to 
urban use, which often disregards important trade-offs. (Eberhard, 2003a:12; Livingston, 1995; 
Pearce, 1993; Randall, 1983:131-132).  Society-wide impacts result from these re-allocations 
demonstrating the applicability of public choice theory in this context.   
 
Public choice theory holds that when opinions differ, the challenge is to achieve consensus 
regarding decisions that concern everyone (social welfare) (Hicks, 1939).  Public choice theory 
engages in researching the link between individual values and collective choice (Arrow, 1951; 
Mueller, 1997).  The important question is whether and, if so, in what way social preferences could 
be derived from individual preference orderings (Graaff, 1957; Hicks, 1975; Scitovsky, 1951).  
Solutions to this challenge could aid in measuring social welfare and public decision-making 
(Arrow, 1984a).   
 
The market as efficient allocation mechanism could be criticized by showing the impossibility of 
achieving social welfare maximisation via any voting procedure, as the market gives a weighted 
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price aggregation of decentralised individual choices (Arrow, 1951; Arrow, 1984b; Arrow, 1984d).  
The social outcome of such a choice is not evaluated and may, therefore, be politically unpopular.  
The result is that no claims can be made to a “best” allocation; the market is just “another” 
allocation.  If the market-allocation mechanism fails, some state intervention is needed to obtain a 
socially “best” allocation.  Care must, therefore, be taken not to see the market as the best allocation 
mechanism because of the gap between economic analysis and the inability to fully address 
problems of institutional reform within the analytical paradigm of neoclassical economics (Dudley, 
1992:757-759; Eberhard, 2003a; Randall, 1983:131; Tisdell and Roy, 1997:28-29).  Additions to 
the market as water resource allocation mechanism are, therefore, needed. 
 
3.3 Government intervention in natural resource allocation 
 
As mentioned, market systems will allocate natural resources to efficient market participants; 
however, not all users participate in the market (e.g. the natural environment).  It is, therefore, 
unlikely that a market system will promote social welfare maximisation, including an efficient and 
sustainable allocation of resources (Livingston, 1995:203-220; Sen, 1977:317-344).  Water 
managers have to intervene to account for market failures because bulk-water supply infrastructures 
are of a public good nature. (Eberhard, 2003a:12-17; Livingston, 1995:203-220; Randall, 1983:131-
148).  Such interventions could take various forms and should be acceptable to the public to 
promote compliance.  In order to promote acceptability, decision-making information regarding 
public preference needs to be expanded to enable decision-makers to make decisions in favour of 
social welfare maximisation without harming their own political positions (Buchanan and Tullock, 
1962; Livingston, 1995:203-220).   
 
As previously mentioned, public choice theory studies the decision-making behaviour of voters, 
politicians and government officials from the perspective of economic theory.  It can be considered 
a bridge between economics and political science because it recognises that politicians as 
individuals are also motivated by self-interest (Arrow, 1951; Arrow, 1984b).  However, the 
fundamental assumption of rational choice theory (also known as the first assumption of 
economics) and related problems were examined, and it proved wrong to build social preference 
orderings by examining individual preference orderings because social welfare was not 
accommodated in the individual preference ordering (Sen, 1977:317-344).  Public choice theory is 
criticized when used in its simplified form, describing that bureaucrats act only in self-interest (Sen, 
1977:317-344).  In addition, incentive-related problems could arise in collective decision-making 
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because of the separation of power and responsibility (i.e. those having decision-making power in 
government agencies do not bear the responsibilities of their decisions, at least not to the same 
extent as profit seeking entrepreneurs do).  There are also no signals in the collective decision-
making process that are comparable to profits and losses in the market environment.  No reliable 
way exists of judging efficiency where outputs are not produced and sold under competitive 
conditions.  However, given that competitiveness features as a measure of efficiency, it is not 
certain that such conditions can be seen as a suitable measure of efficiency for state intervention. 
Care should, therefore, be taken when using efficiency as a measurement criterion. 
 
State intervention can (and does) fail because of incentive-related problems but also because of the 
short-term attitudes of politicians and the personal agendas of service providers (the agent).  Hence, 
the link with principal-agent theory.  The vulnerability of government intervention to lobby groups 
(in the case of the BWMA, urban users could be defined as such) could also lead to government 
failure.  Government failures, therefore, need to be accounted for.  This could partly be done by 
engaging in the information asymmetry problem by broadening the decision-making context.  The 
decision-making context could by broadened by expanding the temporal and spatial dimensions of 
the aforesaid context.  Such expansions have a significant impact on the information needed in the 
decision-making process and consequently on decision-support techniques.  (Refer to Chapter 4 for 
a detailed discussion regarding the expansion of decision-support.) 
 
The above-mentioned discussion does not eliminate the fact that a political decision will dictate 
resource allocation decisions, or in this context, the choice of water allocation scheme.  The only 
watchdog available to oversee the decision-makers (agent) is a functional bureaucracy that 
determines who will be in the influential position of decision-making, i.e. the agent runs the risk of 
losing his parliamentary seat if he does not act in the interest of the principal (Mueller, 1997).  
Nonetheless, during democratic elections, the public entrusts their vote to agents to fulfil their 
expectations and needs.  Voters have no guarantee that bureaucrats will operate in the public 
interest due to their vulnerability to lobby-groups and, therefore, their own interests (i.e. 
government failure).  There is also no guarantee that bureaucrats can be certain of the real 
preferences of the public, nor can the bureaucrat be certain which user preference is sustainable in 
the long-term.  This leads to the emergence of a principal-agent problem (Grossman and Hart, 
1983:7-45; Laffont, 2003), resulting in the need for effective contracting (Bernholz, 1997:419-442; 
Smith, 2004; Van Bommel and Reinhard, 2005).  
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Insight into principal-agent theory supports an understanding of the roles of the state and society in 
long-term resource management.  The relationship of agency is an old codified mode of social 
interaction.  Essentially, all contractual arrangements between agents and principals contain 
elements of agency and problems regarding effective contracting (Ross, 1973:134-139).  Much of 
the economic literature on moral hazard is concerned with problems raised by agency (Arrow, 
1984c; Bentham, 1789; Mirrlees, 1975). 
 
Within the context of this study, the public (principal) is confronted with a resource scarcity 
problem of rivalry/competition over scarce water resources, so it turns to a specialist (the agent) to 
act more efficient.  The principal does, however, need to construct a mechanism (incentive) to 
ensure that the agent behaves at least partly according to the principal's interests.  The principal-
agent problem is that of designing such an incentive scheme – i.e. drawing up a suitable contract to 
co-ordinate the actions of independent decision-makers, thereby saving costs because the cost of 
producing such incentives adds to the principals’ transaction cost (Smith, 2004).     
 
The answer to how the principal should accommodate the agent in resource management, therefore, 
lies in effective contracting, i.e. aiming at minimising transaction costs. In the process, 
asymmetrical information, measurement problems, the risk profile, productivity levels and the size 
of the management structure play important roles (Grossman and Hart, 1983:7-45).  In designing 
incentive schemes, one could question why public (principal) preference should be accommodated.  
Water as a public good has a typical inelastic demand for most of its uses, with few substitutes 
available.  A demand situation like this could imply that the agent has more power than the 
principal (which mostly is the case in water management situations) – local authorities do not allow 
themselves to be manipulated by the public, while the public cannot boycott the purchase of the 
product because of low elasticities.  Taking into account that the public view is at it best an 
amalgamated view of individual preferences, the public vote is simply not good enough to warrant 
serious consideration regarding complex decision-making in sustainable resource utilisation.  
Expert opinions may, therefore, not always coincide with public opinion.  In cases such as these, a 
type of doctor-patient situation develops: the agent has superior knowledge and assumes a 
paternalistic or prescriptive stand in managing his principals’ problem.  This could result from 
limitations in communicating complex management problems to the public.  However, some 
evidence exists that managers should indeed accommodate the public because a broad tendency has 
emerged to decentralize water resource management (Steel and Weber, 2001:119-131).  It is also 
not certain whether a functional bureaucracy will promote sustainable water management and social 
welfare maximisation because of the difference between their time horizons, i.e. political elections 
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typically have a four or five year rotation cycle while bulk-water supply infrastructure 
developments have 20- to 30-year cycles.  It could, therefore, be argued that politicians typically 
have a shorter time-dimension compared to sustainable resource management requirements and this 
difference does not support  “sustainable” resource utilisation.   
 
The problem regarding public involvement could also be seen as a reversed principal-agent 
problem, i.e. at first the principal consults the agent for assistance in a given problem (in this case a 
resource allocation problem), however, by engaging in this problem, the agent needs to consult with 
the principal regarding their preferences in the management challenge.  The question is whether the 
principal should do this, and if it does, to what extent should the agent accommodate the principal 
in the decision-making process (Iacofano, 1990; Wiseman et al., 2003:1001-1012).  In cases where 
urban areas tap into rural water resources, a “parted” principal could emerge.  This means that urban 
users have a higher and often more elastic effective water demand compared to rural users – 
particularly in irrigated areas.  In these cases water transfers from rural to urban areas contain 
hidden costs (loss in production, employment, environmental trade-offs) not sufficiently accounted 
for in agent decision-making – often to the disadvantage of the rural user.  This type of situation 
leads to tension, loaded with emotion, between rural and urban users. The agent is in the process 
confronted with the problem of serving two different principals with conflicting interests regarding 
the same resource at the same time (Conradie, 2002). 
 
3.4 Decision-support for resource management 
 
As mentioned in Section 3.3, government intervention is needed to assist in accounting for market 
failures in resource allocation mechanisms.  However, in intervening, government requires 
decision-support in order to confront complexities associated with allocation decisions, i.e. 
accounting for different climatic, socio-economic and political contexts, both over the short- and 
long-term (Stewart, 2004).  Decision-support anticipates short-term impacts with an acceptable 
level of certainty; however, the long-term impacts of different allocations present major challenges.  
This section focuses on decision-support systems for resource management decision-making.  It is 
by no means exhaustive, but will, nevertheless, provide grounds for the method that was used and 
modified in the study.   
 
Decision-support is directly related to explaining decision-making behaviour.  In order to justify 
and explain behaviour, rational choice theory appeals to three distinct elements in the choice 
situation.  First, there is the feasible set (i.e. the set of all courses of action that satisfy various 
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logical, physical and economic constraints).  Second is the causal structure; in other words, 
interactions between actions and outcomes.  The third element is a subjective ranking of the feasible 
alternatives usually derived from a ranking of the outcomes to which they are expected to lead.  To 
make a rational decision, then, simply means to choose the highest ranked element in the feasible 
set (Belton and Stewart, 2002; Elster, 1986).  Decision-support systems do not solve decision-
making problems, nor are they intended to do so. Their purpose is to provide insight and creativity 
to aid decision makers to make “better” decisions (Belton and Stewart, 2002; Romero and Rehman, 
2003:3-20).   
 
MCDM came to the fore as a specific support system that provides a consistent approach to ranking 
and comparing allocation management alternatives for resource management problems (Romero 
and Rehman, 2003:123-133).  Different MCDM methods exist, and the choice of method is critical 
in terms of appropriateness with regard to resource management problems. This is important not 
only because each method produces different rankings of the same set of management alternatives 
(feasible set) but also because choosing a methodology is subjective at best (Belton and Stewart, 
2002; Hobbs et al., 1992; Tecle, 1992:129-140) (see Table 13). 
 
Essentially, MCDM is both a process and a methodology that compares management alternatives 
from different points of view (criteria).  It combines these criteria (weighted scores) to obtain an 
overall ranking of alternatives that are used as recommendations in allocation decision-making.  
The process facilitates greater understanding of the management problem, involved parties, and 
their priorities, values and objectives. Through exploring these in the context of the problem, it 
guides decision-makers in identifying a preferred course of action.  The method is sensitive to the 
different contexts of the same problem and its different stakeholders.(Belton and Stewart, 2002).  It 
does, however, not provide a “correct” or “true” system of weights or scores because these are 
determined by the inputs of stakeholders in the decision-making process (Hobbs et al., 1992; 
Stewart et al., 2001; Stewart et al., 1997).  The weight structure reflects the trade-offs society is 
willing to make in a specific situation in which the importance of the decision is often related to the 
level of potential conflict between criteria and stakeholders regarding what criteria are relevant 
(Belton and Stewart, 2002; Romero and Rehman, 2003:15-20).  MCDM certainly does not 
neutralise decision-making subjectivity - it only makes the need for subjective judgements explicit, 
and therefore, the decision-making process more transparent by forcing decision-makers to at least 
consider difficult trade-offs (Hobbs et al., 1992:1767-1779; Stewart, 2004; Stewart et al., 2001; 
Stewart et al., 1997). Transparency in this process is important since it promotes stakeholder 
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participation, especially in cases where multiple stakeholders are involved, as is the case in water 
resource allocation management. 
 
The following statements describe the character of MCDM (Belton and Stewart, 2002): 
 
• MCDM tries to take explicit account of the multiple conflicting criteria for decision-
making; 
• MCDM assists in structuring the problem of choice; 
• MCDM provides a focus and a common language for discussion; 
• MCDM facilitates decision-making by assisting the decision-maker to place the problem 
in context, to determine the stakeholder preferences and to present the information; 
• MCDM improves the legitimacy of decisions. 
 
Both Cost-Benefit Analysis (Brouwer and Pearce, 2005) and MCDM are rooted in utilitarian 
principles aimed at the maximisation of social welfare.  The methods are different responses to a 
conceptually simple problem: when one party benefits and another loses, i.e. if a proposed course of 
action (allocation) is not obviously better than the status quo, how can decision-makers test to see if 
society as a whole is better off if such alternative allocation is implemented (Hicks, 1939; Hicks, 
1940; Hicks, 1975; Kaldor, 1939)?  If some members of a society experience an increase in welfare 
while others experience a decrease, how could the interpersonal utility comparisons needed to 
identify a welfare improvement be identified? 
 
Management alternatives contain trade-offs, and trade-offs are determined by utility functions, i.e. 
there will be different “winners” and “losers” for different management alternatives.  Finding a 
balance that will promote social welfare maximisation is the challenge decision-makers face.  
Decision-making regarding such a balance is done with the aid of differentiation criteria.  Within 
the context of this study, we will assume that a criterion is a means or a standard of judging (Belton 
and Stewart, 2002), i.e. some pre-defined standard by which one particular choice could be 
compared to another.  The consideration of a range of choices becomes a multiple-criteria decision-
making problem with a number of standards in conflict.  Such conflicts between standards imply the 
above-mentioned trade-offs.  Every decision implies the balancing of the outcomes of multiple 
criteria in terms of social welfare as a reference framework.  This implies that social welfare is 
defined per se.  The subjectivity of the decisions comes into play in quantifying the trade-offs 
between management alternatives because not all criteria are quantifiable in monetary terms (see 
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the measurement problem in Section 1.1).  It should be clear that the decision-maker is confronted 
with a complex decision-making scenario.   
 
Multi-criteria decision analysis facilitates clear and objective thinking regarding the quantification 
of these trade-offs.  It has a facilitative role and does not intend to guarantee total objectivity and 
the “correct” decision since decisions are context bound.  Optimality also does not feature as 
strongly in the multi-criteria framework and could, therefore, not be completely justified within the 
optimisation paradigm.  MCDM does, however, integrate objective measurement with value 
judgements and, therefore, makes subjectivity more explicit and manageable.  MCDM consists of 
the following (see also Figure 13) (Eberhard and Joubert, 2001): 
 
• Problem identification and structuring.  This step strives towards making sense of the 
decision-making problem.  Key concerns, goals, stakeholders, actions and uncertainties 
needs to be identified.  Before any analysis is possible, all stakeholders (classified in terms 
of level of interest and power of influence) need to develop a common understanding of the 
problem, the decisions that need to be made and the criteria that will be used.  This is the 
most important step in the process since a well-structured problem is halfway solved and 
since a mismatch between problem and model will lead to certain failure. 
• Model building – implies the design of a formal model of decision-maker preferences, trade-
offs, values, and goals to compare different alternatives in a transparent manner.  It is a 
dynamic process and the nature of the model will differ according to the nature of the 
problem and whether alternatives are explicitly or implicitly defined. 
• Action plan development – implies translating the results of the analysis into a workable 
action plan. 
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Figure 13:  The process of MCDA 
Source:  (Eberhard and Joubert, 2002) 
 
The multi-criteria decision-making method is useful for (Belton and Stewart, 2002):  
 
• Problematic choice - where a choice from a set of alternatives must be made; 
• Sorting actions – where management actions must be sorted or categorised; 
• Ranking alternatives – where management alternatives must be sorted according to a given 
preference ordering; 
• Description of actions – where an orderly description of actions and consequences is needed 
to facilitate choice; 
• Design actions – where new decision alternatives are identified and designed to meet the 
goals identified by the multi-criteria decision-making process. 
 
Different approaches to MCDA could be followed (Belton and Stewart, 2002; Romero and 
Rehman, 2003): 
 
• Utility and value function approaches among which multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT) 
and analytical hierarchy process (AHP) are the best known in South Africa.  These 
approaches first assess marginal utilities and then combine these into an overall utility 
function representing overall strength of preference among options.  MAUT is the only 
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technique that addresses uncertainty in its axiomatic framework by analysing the expected 
values.  AHP assesses marginal utilities by asking for the relative strengths of preferences 
between each pair of possible scenarios.  AHP is useful, simple and, consequently, a widely 
used tool. 
• Goal programming and reference point techniques are the original formal forms of MCDM 
techniques.  Goal programming searches for the scenario that minimizes a measure of 
underachievement of goals.  The idea is that once a solution is found the decision-maker will 
review his or her goals, and the process will repeat itself until no significant gains are 
realised (Romero and Rehman, 2003:23-26).  Reference point approaches start by having the 
decision maker specifying achievement levels for each criterion in terms of relevant 
performance measures.  These levels are typically of three types:   
o Goal levels (performance level that will fully satisfy the goals of the decision 
maker); 
o Exclusion levels (performance level at which, if violated, the entire scenario 
becomes unacceptable); 
o Reference levels (expectation of the decision-maker of an acceptable compromise 
between conflicting demands of different criteria. 
• Outranking approaches represent evidence for and against the statement that one alternative 
is as better than another.  Evidence takes the form of voting between criteria. 
• Game theory approaches, in which each criterion can be associated with a single player.  
Game theory synthesizes the utility functions of individual players into a social utility 
function.  It assumes that each criterion is associated with a particular “player” and that 
marginal utilities can be associated with each policy scenario (Romero and Rehman, 
2003:110-113).  Game theory aims at identifying solutions to the decision problem that 
represent the most acceptable compromise between players.  Nash equilibriums - seeking 
the policy scenario that maximizes the product of the marginal utilities - are the simplest 
forms of this type of solution. 
• Interactive MCDM approaches imply a progressive evolution and definition of decision-
makers’ preferences through an interaction between them and the results generated from 
various runs of the model.  This interaction becomes a dialogue in which the model responds 
to an initial set of the decision-maker’s preferences or trade-offs, and then when this 
response has been examined, another set is offered, and thus, the procedure progresses in an 
interactive way and iterative way until the decision-maker has found a satisfactorily solution 
(Romero and Rehman, 2003:79-102). 
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It was previously mentioned that the choice of MCDM method is important because the ranking of 
different management alternatives depends on the chosen MCDM method itself.  Care should, 
therefore, be taken to select the suitable method.  Moving on to a choice between the different 
multi-criteria evaluation methods, studies were undertaken in order to try to determine the “best” 
MCDM method (see Table 13). 
 
Table 13:  Comparative studies on multi-criteria evaluation methods 
 
Different MCDM models include (Belton and Stewart, 2002):  
 
• Weighted Average (WA); 
• Preference Ranking Organization METHod for Enrichment Evaluations (PROMETHEE); 
• Compromise Programming (CP); 
• ELimination Choice Translating REality (ELECTRE); 
• Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP).  
 
Selecting the most suitable MCDM requires testing different methods to reflect the decision-
maker’s evaluation weights, and of course, the validity of applying the method.  The criteria for 
Study Criteria used to compare multi-criteria 
evaluation methods 
Main conclusions 
(Duckstein et al., 
1982:178-184) 
1) Type of data required 
2) Nature of the alternative systems that can be 
analysed (i.e. discreet or continuous systems);  
3)Consistency in results among different MCDMs;  
4) Robustness of results (sensitivity analysis);  
5) Ease of use; and  
6)Amount of interaction needed between the 
analyst and the decision maker.  
The methodology of evaluating MCEMs could be extended to 
include more techniques, evaluation criteria, or other 
applications.
 
(Hobbs, 1986:384-394) 1) Theoretical validity and appropriateness;  
2) Flexibility and ease of use;  
3) Results compared to other methods, i.e. validity   
4) Robustness. 
The choice of MCEM  is itself a multi-objective problem and 
largely depends on the problem (context). 
a) Decisions can depend on the choice of methods, even on 
such theoretically irrelevant factors such as the phrasing of 
questions;  
b) Users would be careful in applying more than one method; 
and  
c) Researchers need to broaden their theories of decision-
making so that “theoretically irrelevant” factors (such as the 
phrasing in questionnaires) can be explained, predicted and 
controlled.
 
(Hobbs et al., 1992:1767-
1779) 
1) Appropriateness;  
2) Ease of use;  
3) Validity; and  
4) Differences in results (robustness). 
Extended his work of 1979 and 1986 and concluded that:  
a) Experienced planners prefer simple and transparent MCEM  
methods  
b) The ranking of management alternatives could be more 
sensitive to the choice of MCEM used to rank them compared 
with which person applies it. 
(Tecle, 1992:129-140) 1) Problem related;  
2) Decision-maker related;  
3) Technique related; and 4) solution related. 
a) The ranking of MCEMs differs according to the problem;  
b) It is possible to find different rankings of MCEMs based on 
the experience of other analysts. 
(Mahmoud and Garcia, 
2000:471-478) 
1) Consistency of the resultant rankings; 
2) Amount of interaction required by users; 
3) Ease of understanding. 
 
MCEMs are intended to show the trade-offs among different 
alternative solutions when evaluated by technical and non-
technical professionals to maximize agreement between all 
interested parties. 
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selection among MCDMs should include an understanding and an acceptance of the method used 
by the decision-maker.  This implies that the theory of multi-criteria evaluation should be 
understood in order to maximize the method’s utility. 
 
Refer to Belton and Stewart (Belton and Stewart, 2002); Hobbs (Hobbs et al., 1992) and Romero 
(Romero and Rehman, 2003) for further details on the methodology of multi-criteria decision 
analysis per se.  As a point of criticism, the method does assumes the problem at hand as a given 
(i.e. it takes the starting point as a well defined set of criteria and focuses on the evaluation).  The 
method is, therefore, not geared towards analysing symptoms of problems or towards identifying 
the problem that needs to be resolved. Thus, the decision-maker should have a clear understanding 
of the decision-making problem. 
  
As public acceptability of different management options is an important decision-making factor in 
integrated resource management, the next section focuses on public participation.   
 
3.5 Public participation in resource allocation 
 
The National Water act (National Water Act, 1998) promotes the decentralization of water resource 
management in order (among other objectives) to gain efficiency.  Since the public (households) is 
the lowest level of decentralization, one could ask whether the public has a legitimate role to play in 
informing priority setting in long-term decision-making for water resource management that has 
potentially significant social welfare implications.  Public involvement in environmental decision-
making is recognized as one of the basic requirements of sustainable resource utilisation (Iacofano, 
1990; Smith, 1984:253-259; Van der Veeren and Lorenz, 2002:316-376).  The Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development also states that: “Environmental issues are best handled with the 
participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level” (United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs: Division of Sustainable Development, 2004).  Although many 
researchers agree on the importance of local community involvement, the level of involvement is 
still low in most developing countries.  Sceptics warn against the “dictatorship of the uninformed” 
and supporters uphold the legitimacy of the participation process while it appears that the public 
have traditionally not been consulted (Litva et al., 2002:1825-1837; Wiseman et al., 2003:1001-
1012). Without public participation, decision-makers assume the risk of enforcing compliance from 
an unwilling public.  Legislators hope that involving those who will be regulated in setting the rules 
will lead to more effective ruling once promulgated (Maguire and Lind, 2004). 
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Although not all literature originates from natural resource management theory, enough evidence 
suggests the potential benefit of testing public preference in resource allocation decision-making 
(Davis, 1996; Dungumaro and Madulu, 2003:1009-1014; Maguire and Lind, 2004; Munro-Clark, 
1990; Nelson and Wright, 1995; Pateman, 1970; Rahman, 1993; Smith, 1984:253-259; Wignaraja 
et al., 1991).  Such literature regarding public participation has grown substantially in the past 
decade due, largely, to the following: 
 
• The public has increased access to information because of the fast growing information 
technology era (Stave, 2003:303-313); 
• The media has become more intrusive and increasingly protected by law as freedom of 
speech is seen as a basic human right; 
• The realization that older management approaches used in the past have failed in terms of 
“sustainable development” criteria (Purnama, 2003:415-439); 
• The rejection of traditional structures by the public and a new sophistication and sensitivity 
regarding the state of the environment amongst lobby groups (Pavlikakis and Tsihrintzis, 
2003:193-205). 
• A shrinking resource base and visible increases in environmental degradation have increased 
competition for resources and challenged government agencies to find a way to manage 
natural resources more sustainably. 
• The conflict resolution and conflict management potential of participating processes (Fisher 
et al., 2002:1-16). 
 
The following could be seen as important concepts regarding public participation in resource 
allocation: 
 
Democracy - within this context, representative democracy refers to equal participation in the 
decision-making process while political equality refers to the equality of power in determining the 
outcomes of decisions (Pateman, 1970).  This is contrasted by non-participatory democracies where 
the participation of the minority elite is crucial.  Two paradigms can be distinguished here. 
Consequently, a choice exists to either believe that representative democracy offers an effective 
means of community involvement in public affairs through elections, accepting that the number of 
votes legitimises representation, or to believe that powers should be devolved to the local level to 
allow local communities to make decisions regarding affairs of importance to their communities.  In 
the first framework, institutions and professionalism regulate and organise public affairs in a more 
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centralised manner, designing policies for the “common good”, while in the second framework, 
institutions and professional agencies recognise local heterogeneity and operate as facilitators of the 
development process. 
 
The role of power – is central to participatory processes and features as one of the reasons why 
people may involve themselves in resource management issues while at the same time agencies are 
unwilling to give up their control over the resource (Nelson and Wright, 1995).  The nature and the 
levels of participation in a policy development process are often measured in terms of power and 
the roles that the different stakeholders have in the decision-making process.  The greater the 
control by those outside the local community, the less local communities tend to be involved at 
critical decision-making stages.  If, for example, the community plays an active role in decision-
making, the nature of their role changes from being “subjects” to “directors” of the process.  It is 
often implicitly assumed that the more people participating the better the outcome for the 
community (Munro-Clark, 1990).  However, if the necessary mechanisms for stakeholder groups to 
influence the integration of their opinions in policy and practice do not exist, the number of 
participants becomes irrelevant. 
 
Community empowerment - “empowerment of the grassroots” is a common saying in participatory 
development.  However, the exact meaning of such a statement is less clear and the term can easily 
be misused or misunderstood.  It could mean that power has been devolved or decentralised and that 
people have a more effective say in the running of their affairs (Chambers, 1997).  Or, on a more 
individual level, empowerment reflects a state of personal development, a state of mind through 
which people engage in a learning process, increasing their self-esteem and confidence and enabling 
them to better use their own resources (Rahman, 1993).  The educative dimension of taking part in 
the running of a democracy is a very strong attribute of participatory democracy theories (Davis, 
1996).  Social welfare would be promoted if citizens, learn to become involved in civic duty, 
thereby becoming  “better” citizens. 
 
Changing the relationship pattern - The other positive aspect of engaging in a participatory 
management approach is the improved interaction between the community and the respective 
government agencies.  As different people get involved in consultation, discussion or negotiation, 
different parties get to know and understand one another better and even start trusting one another.  
The improved knowledge certainly improves communication channels which are crucial in 
participatory processes (Blaikie and Soussan, 2001). 
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Benefits and costs of participation - the appeal of participatory planning and management lies in the 
assumption that when communities’ views have been taken into account, the policy or the projects 
will fit into a social and economic reality. People, feeling a sense of ownership, will be more 
compliant in bearing costs, such as the costs of increased administration, opposition development, 
raising expectations, limiting viewpoints, representation and validation (Davis, 1996; Rahman, 
1993).  Unfortunately, the monitoring and evaluation of participatory processes and programs has 
been neglected, and little information exists on how to assess the real impacts of participation on 
community development. 
 
Implementing participation - the benefits of participation will be lost when there is a mismatch 
between the theory and its implementation.  Types of public participation techniques used include:  
public information, public hearings, conferences, task forces/advisory boards, workshops, 
collaborative problem-solving and joint decision-making.  People from the wider community often 
come to the participatory process expecting to gain greater control over the process while at the 
same time government rarely wants to relinquish its control.  Most consultation processes use 
techniques like community meetings to reveal knowledge about the decision rather than to seek 
opinions or to allow influence (Smith, 1984).   
 
The promotion of public participation is only part of the challenge.  Effective implementation, after 
having decided to accommodate the public, is equally important.   
 
A literature search yielded a small number of studies on whether or not (see Block 7, Table 1) to 
include public opinion in long-term resource management (Buchy and Hoverman, 2000; 
Dungumaro and Madulu, 2003:1009-1014; Litva et al., 2002:1825-1837; Maguire and Lind, 2004; 
Munro-Clark, 1990; Pateman, 1970; Steel and Weber, 2001:119-131; Wiseman et al., 2003:1001-
1012).  However, a number of studies on how (see block 10, Table 1) to include/accommodate 
public opinion were found.  A wide variety of methods have been used by researchers to 
accommodate public preferences in the decision-making process, covering system dynamics 
modelling (Stave, 2003:303-313); value function approaches (Ananda and Herath, 2003a:75-90); 
conjoint analysis (Alvarez-Farizo and Hanley, 2002:107-116; Dennis, 2000:127-137); stated 
preference models (Haider et al., 2002); multi-criteria approval (Laukkanen et al., 2001:127-137; 
Pavlikakis and Tsihrintzis, 2003:193-205); direct preference investigation  (Kolokytha et al., 
2002:391-400); analytical hierarchy process (Ananda and Herath, 2003b:13-26; Duke and Aull-
Hyde, 2002:131-145; Gomez-Limon, in press; Tzeng et al., 2002:109-120) and even photo 
questionnaires (Ryan, 2002:19-35).  The choice of method is as important as properly implementing 
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the method itself because of some systematic inconsistencies between expected (rational) and actual 
behaviour.  In other words, given a choice between management alternatives, the public will not 
consistently select the “best” alternative based on the evaluation criteria.  Experts in public resource 
management, therefore, sometimes have difficulty in combining information in appropriate ways 
because of limitations in the intuitive decision-making process (Dinar, 1998:367-382; Goicoechea 
et al., 1992:89-102).   
 
The difference between whether to or how to accommodate public opinion is of importance here.  
Answering the question of how to accommodate public opinion implies that a decision has already 
been taken to accommodate it.  Such studies focus on the efficiency of the given method to 
accommodate public opinion and the ability of the method to obtain objective and legitimate 
responses from the public.  These studies do not engage in the fundamentally important decision of 
whether or not to accommodate public opinion. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
This literature review followed roughly the structure shown in Table 1 presenting theoretical 
grounds relevant to the research problem.  The review discussed some reasons for market failures 
relative to public goods, such as bulk-water supply infrastructure.  The rationale for government 
intervention and the problem of government failures in water resource allocation were explained. 
 
MCDM as a specific decision-support mechanism was explained.  Employing this technique would 
certainly be a step in the right direction; however, such a process needs to be refined and expanded 
since the decision-making contexts for government intervention were criticized as being too 
narrowly defined. This has led to an ignorance of important effects and, hence, the need for 
expansions in decision-making contexts.  Expansions with regard to the temporal and spatial 
dimensions of the decision-making context were proposed.  But expansions have impacts on the 
decision-making information load, and consequently, lead to the need for expansions in decision-
support techniques, such as MCDM.  Expansions in decision-support techniques bring to the fore 
uncertainties regarding methodologies of public participation in government intervention and 
resource allocation decision-making.  It was made clear that uncertainty regarding methodologies 
for public enquiry into resource allocation management decision-making, therefore, still exists.  The 
foresaid uncertainty refers to the objective presentation of management options in order to avoid 
bias, thereby jeopardising the legitimacy of the findings.  Political transparency becomes of extreme 
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importance and this study is especially sensitive to this.  Hence, uncertainty refers to the 
achievement of acceptable response rates from public enquiry.  Simple communication of complex 
problems becomes important, implying advance insight into the management problem from the 
decision-maker’s side.  This study engages in the issue of public enquiry and the following chapter 
provides more detailed discussion on the proposed expansion. 
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4. DECISION SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 1 explained the necessity for an expansion in the water allocation decision-making context 
and in decision-support, mainly because of the measurement-problem as mentioned in Section 1.1.  
Chapter 2 set the physical context for the expansions by applying the measurement-problem to the 
BWMA while Chapter 3 provided the theoretical grounds for the problem and for the proposed 
expansions.   
 
This chapter explains the expansion of the decision-making context and the consequent expansion 
in decision-support in detail.  Such expansion increased the need for decision-making information 
and led to modifications in decision-support methodology.  Section 4.2 briefly introduce the two 
expansions.  The next Section (4.3) focuses on the first expansion being a temporal expansion of the 
decision-making context, which is explained via the development of two sequences of bulk supply 
options that compel the consideration of long-term impacts over time instead of sets of options at 
the same moment in time.  Section 4.4 discusses the second expansion, which comprises expanding 
the spatial dimension of the decision-making context in the BWMA.  This entails expanding the 
physical decision-making boundary to include previously excluded rural areas in the decision-
making process.  Lastly, a public and expert panel survey are undertaken to preview the posited 
expansions.  Both surveys are explained in more detail. 
 
4.2 Expansion of decision support 
 
The expansion of decision-support is a direct consequence of expanding the decision-making 
context since an expansion of the context implied an increase in decision-making information (see 
Figure 14).  Expanding decision-support is of the utmost importance if decision-makers strive 
towards social welfare maximisation that includes a sustainable but efficient and equitable resource 
distribution.  This section presents the expansion of two dimensions of the decision-making context.  
Each expansion will be defined and discussed regarding relative importance and methodology.  In 
order to make it more tangible, this problem is applied to bulk-water resource management in the 
BWMA. 
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Figure 14:  Expansion of decision-support 
Source:  (De Lange, 2005) 
 
Figure 14 presents alternative expansion paths to decision-support in this study.  The first is a 
spatial expansion of decision-support and the second is a temporal expansion.  A spatial expansion 
was attempted by broadening the physical context (boundaries) of the decision-making area for 
water resource management.  This expansion implied expansions in representation in decision-
making and was accommodated via a public survey, expert panel survey and an expansion of 
representation of key decision-makers.  The expansion needed to yield a satisfactorily response rate, 
be politically transparent and objective and imply changes in information loads.  Expansion of the 
temporal dimension was attempted via the development of two “development paths” complying 
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with objective criteria, transparency criteria and information load criteria.  This also required an 
expansion of decision-making criteria.  The temporal expansion is discussed before the spatial 
expansion. 
 
4.3 Expansion of the temporal dimension  
 
Expanding the temporal dimension will impact directly on the measurement problem since it will 
force decision-makers to at least consider the long-term costs/benefits that did not previously come 
to the fore in the decision-making process.  The expansion was made tangible via the development 
of two sets of sequences of supply augmentation schemes (development paths or scenarios – see 
Table 14) for future supply in the BWMA.  Each sequence represents the consideration of schemes 
over time instead of alternatives at the same time as has been done in previous studies (Eberhard 
and Joubert, 2001; Eberhard and Joubert, 2002; Joubert et al., 2003; Stewart et al., 1997).  Each 
sequence was constructed in an objective and transparent way by involving local decision-makers in 
the development of each path (Killick, 2006; Van Rooyen, 2005; Van Zyl, 2005).  The 
distinguishing factor of the two development paths could be regarded as water users’ willingness-
to-pay for “greener” water supplies.  Although, still somewhat controversial, it does represent two 
legitimate alternatives for long-term bulk-water supply development for the WCSS.  It is important 
to note that such a suggested outlay is not fixed and could be changed as new information 
(especially regarding costs) becomes available. 
 
Table 14:  Two long-term water resource management strategies 
 
Development path  A Development path  B 
Water scheme 
Implementation 
year 
Scheme 
capacity 
(Mkl) 
Total storage 
capacity in the 
WCSS (Mkl) 
Water scheme 
Implementation 
year  
Scheme 
capacity 
(Mkl) 
Total storage 
capacity in the 
WCSS (Mkl) 
Current water supply 
infrastructure 
2004  
440 
Current water 
supply infrastructure 
2004  
440 
Berg River Project 2006 81 521 Berg River project 2006 81 521 
Voëlvlei scheme Phase I 2013 35 556 Desalination Plant 1 2012 65 586 
Lourens River diversion 2016 19 575 - - - - 
Table Mountain Group 
Aquifer 
2018 70 
645 
Desalination Plant 2 2020 65 
651 
Cape Flats Aquifer 2026 19 664 - - - - 
Eerste River Scheme 2027 8 672 Desalination Plant 3 2027 65 716 
Desalination Plant 1 2028 60 737 - - - - 
 
Source:  (De Lange, 2005) 
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The development paths contain different combinations of supply schemes – some investigated at 
feasibility level and others at pre-feasibility level (City of Cape Town: Water Services, 2002; 
Eberhard and Joubert, 2002; Joubert et al., 2003; Kleynhans, 2002a; Kleynhans, 2002b).  It is 
important to note that the focus is not on individual schemes, but on a development path as a whole.   
 
Development Path A represents the more “conventional” way of supplying future bulk-water needs.  
It incorporates all bulk-water supply schemes up to 2004 in the BWMA (including all water 
demand management strategies such as leakage repair, pressure control and user education).     
 
Development Path B poses an alternative to Development Path A, implementing “expensive” bulk-
water supply options at an earlier stage.  This development path challenges current decision-making 
and cost-estimation methodologies by questioning the relative cost of current “expensive” options 
compared to “cheaper” alternatives if all costs could be quantified and included in the equation.  
Development Path B could also be seen as a structured argument for not increasing water allocation 
from rural to urban areas in the study area.   
 
In practical terms, the main difference between paths A and B relates to the timing of “more 
expensive” supply schemes such as the desalination of seawater.  Development Path A contains 
more robust technology compared to B, while B is more sensitive to technological development 
than A; however, B has, therefore, greater potential in terms of efficiency gains with regard to 
technological development. 
 
The challenge was to identify what long-term impacts each path will have and to evaluate their 
relative legitimacy accordingly.  It was, therefore, extremely important to evaluate the two 
development paths as packages and not merely as the sum of individual schemes.  Within the 
expansion of the temporal dimension, new spatial dimensions (see Section 4.4) came to the fore 
and, with that, additional socio-economic and ecological considerations, forcing decision-makers to 
think more broadly regarding the consequences of water management decisions. 
 
4.4 Expansion of the spatial dimension 
 
Although not the only water user entity in the BWMA, the CCT is by far the biggest (in terms of 
volume and number of users).  It is estimated that more than 90 percent of the total annual water 
supply for the city originates outside the municipal boundaries of the CCT, which makes the CCT 
dependent on the surrounding rural areas for its water supply.  However, in the past, adjacent rural 
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areas have been accommodated to a lesser extent in long-term allocation decision-making.  A 
situation such as this has the potential for the development of conflicting interests between different 
user groups.  Water allocations within the administrative boundaries of the CCT (and even within 
the BWMA in the case of inter-basin transfers) are, therefore, often not as sensitive to allocation 
effects beyond the municipal boundaries of these areas compared to impacts within municipal 
boundaries.  This is because municipal authorities are to a lesser extent responsible for effects 
outside their administrative boundaries and are, therefore, not as sensitive to allocation effects 
occurring outside their boundaries – this could lead to misallocations of water in regional contexts.  
Expanding the spatial dimension of the decision-making context engages in this problem of “bad 
boundaries make bad governments” – or in this case “governance”. 
 
The expansion of the spatial dimension of the decision-making context was made tangible via an 
expansion of the physical boundaries of the area included in decisions-support (see Figure 15 for a 
presentation of the spatial context of the study – defined in terms of secondary catchments).  The 
red line indicates the CCT municipal boundary, while the area in green (including the CCT) 
represents the expansion of the decision-making context.  The expansion is defined in terms of 
secondary catchments and includes all rural areas sharing water resources with the CCT.  The area 
also includes some rural areas from the adjacent Breede Water Management Area, which is 
subjected to inter-basin transfers to the BWMA. 
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Figure 15:  Physical expansion of the decision-making context 
Source:  (De Lange, 2005; Western Cape Department of Agriculture, 2005) 
  
Table 15 presents the local municipalities apart form the CCT that were partly included in the 
expansion. 
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Table 15:  Municipal districts included in the study 
 
West Coast District municipality, 
Moorreesburg: 
Boland District municipality, 
Worcester: 
Overberg District municipality, 
Bredasdorp: 
Berg River local municipality, 
Piketberg 
Drakenstein local municipality, Paarl Theewaterskloof local municipality, 
Caledon 
Saldanha Bay local municipality, 
Vredenburg 
Stellenbosch local municipality, 
Stellenbosch 
 
Swartland local municipality, 
Malmesbury 
  
Source:  (Western Cape Department of Agriculture, 2005) 
 
The expansion of the physical boundaries of the decision-making context resulted in an increase in 
the decision-making information load for decision-support.  Part of this increase in information is 
due to an expansion of representation in the decision-making process of users in newly included 
areas.  This expansion of representation needed to be accounted for and was, hence, accommodated 
in the expansion of three prominent groups in the decision-making process: 
 
• Public enquiry 
• An expert panel 
• Decision-makers 
 
The expert panel and the public were consulted via two surveys while decision-makers via the 
accommodation of the political process running parallel to the whole process. 
 
4.4.1 Expert and public surveys 
 
Since the expert panel and the public differ significantly in their roles in the decision-making 
process, the need for two separate surveys was identified.  The first survey focused on the 
identification of public preferences with regard to long-term water allocation management.  The 
outcome of this survey was used as input for the expert panel survey, which focused on determining 
a weighted score for the two development paths (Table 14) and was used to advise decision-makers. 
 
Political transparency played an important role in the development of both surveys since the process 
could be hampered by opportunistic political behaviour.  If researchers ignore the impacts of 
politics, the legitimacy of the results could be questioned.  The study, therefore, incorporated the 
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political process running parallel to the study right from the inception phase of the study.  This did 
slow the development process somewhat but did ultimately enhance political acceptability of the 
research findings.  The following is a broad chronological layout of the methodology followed in 
the development of the two surveys: 
 
• Conceptual research problem formulation; 
• Consultation with decision-makers; 
• Initial literature review (updated throughout the study); 
• Continuous networking management figures in BWMA; 
• Research problem identification, definition and identification of theoretical shortcoming; 
• Literature review and structuring of action plan; 
• Initial survey planning; 
• Consultation with decision-makers; 
• Respondent identification for both surveys; 
• Public and expert questionnaire development; 
• Consultation with decision-makers; 
• Public and expert survey development (logistics); 
• Consultation with decision-makers; 
• Peer review of questionnaires for political acceptability, relevance, accuracy, volume of 
information presented, simplicity, and criteria-groups employed.  (A small selected panel of 
key figures from Stellenbosch University, Cape Town University, the CCT and the 
Departments of Agriculture and Water Affairs and Forestry conducted this review process.); 
• Public sampling process; 
• Expert panel identification (participation on invitation); 
• Pilot run for public survey; 
• Finalisation of questionnaires; 
• Sampling and survey processes; 
• Return of public questionnaires and expert panel questionnaires; 
• Processing; 
• Expert panel interviews; 
• Expert panel follow-up; 
• Analysis; 
• Final comparison of development paths A and B and  
• Reporting and communication of results 
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4.4.2 Assumptions 
 
The following are the main assumptions that were made in the research that needed to be kept in 
mind when interpreting the results: 
 
• Since this is not a technical study, most of the quoted technical specifications of the bulk-
water supply augmentation schemes were obtained from specialised studies.  These 
technical specifications were not verified in depth and were assumed to be acceptable for the 
purposes of the study. 
• Although the continuation of the pilot study has been approved, this study does not assume 
that the CCT will automatically proceed with the Table Mountain Group Aquifer as a supply 
augmentation scheme. 
• The individual preference orderings of rural and urban respondents were considered equally 
important. 
• All participants in the expert panel survey are seen as specialists in their distinct fields with 
no distinction being made between the relative importance of disciplines.  Responses and 
comments from the different experts are, therefore, seen as equally important. 
 
4.4.3 Public survey 
 
Public enquiry was accommodated by means of a survey that determined public preference with 
regard to the two development paths, as mentioned in Table 14, for the expanded decision-making 
context (see Figure 15).  A conjoint-analysis based approach was followed (Alvarez-Farizo and 
Hanley, 2002:107-116; Belton and Stewart, 2002).  This method collects and analyses individual 
preferences for goods and services (in this case it was a public good - bulk-water supply).  The 
method assumes that each scheme may be described in terms of its characteristics or attributes to 
society and the natural environment and the extent to which respondents value the good or service 
(water scheme-services) depends on their valuation of the attributes of the good or service.   
 
Survey questions may be asked in pairs or in the full-profile method.  This study settled for a one-
page full-profile presentation because of the obvious limitation of respondents to absorb a large 
volume of information.  Just enough information was provided to enable respondents to display 
their preferences.  This was done to keep the response rate as high as possible.  The information 
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presented was, for the aforesaid reason, focused to indicate differences between the two 
development paths and not all strong and weak points of each development path.   
 
Presenting a legitimate and objective view of a complex situation, in simple language, on one page, 
proved challenging.  It was anticipated that the public would use the provided information to merely 
guide their preferences, as responses will be a function of the information provided and own 
personal perceptions and contexts.  Once again, the transparency of the questionnaire development 
process became important with the key stakeholders and local government participating in the 
development of the questionnaires.  It became clear that building public support for resource 
management policies without manipulating the public in a specific direction requires raising public 
awareness of resource problems and developing an understanding of the consequences of different 
management options (i.e. an educational challenge, particularly in environmental educational 
sciences). 
 
A small pilot study was done in the towns of Stellenbosch and Paarl (see Figure 15) to verify that 
the questionnaire was easy to understand.  Minor adjustments were subsequently made.    
 
Budget limitations allowed for a stratified random sample of approximately 7000 postal 
questionnaires.  Raw data (a database containing 607292 rows of information in respect of all 
registered water users in the CCT) for the urban areas was obtained from the CCT city engineers 
(Mostert, 2004; Muller, 2005).  Since this was a postal survey, the rows were sorted by postal 
address, and all records without a postal address were deleted.  The database was then sorted 
according to land-use, from where all non-residential uses, including schools, government buildings 
and industries were deleted.  This was done because non-residential users do not pay according to a 
block tariff system and the voting power does not lie with them.  The data was then sorted 
according to land value.  All records comprising municipal property values lower than R50 000 
were deleted because of the risk of the non-payment problem associated with such properties.  All 
properties with municipal valuations above R3 000 0000 were also deleted because the assumption 
was made that these water users will probably pay their municipal accounts via debit order and will 
never question their water bill each month.  Approximately 195630 data entries in 60 suburbs were 
left in the database after checking for duplicate records.  Each suburb was extracted into a separate 
spreadsheet and was again sorted according to land value.  A random number ranging between zero 
and the number of the particular suburb was allocated to each property.  Each suburb was then 
sorted according to the random numbers in ascending order. 
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The rural areas in the expanded decision-making context (Figure 15) were handled in much the 
same way. Parts of the following district municipalities were included along with the CCT (see 
Table 15): 
 
• West Coast 
• Boland 
• Overberg 
 
However, not the whole of the above-mentioned district municipalities were included in the sample 
since not the whole of each area shares water resources with the CCT.  Much effort went into 
matching the district municipal database with the secondary catchments in rural areas sharing with 
the CCT.  Each local municipality (as indicated in Table 15) was approached to obtain their address 
lists.  The initial database was significantly smaller with 79382 entries remaining after the data was 
cleaned and ordered in the same way as was the CCT data. 
 
The budget limitation of approximately 7000 questionnaires allowed a 2.55 percent stratified 
sample of the 275012 data entries.  Samples equal to the representative size of each suburb/region 
were drawn.  A total of 7029 questionnaires went out to respondents in January 2005.  The timing 
in terms of response rate of the survey was favourable because of a newly announced 20 percent 
water restriction in October 2004 in almost the whole BWMA.  The media also played an important 
role in increasing public awareness regarding water scarcity in the region. 
 
Each participant in the public survey received the following: 
• A covering letter introducing the reason and aim of the survey; 
• Background information and questionnaire on a single page; 
• A return envelope to increase the response rate (see  Annexure 2). 
 
The postal survey did not test the ability of the public to provide suggestions for long-term water 
management but merely asked the public’s opinion regarding two legitimate long-term water 
resource management strategies for the BWMA (being the two development paths -see Table 14).  
The public was confronted with key expected impacts/outcomes of the two developments paths 
broadly structured in terms of the same criteria as used in the expert survey (see Figure 16).  
Respondents were merely asked to indicate their relative preference for each development path via a 
scoring system.  The outcome of this survey was used to obtain an indication of the relative 
preferences of the public regarding long-term water management as well to compare the outcome of 
 86 
the survey with expert estimations regarding public preferences.  For results on the public survey, 
refer to Section 5.2. 
 
4.4.4 Expert panel survey 
 
Expert panel enquiry followed a modified Delphi technique.  The method was originally conceived 
as a way to obtain the opinion of experts without necessarily bringing them together face to face 
(Curtis, 2004), however in this study face to face interviews were necessary. 
 
Expert panels are not responsible for the final choice of supply augmentation scheme since their 
sole function is to provide a legitimate information platform upon which decision-makers can base 
management decisions.  The physical expansion of the decision-making context significantly 
increased the decision-making information load needed to make water allocation decisions.  
Consequently, the group of experts providing decision-making information also needed to be 
expanded.  A list of key experts was identified (see Annexure 3) using the criteria structure as 
mentioned in Figure 16 as a guideline.  The newly established expert panel was then utilized to 
compile an information and scoring document (see Annexure 6) to expand the temporal and spatial 
dimensions.  Previous MCDM studies done in the BWMA (Belton and Stewart, 2002; Eberhard and 
Joubert, 2002; Joubert et al., 2003; Kleynhans, 2002a; Stewart et al., 2001; Stewart et al., 1997) 
served as a basic point of departure for the development of the information and scoring document.  
In previous studies, individual water management schemes were evaluated, while for this study, the 
emphasis fell on the evaluation of alternative development paths (sequences of supply augmentation 
schemes-see Table 14) over time.  The alternative development paths were compiled by 
amalgamating the responses of the various water management experts consulted in the Western 
Cape. It is important to note that the emphasis fell on the development of the two development 
paths as units within a regional context and not as discrete schemes. 
 
Some standards of judgement and comparison were necessary to compare the development paths – 
from there, the compilation of the criteria set as presented in Figure 16.  These criteria also 
structured the information and scoring document (Annexure 6).  Political acceptability was critical 
for this part of the study, and the process was, therefore, made as transparent as possible via 
numerous discussions with the local Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, Department of 
Agriculture and the CCT Administration.  The selection of comparison criteria for the two 
development paths is crucial for obtaining a legitimate answer.  In order to follow a holistic 
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approach, an extensive list of criteria was first identified to describe the two development paths.  
However, not all were relevant in the decision-making process, and a balance between volume of 
information and relevance needed to be found.  It was, therefore, decided that only differentiating 
criteria would be used to distinguish between the two development paths, i.e. the emphasis would 
be placed on presenting the differences rather than the similarities between the two development 
paths. This was aimed at keeping the information to a minimum and as relevant as possible.  
Therefore, only criteria that yielded enough information to describe significant differences between 
development paths A and B were used in the study (see Figure 16).   
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Figure 16:  Criteria tree for the regional MCDA used in the study 
 
Five main criteria groups, of which four consisted of sub-criteria, were identified: 
 
• Water balance, with two sub-criteria.  The first sub-criterion was the relative “confidence in 
the yield” expectation, because it would heavily influence the relative time before new 
supply schemes would be needed.  The second sub-criterion was “timing of yield” or the 
timely phasing in of different schemes to supplement supply, and it was seen as an 
important criterion if viewed from an assurance of supply point of view – particularly if 
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schedule one (water for human consumption and in-stream flow requirements) water users 
are considered as the most important users of water. 
• Finances, with three sub-criteria.  The unit reference value (“URV”) was included as this 
measure is the standard financial indicator to compare bulk supply projects.  The URV is a 
discounted value (over the project life-time using a predetermined discount rate) per cubic 
metre of water for the project.  This value only accounts for the capital, operational, and 
maintenance costs of schemes over the project lifespan.  It does not include externalities 
(positive or negative) and the long-term impacts of the schemes.  The relative “confidence 
in the accuracy of cost estimations” impacts on water tariff settings (particularly in cases 
where cost-recovery strategies are followed) and, therefore, also on the relative weight of 
financial criteria as a whole – this criterion is, therefore, important and was included.  
“Changes in tariffs” necessary to maintain the water supply services reflect on the 
affordability of an option or, in this case, development path.  It has an important impact on 
the public’s acceptance of an option and eventually on the relative willingness of the public 
to pay for this water. 
• Socio-economics included six sub-criteria.  The “dependency on natural rainfall” and the 
“volume of water allocated from rural to urban areas” were used as the point of departure 
for the discussion on socio-economic impacts.  One could question whether these two could 
be seen as criteria; however, after consideration it was decided that they should be included 
because they form the bases for differentiating spin-offs from themselves.  The "dependency 
on natural rainfall” was included to present the basic difference between the development 
of additional storage capacity and water production.  The relative importance of agricultural 
irrigation in terms of water usage was accommodated by including the impacts of water 
restrictions (“impact on agricultural production and employment”) on irrigated agriculture.  
These impacts were pulled through to the rest of the economy by using “multipliers”.  
“Urbanisation” was included for its relative importance in population demographics as an 
important driver of water demand and to show the opportunity cost of keeping the people in 
the rural areas.  Finally, “recreation and tourism” were included because of the correlation 
between tourism and the natural beauty of water bodies.   
• The environment criteria group proved to be a controversial topic (Day, 2005; Killick, 
2006).  Without being trapped in lengthy discussions on differing values and moralities, it 
was decided to include five sub-criteria.  “In-stream flow requirements” proved to be the 
first and most important determinant in this section.  Minimum in-stream flow requirements 
are enforced by law in South Africa, and much research effort goes into the quantification of 
such requirements for the different catchment areas in South Africa.  “Waste disposal and 
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the dilution effect” of rivers were included because these have a direct impact on pollution 
as an important driver of water demand.  “Ground-water recharge and discharge” tempos 
were included to focus specifically on the groundwater potential (being the next source of 
bulk supply because of the lack of alternative surface supply options) of the area and the 
differences between the two development paths in this regard.  “Flood and erosion control” 
were also included; however, little scope remains for the construction of additional dams in 
the study area, which limits the expansion of increased flood control.  The “impacts on 
biodiversity” remain rather open and were seen as the “generic criteria” of environmental 
impacts.  
• Public acceptance was accommodated as a separate criteria group. 
 
In compiling the list of experts used on the expert panel, 16 individuals who served on the 
CMABWS study (Eberhard and Joubert, 2002; Kleynhans, 2002a) were used as a point of 
departure.  An additional 34 individuals (chosen from among authors included in the literature 
review and networking contacts) were identified and invited to participate (see Annexure 3).  Of the 
50 invitations, 17 agreed to participate in the survey. 
 
Initially, the intention was to complete the expert panel survey at a series of workshops where all 
scoring and negotiations could be concluded.  However, finding a date that would be suitable for all 
proved impossible to obtain.  This proposal was abandoned and an electronic survey via e-mail was 
chosen instead.  Participation entailed scoring the two proposed development paths in terms of a 
criteria tree (see Figure 16).  The expert panel survey presented the two developments paths in 
significant detail, and the challenge was to quantify (or at least discuss) the long-term impacts of 
both development paths in terms of the criteria set.  Experts were asked to score and make a trade-
off based on the presented information and their own field of expertise.  The panel were also asked 
to indicate the relative importance of the different criteria (see Figure 16) via a weight allocation 
exercise.  They also received the public questionnaire (see Section 4.4.3) and were asked to provide 
their estimation regarding the outcome.  This was important to determine whether, or to what 
extent, the experts (decision-makers or agents) have insight into public (principal) preference. 
 
The e-mail session was followed by a personal consultation with each expert after completion of the 
scoring document.  During this meeting, all scores and weights were discussed and verified, and 
care was taken to ensure the correct interpretation of questions.  All the comments made during 
these meetings were noted.  After completion of the round of interviews, all comments were 
compiled in a single questionnaire (see Annexure 6) and used in a follow-up e-mail session (see 
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Annexure 5) during which the expert panel were given the opportunity to respond to one another’s 
comments.  All comments were used anonymously to partially guide the statistical analysis and 
inference in Chapter 5. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
It should be clear that the study area is defined in a regional context with sequences of supply 
augmentation schemes being compared over time.  This scenario confronts decision-makers with a 
broader set of variables that influence scores in the MCDM process (and compilation of the weight 
structure) than comparing a single scheme at a time.  MCDM exercises could, therefore, promote 
different management strategies depending on the context.  The challenge, therefore, lies in defining 
the “best” decision-making context before comparing different management options since 
seemingly the “best” option for implementation when comparing single schemes could prove to be 
a “poor” option when viewed in a regional context over time.  
 
An expansion in the decision-making context necessitated by effects not accounted for regarding 
previously excluded parties and increased information needs in water resource allocation 
management in the BWMA was explained in this chapter in detail.  Two expansions were 
discussed, - the first was a spatial expansion of the decision-making context, which was 
accommodated via the development of two sequences of bulk supply options. This necessitated the 
consideration of long-term impacts over time instead of sets of options at the same time.  This 
expansion forced decision-makers to at least consider previously unaccounted for effects in 
allocation decision-making.  The second expansion comprised expanding the spatial dimension of 
the decision-making context in the BWMA.  This was done via the physical expansion of the 
decision-making boundary to include previously excluded areas in the decision-making process in 
the BWMA.    
 
The risk of ignorance towards the expansions was explained.  Both expansions loaded the 
informational need in decision-making and, therefore, led to modifications in decision-support 
methodology.  Consequently, a public and an expert panel survey were done to partially 
accommodate this need.  The delimitation and methodology of both surveys were explained in 
detail. The next chapter focuses on presenting the outcomes of the expansions in terms of the results 
of the public and expert panel surveys. 
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5. OUTCOMES 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The necessity of expanding the water allocation decision-making context was explained in Chapter 
1.  This expansion motivated expansions in decision-support techniques and decision-making 
information.  Chapter 2 set the context for the expansion while Chapter 3 provided the theoretical 
base.  Chapter 4 explained the methodology behind the aforesaid expansions. 
 
This chapter presents the outcome of the public and expert panel surveys as discussed in Chapter 4.  
Section 5.2 focuses on the public survey, presenting some descriptive statistics of the outcome.  The 
public survey fed into the expert panel survey (as mentioned in Section 5.3), resulting in a final 
weighted score for each development path that will be used to inform long-term allocation decision-
making.  Important expert comments were noted in Section 5.4 and main contributions are 
discussed in Section 5.5. 
 
5.2 Public survey outcome 
 
The public survey estimated public preference relating to long-term water resource allocation 
management in the BWMA.  Public preference for “greener” water supplies (Development Path B) 
compared to “traditional” augmentation schemes (Development Path A) was needed to inform 
expert estimations since it is important that decision-makers do not decide on preferences on behalf 
of the public.  It was, therefore, necessary to obtain public preference in a transparent manner (as 
discussed in Section 4.4.3). 
 
The two developments paths were compared in terms of the criteria set, as mentioned in Figure 16 - 
however, only main criteria groups were used to allow for simplicity and length of the 
questionnaire.  Respondent were asked to state their preference on a scale out of 100.  For 
discussion purposes the focus will be on Development Path A, since Development Path B will be 
the mirror image of A.  The outcome of Development Path B will however be reported where 
necessary. 
 92 
 
Table 16:  Descriptive statistics for the public and expert panel surveys 
Descriptive statistics Development Path A Development Path B Development Path A Development Path B
Mean 38.563 61.438 44.118 55.882
Standard Error 0.772 0.772 4.314 4.314
Median 35 65 40 60
Mode 40 60 60 40
Standard Deviation 25.473 25.473 17.787 17.787
Sample Variance 648.853 648.853 316.360 316.360
Kurtosis -0.363 -0.363 -0.923 -0.923
Skewness 0.475 -0.475 -0.431 0.431
Range 100 100 60 60
Minimum 0 0 10 30
Maximum 100 100 70 90
Sum 41956 66844 750 950
Count 1088 1088 17 17
Public survey Expert estimations
 
Source:  (De Lange, 2005) 
 
Table 16 presents descriptive statistics as well as comparative expert estimations for Development 
Path A from the public survey.  As mentioned in Section 4.4.4 participants in the expert panel 
survey also received a copy of the public questionnaire to enable them to indicate their estimations 
regarding the outcome of the public survey.  It must be noted that no generalisation could be made 
whatsoever with regard to the comparison of the obtained public preference and expert panel 
estimations since the outcome will always be a function of the issue at hand. Although possible, no 
statistical analysis of the comparison of the public preferences and expert panel estimations of such 
preferences was done.  The important point is that public preferences were consulted and not 
assumed. 
 
Of the original 7029 postal questionnaires that went out, 1088 were returned.  This represents a 
15.48 percent response rate, which is considered satisfactory, given that response rates of between 5 
percent and 10 percent are often realised in surveys relating to public issues.  However, 
expectations were higher because, at the time of the survey, the BWMA was in a one-hundred-year 
drought cycle accompanied by wide media coverage regarding the natural, socio-economic and 
financial impacts of the drought.  Low response rates could hamper the legitimacy of public surveys 
regarding strategic recourse issues.  Individual respondents may feel that public issues do not affect 
them directly, nor could they make a difference in the final outcome.  This links up with the basic 
claim underlying public choice theory, which holds that sound government policies in a functional 
democracy are an under-provided public good, because of the rational ignorance of voters: each 
voter is faced with an extremely small probability that his/her vote will change the result of the 
outcome, while gathering the relevant information necessary for a well-informed answer/vote 
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generally requires substantial time and effort.  Therefore, the rational decision of each voter is to be 
generally ignorant of surveys regarding public goods, politics and is perhaps even withhold from 
voting.  Rational choice theorists claim that this explains the gross ignorance of most citizens in 
modern democracies as well as low voter turnout (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Buchy and 
Hoverman, 2000; Mueller, 1997).  This study attempted to compensate for significant investments 
in time and effort to gather decision-making information by providing for this need in an objective 
manner within the public questionnaire (see Annexure 2). 
 
The outcome of the public questionnaire yielded a preference for Development Path B (and, 
therefore, a  “greener” water allocation strategy) in the proportion of 60:40 by three indicators of 
relative location of the data.  Although both the mode and median are preferable to the mean as 
indicators of relative location for non-parametric data, only small differences were realised between 
the three measures with all three measures indicating a preference towards Development Path B in 
the same magnitude (see Table 16).  It was decided that the mean score of 38.56 for Development 
Path A (and 61.44 for Path B) would be used in the aggregation process, which follows the expert 
panel survey (see Table 17).  Mean and median expert panel estimations approximate the outcome 
of the public survey except for the mode that was the exact opposite, indicating outliers (or possible 
disagreement) in expert opinion (see Table 16).     
 
5.3 Expert panel survey outcome 
 
The expert panel survey was a more detailed multi-disciplinary comparison of the two development 
paths.  The comparison followed the structure of the criteria set as describe in Figure 16 with four 
of the five main criteria groups being accommodated in the expert panel survey.  The fifth main 
criteria group (public acceptance) was measured by the public survey and was only accounted for in 
the aggregation process as summarised in Table 17, Table 18 and Table 19.   
 
Two issues were of importance for the expert panel survey: first, the level of consensus among 
experts regarding the scores and criteria weights (relative importance of the differentiating criteria) 
and second, the aggregated weighted total score for each development path.  The level of consensus 
was important since it impacted on the decision regarding which point parameter in each 
distribution will be used in the aggregation process.  The aggregation process per se will allow 
decision-makers to make water resource allocation decisions with greater confidence without 
harbouring the fear that these decisions will harm their political positions. 
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Normal probability plots (not shown) indicated that a significant number of criteria were non-
normally distributed with significant variation evident for both scores and weights (see Figure 17).  
This implies a relatively low level of consensus among experts regarding the level of importance of 
the different criteria.  However, differences were expected since the panel was composed of experts 
from different fields of interest. 
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Figure 17:  Box and whisker plot for scores and weights of all criteria 
Source:  (De Lange, 2005) 
 
A single parameter representing each distribution of scores and weights was needed for aggregation 
purposes (therefore assuming normality).  For the sake of comparison, the mean, mode and median 
were used in three separate aggregation runs for comparative calculations.  Answers of the same 
magnitude were obtained with all three indicators displaying a majority for Development Path B.  
The study settled on presenting only the mean for the weight structure, which gave the most 
balanced view of the criteria for display purposes (see Figure 18 for the mean weight of each of the 
five main criteria groups and Figure 19 for the average of the different sub-criteria). 
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Figure 18:  Mean weights: main criteria groups 
Source:  (De Lange, 2005) 
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Figure 19:  Mean weights: sub-criteria groups 
Source:  (De Lange, 2005) 
 
Aggregated total scores for the two development paths were obtained by aggregating the weighted 
scores obtained from each sub-criterion.  A weighted score for each sub-criterion was obtained by 
multiplying mean (mode or median) scores by the mean (mode or median) weight of the particular 
sub-criterion.  Total scores for development paths A and B were, therefore, compared in terms of 
the mean (see Table 17), the mode (see Table 18) and the median (see Table 19).  Answers of the 
same magnitude were obtained and using the mean was settled on, which gave the most balanced 
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view of the criteria.  (Note the placing of the outcome of the public survey under the public 
acceptance criteria group.)  
 
Table 17:  Aggregated score for development paths A and B (mean) 
Main criteria Sub-criteria: Weight Cumulative weight A B A B
Water balance 1.000 0.221
Confidence in yield 0.529 0.119 0.387 0.613 0.046 0.073
Timing (ability to supply the demand) 0.471 0.101 0.370 0.630 0.038 0.064
Financial aspects 1.000 0.242
URV 0.389 0.091 0.682 0.318 0.062 0.029
Confidence in total cost estimates 0.304 0.075 0.466 0.534 0.035 0.040
Tariff changes necessary to maintain service 0.307 0.077 0.631 0.369 0.049 0.028
Socio-economic aspects 1.000 0.178
Dependency on natural rainfall 0.221 0.039 0.153 0.847 0.006 0.033
Volume of water allocated from rural to urban areas 0.130 0.023 0.267 0.733 0.006 0.017
Impacts on agricultural production and employment 0.296 0.053 0.382 0.618 0.020 0.033
Multipliers 0.125 0.025 0.406 0.594 0.010 0.015
Urbanisation 0.115 0.017 0.414 0.586 0.007 0.010
Recreation and tourism 0.112 0.021 0.445 0.555 0.009 0.011
Environmental aspects 1.000 0.265
Expected impacts on IFR 0.311 0.086 0.270 0.730 0.023 0.063
Waste disposal and dilution effect 0.174 0.045 0.342 0.658 0.015 0.029
Ground water recharge. 0.175 0.044 0.409 0.591 0.018 0.026
Flood and erosion control 0.100 0.027 0.544 0.456 0.015 0.012
Loss of biodiversity 0.241 0.064 0.359 0.641 0.023 0.041
Public acceptance 1.000 0.094 0.386 0.614 0.036 0.058
1.000 0.418 0.582
Score (unweighted) Score (weighted)
 
Source:  (De Lange, 2005) 
 
Table 18:  Aggregated score for development paths A and B (mode) 
Main criteria Sub-criteria: Weight Cumulative weight A B A B
Water balance 1.000 0.330
Confidence in yield 0.700 0.210 0.400 0.600 0.084 0.126
Timing (ability to supply the demand) 0.300 0.120 0.500 0.500 0.060 0.060
Financial aspects 0.900 0.175
URV 0.300 0.090 0.700 0.300 0.063 0.027
Confidence in total cost estimates 0.200 0.045 0.400 0.600 0.018 0.027
Tariff changes necessary to maintain service 0.400 0.040 0.700 0.300 0.028 0.012
Socio-economic aspects 0.900 0.165
Dependency on natural rainfall 0.200 0.030 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.030
Volume of water allocated from rural to urban areas 0.150 0.030 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.030
Impacts on agricultural production and employment 0.300 0.045 0.500 0.500 0.023 0.023
Multipliers 0.100 0.030 0.500 0.500 0.015 0.015
Urbanisation 0.100 0.015 0.500 0.500 0.008 0.008
Recreation and tourism 0.050 0.015 0.500 0.500 0.008 0.008
Environmental aspects 1.050 0.190
Expected impacts on IFR 0.400 0.050 0.200 0.800 0.010 0.040
Waste disposal and dilution effect 0.200 0.025 0.400 0.600 0.010 0.015
Ground water recharge. 0.200 0.050 0.500 0.500 0.025 0.025
Flood and erosion control 0.050 0.015 0.400 0.600 0.006 0.009
Loss of biodiversity 0.200 0.050 0.400 0.600 0.020 0.030
Public acceptance 1.000 0.100 0.386 0.614 0.039 0.061
0.960 0.415 0.545
Score (unweighted) Score (weighted)
 
Source:  (De Lange, 2005) 
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Table 19:  Aggregated score for development paths A and B (median) 
Main criteria Sub-criteria: Weight Cumulative weight A B A B
Water balance 1.000 0.170
Confidence in yield 0.500 0.080 0.400 0.600 0.032 0.048
Timing (ability to supply the demand) 0.500 0.090 0.357 0.643 0.032 0.058
Financial aspects 0.960 0.200
URV 0.330 0.070 0.700 0.300 0.049 0.021
Confidence in total cost estimates 0.300 0.070 0.500 0.500 0.035 0.035
Tariff changes necessary to maintain service 0.330 0.060 0.700 0.300 0.042 0.018
Socio-economic aspects 0.943 0.157
Dependency on natural rainfall 0.200 0.040 0.100 0.900 0.004 0.036
Volume of water allocated from rural to urban areas 0.143 0.020 0.308 0.692 0.006 0.014
Impacts on agricultural production and employment 0.300 0.045 0.400 0.600 0.018 0.027
Multipliers 0.100 0.020 0.438 0.563 0.009 0.011
Urbanisation 0.100 0.018 0.462 0.538 0.008 0.009
Recreation and tourism 0.100 0.015 0.500 0.500 0.008 0.008
Environmental aspects 1.000 0.230
Expected impacts on IFR 0.300 0.063 0.286 0.714 0.018 0.045
Waste disposal and dilution effect 0.200 0.045 0.400 0.600 0.018 0.027
Ground water recharge. 0.200 0.050 0.400 0.600 0.020 0.030
Flood and erosion control 0.100 0.023 0.500 0.500 0.011 0.011
Loss of biodiversity 0.200 0.050 0.357 0.643 0.018 0.032
Public acceptance 1.000 0.100 0.386 0.614 0.039 0.061
0.857 0.366 0.491
Score (unweighted) Score (weighted)
 
Source:  (De Lange, 2005) 
 
The outcome suggests that Development Path B was the preferred option suggesting a willingness 
to pay for “greener” water and public acceptance of increased water tariffs to accommodate the 
implementation of such strategies.  However, care must be taken not to use the outcome of this 
study as an “over-generalization” to promote “greener” allocation strategies in the CCT since, it 
should be borne in mind that an MCDM exercise merely aids in the decision-making process and 
does not replace the water manager as the final decision maker. 
 
5.4 Expert comments 
 
Although the public returned numerous comments, it was decided to focus only on comments from 
the expert panel survey  (see Annexure 6).  The study proved dynamic and controversial with 
numerous comments received from the expert panel survey.  The main concerns from the expert 
panel could be summarised as follows: 
 
• The risks associated with public enquiry were emphasized.  One of these risks was public 
response always being a mixed function of the presented information and personal 
perception.  Another was public response also being vulnerable to information overloads 
and bias.  The study agreed with this comment. 
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• A bias against Development Path A with regard to criteria selection and the presentation of 
information was mentioned – especially with regard to the cost and affordability of 
desalination.  However, this argument stands completely ignorant towards Figure 1. 
• It was noted that the adjacent Breede Water Management Area has significant potential to 
augment the BWMA and that additional supply options such as the desalination of seawater 
are not needed at this point in time.  However, the study is of the opinion that such a 
comment is ungrounded. 
• The importance of the impact of climate change on long-term resource allocation was noted. 
 
5.5 Main contributions 
 
The central contribution of the study focused on engaging in the measurement problem as described 
in Chapter 1 by a proposed expansion in the decision-making context of water resource allocation 
decision-making.  The decision-making context was broadened by expanding its temporal and 
spatial dimensions.  These processes were made as transparent as possible to increase stakeholder 
buy-in.  Expansions were discussed in detail in Chapter 4 while the current chapter expounded the 
two surveys that formed part of the increased information load as discussed in Section 4.4. 
 
The outcome of the aggregation process as mentioned in Section 5.4 indicated a preference towards 
acceptance of “greener” allocation strategies, even if these implied an increased financial burden on 
the receivers of such strategies.  The acceptance of a higher financial burden suggested greater 
understanding of the “measurement problem” as indicated in Figure 1 and implies that decision-
makers could make “greener” allocations with greater confidence and without fear of harming their 
political positions.  The outcome of the public survey also showed the value of consulting the public 
for its preferences as opposed to making assumptions regarding these. 
 
The risks associated with public enquiry were emphasized.  These included the public response 
always being a mixed function of the presented information and personal perception.  Public 
response is also vulnerable to information overloads and bias. 
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5.6 Conclusion 
 
The outcomes of the public and expert panel surveys were discussed in this chapter.  These were 
presented in terms of an aggregated public score for the two development paths that was used along 
with the expert panel survey outcome to compute an overall score for both development paths.  
Both cases displayed a willingness to pay for greener water management options. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS, SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
From this study, certain conclusions and recommendations may be drawn with regard to decision-
making in water resource allocation management.   
 
6.1 Conclusions 
 
The study assumed a water resource scarcity situation in the BWMA, with allocations between 
different users as the prominent decision-making challenge.  The presence of unaccounted-for 
effects in allocation distributions (due to the current inability to confidently estimate total 
costs/benefits of allocation distributions) promotes ignorance of some spatial and temporal 
dimensions of resource allocation decision-making, and therefore, narrows the allocation decision-
making context.  This leads to a measurement problem that promotes failures in market and 
government orientated allocation systems, thereby hampering the promotion of allocations that 
support social welfare maximisation.  Decision-support techniques, including multi-criteria 
decision-making (MCDM), are employed to aid in this regard, but need to be refined to allow for 
the confident capturing or at least consideration of unaccounted for effects (longer-term impacts) in 
a broader decision-making context.  This study identified the need to make resource allocation 
decision-making more sensitive to this measurement problem within the BWMA. 
 
The competitive market as a resources allocation mechanism caters for individual allocation 
decision-making, but not to the same extent for bulk resource allocations.  This is because bulk-
water infrastructure, as a public good, is often an example of a market failure since market solutions 
to the allocation problem are the aggregate of the outcome of individual preference orderings.  To 
argue that such an allocation will promote social welfare would be wrong since the individual 
market player did not aim his participatory behaviour towards social welfare but merely towards 
promoting his own welfare. It cannot, therefore, be claimed that market allocations are the best 
resource allocation mechanism.  Government needs to intervene to account for market failures in 
the case of public goods, such as bulk-water supply infrastructures. 
 
Government intervention is guided by resource allocation legislation which strives towards 
sustainability, efficiency, equity and, ultimately, social welfare maximisation.  In intervening, 
principal-agent relationships emerge between the public (principal) and resource allocation 
decision-makers (agent).  Agents are confronted with the above-mentioned measurement problem 
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hampering their ability to account for all costs and benefits associated with different resource 
allocation options, i.e. a scenario of decision-making with incomplete information.  Uncertainty 
regarding user (principal) preferences accounts in part for this incomplete information.  It is, 
however, uncertain whether the public should indeed be consulted with regard to long-term strategic 
water management issues.   
 
Long-term water resource management has become a specialized and complex field and the relative 
legitimacy of involving the general public in these matters becomes questionable.  However, on 
investigating the impacts of accommodating public preferences in strategic decision-making, 
evidence from the literature suggested enquiry into public preference for water resource 
management; hence, the accommodation of public preference forms part of this study.  The exact 
methodology of public enquiry to obtain a legitimate answer is still uncertain.  This uncertainty 
refers to the objective representation of management options and the achievement of acceptable 
response rates from the public enquiry without attracting criticism regarding bias relating to 
management options.  The public cannot be regarded as experts with regard to allocation decision-
making, and care should, therefore, be taken not to lead public preferences.  Transparency of the 
public enquiry process will avoid expert and political critique regarding bias.  This implies that 
politicians and experts should, therefore, buy into the public enquiry process from the beginning. 
Response rates are also problematic because of the rational ignorance of the public.  An acceptable 
response rate could be promoted through simple communication of the impacts of a complex 
problem.  However, this implies a need for advanced insight into the management problem and a 
need to keep information volumes limited and relevant.    
 
The measurement problem together with a vulnerability to lobby groups, hidden agendas and the 
permissibility of discretion, often leading to the misuse of power, lead to government failures.  A 
need is, therefore, created to support government intervention, by consulting the public, to ensure 
the promotion of social welfare.   
 
Structured thinking and an expanded decision-making context are needed to promote accountability 
with regard to the measurement problem in resource allocation decision-making.  It should, 
therefore, be clear that an integrated approach is called for together with expansions in decision-
support.  Such expansion increases the decision-making information load and, therefore, the need 
for expanded decision-support techniques.  These expansions were accommodated via spatial and 
temporal expansions of the decision-making context.  Temporal expansions were accommodated 
via the development of alternative long-term strategies regarding water supply augmentation in the 
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BWMA.  Spatial expansions entailed physically expanding the decision-making boundaries to 
include relevant, but previous neglected, rural areas that shared water resources with urban areas in 
the BWMA.  This led to an expansion in representation of the newly included areas.  The 
expansions forced the accommodation or at least the consideration of measurement problems and 
resulted in better decision-making information. 
 
Decision-support (such as MCDM) for cases such as these should certainly not be seen as a fail-safe 
method of ensuring that all parties’ welfare will be maximised, but rather as a method of making 
allocation processes more tangible through making risks and uncertainties more explicit.  Previous 
MCDM runs (Eberhard and Joubert, 2002; Joubert et al., 2003) yield preferences for “conventional” 
bulk supply schemes.  However, after expanding the decision-making context, a higher willingness 
to pay for “greener” allocations was noted, suggesting that an expansion of the decision-making 
context, along with decision-support, promotes social welfare - even if all costs and benefits could 
not be quantified.  The legitimate presentation of total costs through the promotion of political 
transparency safeguards against bias with regard to representation of the impacts of alternative 
allocations.  It is important that decision-makers should not only focus on direct costs as this could 
lead to bias and unsustainable resource allocations. 
 
Part of engaging in the measurement problem involves drawing the decision-making context wide 
enough to avoid ignorance of negative impacts on social welfare in the longer term.  The 
delimitation of such a decision-making context should be sensitive to the spatial and temporal 
dimensions of long-term allocation management. 
 
This study engaged in expanding the spatial and temporal dimensions of the decision-making 
context and argued the importance of noting public preference regarding proposed allocation 
decisions as apposed to merely assuming the nature of public preferences.  Theory suggested a 
principal-agent relationship; instead, a reversed principal-agent relationship with a parted principal 
for the same agent was encountered.  Agents certainly need to accommodate the principal in the 
decision-making process, i.e. agents must accommodate public preferences without verifying the 
long-term planning ability of the principals.  The principal (public) needs to be confronted in 
advance with legitimate and objective development path and then consulted regarding its 
preferences.  The success of presenting a legitimate development path will depend on the ability of 
the agent to make future trade-offs with the information available to it and to communicate a 
complex management problem in a simple, objective and understandable way in order to obtain a 
meaningful answer from the public.  The ability of the agent to make future trade-offs in terms of 
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direct and indirect costs and benefits is confronted by a measurement problem, displaying the inter-
linkages and the complexity of the decision-making milieu.  Agents should, therefore, involve the 
public in long-term water management decision-making by tapping into their preferences.  The 
challenge is to develop communication strategies that will be consistent over time and space and 
that will communicate clearly and effectively with the public.  Decision-makers should 
acknowledge the risks of tapping into public preference in terms of response rates and possible bias.  
The main contributions of the study could be summarised as follows: 
 
• The study confirmed a principal-agent relationship in resource allocation management but 
also a reversed form of this relationship in long-term water resource allocation decision-
making. 
• The natural resource allocation decision-making context was expanded and refined with 
regard to the spatial and temporal dimensions and applied to water resource allocation 
decision-making.  The importance of drawing the allocation decision-making context wide 
enough, cannot be over-emphasized.   
• The importance of political processes running parallel to resource allocation management 
was emphasized.  These processes were accounted for by making the study as transparent as 
possible by allowing political buy-in right from the inception phase. 
• The promotion of environmental education to foster public insight into the measurement 
problem could be justified – this education process will also positively affect a non-payment 
problem that is common to basic services such as water provision. 
• Applications are not bound to the field of natural resource management but apply to all 
fields where principal-agent relationships with regard to allocation decision-making are 
present (e.g. medical aid and insurance).  
 
6.2 Summary 
 
Water resource allocation policy decisions often have impacts exceeding the administrative 
boundaries of the management jurisdiction.  These impacts are often experienced in rural areas, 
which share water resources with adjacent urban areas.  If water resources become scarcer because 
of a shrinking resource base or increased demand, the competition for the resource will increase.  
This study engages in this situation via the expansion of the resource allocation decision-making 
context.   
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Allocation strategies, such as competitive markets, cater for private needs (water as a private good), 
but not to the same extent for public goods such as bulk supply infrastructures.  Government 
intervention needs to account for this limitation of the market in allocation decision-making by 
taking a long-term but spatially expanded view of resource allocation issues.  The essential point in 
allocation decision-making is a trade-off between immediate higher direct costs for sustainability 
gains.  Given that more sustainable options imply immediate sacrifice (financial) in exchange for 
future gains, the popularity of more sustainable options decreases because uninformed users tend to 
prefer immediate gains to immediate sacrifice.  This choice entails a value-laden judgement.  The 
market typically makes implicit assumptions regarding such trade-offs.  However, this study made 
the trade-offs explicit to facilitate a choice of allocation strategy.  Bureaucrats and decision-makers 
cannot be allowed to estimate public value judgements (public preferences) since the “softer” and 
less quantifiable/measurable the issue, the more space is created for misinterpretations and, hence, 
the development of bias to manipulate the outcome.  The focus on the modus operandi for the 
accommodation of public preference, therefore, becomes extremely important. 
 
Finding the “correct” resource allocation strategy for a specific natural resource allocation context, 
which would maximise social welfare, proved challenging.  Opting for the “correct” allocation 
strategy, is a function of applied criteria guiding the choice of strategy.  Such criteria are derived 
from numerous physical, technological, environmental, economic, social, institutional and political 
variables describing the decision-making context and the allocation strategy, which are both 
dynamic over time and space.  The choice of criteria is driven through impacts and trade-offs - both 
in the short- and long-term, making the choice between criteria and management strategies 
challenging.  Ideally, such criteria should serve the inclusive vision of social welfare maximisation; 
however, deviations are the rule rather than the exception.  Opting for the “correct” allocation 
strategy while implementing it in a “sub-optimal” way is preferable to opting for the “wrong” 
option implemented in an “optimal” way.  Hence, the order of selection and implementation of 
decision-making criteria in long-term resource allocation management has important social welfare 
and sustainability impacts - first, apply social-welfare and related sustainability criteria to determine 
what to do or which option to implement (i.e. doing the “correct thing”), then apply efficiency 
criteria to determine how to implement the option (i.e. doing it the “right way”).   
 
It should be clear that resource allocation management requires informed choices from the decision-
makers’ side regarding the desired levels of economic activity, public acceptability and ecosystem 
functionality within the management area but also in adjacent management areas.  It, therefore, 
requires legitimate and reliable information regarding the impacts of different allocation strategies 
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to enable a choice of strategy that will promote social welfare and sustainable resource use.  
However, a measurement problem with adverse impacts on the quality and legitimacy of decision-
making information, presents itself.  Such a problem hampers the sustainable management of public 
goods, such as bulk-water infrastructures, by hindering the evaluation of the true cost of different 
long-term allocation options and strategies.  This implies decision-making with incomplete 
information, which narrows the decision-making context, resulting in potentially negative 
sustainability impacts because quantifiable decision-making criteria are more easily conceptualised 
and accounted for than less quantifiable criteria.  Ease of quantification should, therefore, not 
determine the relative importance of decision-making criteria.  Management agents should be 
sensitive to this, and long-term resource allocation should be done within a regional context 
especially in cases where inter-basin transfers and re-allocations from rural to urban areas occur.  
When applied in a regional context, management agents will be forced to at least consider 
monetarily unquantifiable costs and benefits in order to promote use patterns that will promote 
social welfare maximisation.   
 
This study engaged in broadening the resource allocation decision-making context in order to 
accommodate unaccounted-for costs and benefits (i.e. the “measurement problem”) in the decision-
making process.  These expansions materialised in the form of expansions to the spatial and 
temporal dimensions of the decision-making context.  Consequently, decision-support needed to be 
expanded and applied in the broader context to safeguard against the measurement problem and the 
impacts of ignoring long-term allocation impacts.  Such expansions were made tangible by focusing 
on long-term water allocation in the BWMA of South Africa.  Bulk-water resource allocation in 
semi-arid areas (such as the BWMA) is influenced by a variety of considerations, including 
increased competition for water resources and the need for acknowledging the geographically wider 
impacts of re-allocations.  Allocation strategies, such as market and state intervention strategies, are 
employed but can and often do fail because the measurement problem has different impacts on 
market- and government-oriented allocation strategies.  Market-driven allocation strategies have 
been accused of excluding important non-participants while government intervention often fails 
because of mixed and, often, corrupt incentives. 
 
To acknowledge the wider impacts of allocation strategies requires integrated decision-making with 
expansions in the decision-making context.  Despite a general acceptance of an integrated approach 
to water resource management, progress in the actual implementation of it has been slow because 
decision-makers are learning as they proceed, with no obviously correct methodology to follow.  As 
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a result, researchers are usually cautious and follow an incremental strategy in which they proceed 
slowly. 
 
The expansion of the decision-making context materialised through an expansion of the temporal 
and spatial dimensions of the decision-making context.  Expanding the temporal dimension was 
made tangible through the comparison of alternative approaches to long-term water resource 
allocation management in terms of key management criteria.  Sequences of bulk-water supply 
schemes were considered over time instead of using previous methodologies that compared 
selections of management options and schemes simultaneously.  Two management regimes or 
“development paths” were developed and compared in terms of a carefully chosen criteria set.  The 
first path promoted a “conventional” (cost-recovery strategy – i.e. in terms of measurable costs) 
long-term water management strategy, while the second path displayed the measurement problem in 
the form of a scenario of higher up-front, direct costs in return for “greener” water.  It was by no 
means an exhaustive exercise, but it did provide some of the basics for the study and some ground 
rules for the development of a more detailed run. 
 
The expansion of the spatial dimension was accomplished by expanding the physical boundary of 
the decision-making context in the BWMA.  This expansion necessitated the consideration of re-
allocation trade-offs in a geographically expanded area (for the case of the study: rural to urban 
areas).  A need was consequently indicated to expand representation in the decision-making process 
via the inclusion of new and relevant stakeholders leading to the question of how and to what extent 
to accommodate public opinion in long-term water resource management. 
 
Both expansions increased the need for legitimate and reliable decision-making information.  Two 
separate surveys were done to partially account for such increased demand.  The first was a public 
survey aimed at accommodating the public through enquiring about their preferences regarding 
trade-offs in different resource allocations.  The public were, therefore, consulted regarding their 
preferences as indicated in terms of distinguishing criteria.  The challenge of communicating 
complex issues in a simple way in order to obtain a legitimate answer came to the fore.  The 
rationale and risks of simplifying complex problems, such as strategic water management, and 
presenting these questions to the public in order to identify their preferences were explained and 
discussed.  The second survey was an extended expert panel survey in which the two development 
paths were compared against a criteria set.  The outcome of this survey was used to make 
recommendations regarding long-term water resource allocation management methodologies. 
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The public survey consisted of a stratified random public survey comprising 7029 questionnaires of 
which 1088 were returned.  The 15.48 percent response rate was considered satisfactory; however, a 
higher response rate (20 percent) was expected given that at the time of the survey, the BWMA was 
in an in one-hundred-year drought cycle.  The expert panel survey invited 50 selected experts of 
which 17 agreed to participate (34 percent response rate).  A personal interview for verification and 
discussion purposes followed.   
 
Both surveys yielded a broad conceptual willingness to pay for “greener” water even if such this led 
to increases in direct costs (water tariffs).  The outcome may be used to motivate a paradigm shift 
from management’s side to consider “greener” water supply options more seriously even if such 
options implied higher direct costs.  These could then be implemented without fear of harming 
managers’ own political positions.  Such willingness to pay would also relieve pressure on an 
already narrow tariff resource base to absorb tariff increases that could lead to increases in the 
current non-payment problem. 
 
6.3 Recommendations 
 
Most of the limitations of this study are associated with the assumptions it makes.  Therefore, 
further research is required to substantiate the following assumptions: 
 
• The preference orderings of rural and urban respondents were considered equally important.  
Such an assumption is debatable especially if differences in willingness and ability to pay 
are taken into account. 
• No objective method exists of verifying and comparing the level of importance of the 
participants in the expert panel survey.  All participants in the expert panel survey are seen 
as specialists in their distinct fields, and no distinction was made regarding the level of 
importance of these disciplines.  Responses and comments from the different experts are, 
therefore, seen as equally important. 
 
This study showed the value of improved resource allocation decision-making information.  This 
implies internalising externalities as explained in the discussion on the measurement problem 
leading to the constant development of quantification techniques.  Specific needs include the 
following: 
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• Decision-support needs to be developed further with regard to the quantification of the 
impacts of different management options.  As such, some refinements are also needed with 
regard to the establishment of decision-making criteria hierarchies for long-term bulk-water 
resource management.  Improved estimations of the socio-economic impacts of different 
management options could be done by unifying water allocation models with multi-sector 
economic models. To date, no such project has been undertaken in the BWMA. 
• The “drivers” (or criteria) of the relative level of importance of different decision-making 
criteria need to be formalised.  Such drivers could include the ease of quantification, but 
additional drivers should be identified. 
• Although numerous studies are underway, not enough legitimate information regarding the 
effect of climate change on land-use patterns is available to back resource allocation 
decision-making.  This is due to the context-specific attributes of the impacts of climate 
change.  The long-term impact of climate change on homogenic land-use patterns should, 
therefore, be modelled. 
• Additional research is also required into the crop-water-yield requirements of different long-
term crops (viticulture and deciduous fruit) specifically in the BWMA since it promotes the 
accurate estimation of direct and indirect impacts of water restrictions/droughts as well as 
opportunity estimations of water allocations.    
• A series of “green” water supply scenarios need to be developed and compared in terms of 
revised criteria sets. 
• The economic impact of significant water tariff increases on the Western Cape economy 
needs to be modelled.  Dynamic spatial equilibrium models could be employed, but these 
models are extremely data intensive.  The output of this type of study should prove to be 
useful to aid in arguments regarding management issues on the affordability of “greener” 
water. 
 
Agents must have a clear understanding of public preferences to inform resource allocation 
decisions.  The public must be confronted with a legitimate and objective decision-making scenario 
and to be consulted accordingly.  The relative success of presenting a legitimate vision depend on 
the ability of agents to make future trade-offs with the information available to them and to 
communicate a complex management problem in a simple, objective and understandable way in 
order to obtain a meaningful answer from public.  Agents should therefore not verify the principals’ 
ability to foresee the future but consult their preferences regarding the future and use these revealed 
preferences to inform allocation decision-making.    
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Annexure 1:  WCSS demand estimations 
 
Concern regarding the long-term impacts of supplying the CCT from adjacent rural areas as 
mentioned in the previous chapter, is by no means unique.  Semi-arid urban areas throughout the 
world are often in the position where demand outstrips supply because of external drivers of 
demand (population demographics, economic growth, climate change, pollution and also equity 
considerations).   
 
It has been indicated that the demand for water in the BWMA areas will grow for a considerable 
time in future.  Urban demand is growing faster than rural demand because of demographic and 
economic-growth related factors.  Rural and urban water users are and will increasingly compete for 
the same water resources.  Limited conventional water storage alternatives (such as the construction 
of additional storage dams), combined with global-warming-driven changing rainfall patterns that 
may affect the supply of water adversely, place the CCT and the study area at risk of experiencing 
serious water shortages in the near future.   
 
The Western Cape System Analysis (Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 1991; Department 
of Water Affairs and Forestry, 1993; Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 1998) modelled the 
adequacy of the major dams in the Western Cape system and excluded small local sources of the 
City of Cape Town, Saldanha, Paarl and Stellenbosch.  The Western Cape System Analysis only 
reported the demands on the dams, which were regarded as ‘demand centres’ that could be curtailed 
in times of droughts.  Compensation releases were not included with the ‘demand centres’ 
(Kleynhans, 2002a).  This appendix provides a detailed breakdown of the demands that were 
included in the Western Cape System Analysis (Kleynhans, 2002a): 
 
Water demands (Mkl) 
 Description 1998 1999 
 Total demands   
A Metropolitan consumption1 317 332 
B Own supplies of Paarl/Wellington 1 1 
C DWAF to other urban areas2 19 22 
D Estimate of own supplies of Stellenbosch and Swartland/Salhanha6 5 5 
E Agricultural demands on Theewaterskloof and Voëlvlei3 136 141 
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F Estimate of additional pumping directly from Theewaterskloof 13 13 
G TOTAL 491 514 
 Demands not included with the yields of the WCSA prior to 1 Nov 
19984 
  
H Localised metropolitan sources 15 10 
I Own supplies from Stellenbosch, Swartland/Saldanha and 
Paarl/Wellington6 
6 6 
J Compensation releases from Theewaterkloof/Voëlvlei5 15 15 
K Abstractions from the 24 Rivers Canal upstream of Voëlvlei 22 18 
L Estimate of pumping from Theewaterskloof at 1990 level 8 8 
M TOTAL 66 57 
 Actual demands corresponding to yields reported in the WCSA, Berg 
River project and annual re-runs of the WCSA 
  
N Metropolitan consumption and sales to Paarl/Wellington (N=A-H) 302 322 
O DWAF supply direct to Stellenbosch and Swartland/Saldanha (O=C) 19 22 
P Agricultural demands on Theewaterskloof and Voëlvlei (P=E-J-K) 99 108 
Q Estimate of growth in pumping from Theewaterskloof since 1990 (Q=F-
L) 
5 5 
R TOTAL 425 457 
 
Notes: 
1. Includes the supply by the City of Cape Town of purified water from Wemmershoek Dam to 
Paarl and Wellington, which are outside the Cape Metropolitan boundaries. 
2. DWAF supplies raw water directly from Theewaterskloof to Stellenbosch and from Voëlvlei 
to Swartland/Saldanha. 
3. Includes abstractions from 24 River canal system upstream of Voëlvlei. 
4. Not all the demands were included in the yields reported in the WCSA and the Berg River 
feasibility studies for two reasons: 
• Some of the demands act on relatively small local sources that were not included 
like the own supplies of the City of Cape Town, Stellenbosch and Saldanha. 
• Compensation releases from the major dams and the agricultural demands on the 
24 Rivers Canal were not grouped with the curtailable ‘demand centres’ and 
therefore, were not counted as part of the system yield. 
 119 
5. Initial compensations were Theewaterskloof (3,8*106m3/a), Kleinplaas (1,5*106m3/a) and 
the Berg siphon (10*106m3/a), totalling 15*106m3/a.  In runs after 2000, the compensations 
were increased to include transmission losses becoming 17*106m3/a in total. 
6. Assuming 4,7*106m3/a from the Stellenbosch own resources.  In 2000, Saldanha may take 
1,5*106m3/a from an aquifer. 
 
Sub-system historical firm yield and long-term stochastic yields (million cubic metres) 
Long-term characteristic yield Sub-system Historical 
firm yield 1 in 20 1 in 50 1 in 100  1 in 200 
Theewaterskloof 193 236 216 210 203 
Voëlvlei 96 112 105 101 98 
Wemmershoek 50 58 54 52 51 
Steenbras 38 42 40 39 38 
Palmiet transfer 22,5 22,5 22,5 22,5 22,5 
TOTAL 399,5 470,5 440,5 424,5 412,5 
 
Source:  (Kleynhans, 2002a) 
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 Annexure 2:  Public survey questionnaire 
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Each of water supply strategies A and B consists of suggested water schemes that will be implemented 
at different times in the future.  The following table shows each scheme, the implementation date and the 
contribution to water supply: 
 
 
 
Water supply strategy A expands the current water storage capacity up to the maximum before it changes to 
the desalination of seawater.  Water supply strategy B changes to seawater desalination at a much earlier 
date.  After 2028 both strategies opt for seawater desalination.   
 
Water supply strategy A and B compare as follows:  
 
Financial implications 
for the public 
Long-term water tariffs with Strategy A will stay after 2012 approximately 12%-
20% lower than B.  Water will therefore stay more affordable with Strategy A. 
Availability of water Water supply Strategy A is more dependent on rainfall in the long-term than B.  
Strategy A will therefore expose the public more to seasonal municipal water 
restrictions than B. 
Strategy A has higher risks for negative impacts on agricultural production, 
employment and the rest of the Western Cape economy than B. 
Environmental 
impacts relevant for 
the public 
Strategy A has higher risks for increased levels of pollution in rivers and losses 
in bio-diversity than B. 
The harvesting of aquifers in Strategy A has potential negative impacts for 
underground water. 
 
Give the highest score to the water supply strategy of your choice.  The two scores must add to 100. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To be considered for the lucky draw, please indicate a telephone number (preferably a cell number): 
 
 
 
 
Please make use of the return envelope and return the questionnaire before 31 March 2005 to: 
 
WJ de Lange 
Western Cape Department of Agriculture 
Private Bag X1, Elsenburg, 7607


THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND HAVE A NICE DAY ! 
 
Development Path  A Development Path  B 
 
Water scheme 
      	 
  
  	  
Scheme 
capacity 
(million 
kiloliter) 
Total storage 
capacity in the 
Western Cape 
(million 
kiloliter) 
 
Water 
scheme 
      	 
  
  	  
Scheme 
capacity 
(million 
kiloliter) 
Total storage 
capacity in the 
Western Cape 
(million kiloliter) 
     	  
     
 	 
     
2004  
440 
     	  
     
 	 
     
2004  
440 
          2006 81 521           2006 81 521 
     
       	 
   2013 35 556   
 	  	   	    2012 65 586 
     
       
    2016 19 575   - - - 
! 	 "  #    	  $    % &    2018 70 645   
 	  	   	  '  2020 65 651 
 	   ( 	 
 % &    2026 19 664   - - - 
)  
     *      2027 8 672   
 	  	   	  + 2027 65 716 
  
 	  	   	    2028 60 737   - - - 
 
 
+ 
Your score for development path A
 : Your score for development path B : 
QUESTIONNAIRE REGARDING THE TWO WATER SUPPLY STRATEGIES 
 
= 100 
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Annexure 3:  Expert panel invitation 
 
February 2005 
Invitation to participate in an expert panel survey on: 
Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis in bulk water supply management in the 
Western Cape 
 
Dear Prof, Dr, Mr, Me 
 
You are one of approximately 50 experts from various disciplines invited to participate in an expert panel 
survey regarding bulk water supply management in the Western Cape.  The outcome of the survey is part of 
a larger multi-disciplinary study regarding current methodologies used to compare water management 
alternatives in the province. The research initiative is jointly managed by the Western Cape Department of 
Agriculture and Stellenbosch University, and is partly funded by the National Research Foundation. 
 
The current drought in the Western Cape emphasize the need for additional research on alternative water 
supply options such as the desalination of seawater or recycling to potable standard.  The numerous 
complexities associated with long-term water resource management, necessitate contributions of different 
perspectives from different experts.  This is where your participation will provide valuable information for 
sustainable water resource management in the Western Cape.   
 
We would like you to indicate your willingness to rate (score) two different long-term water management 
strategies against various criteria and to dedicate approximately one hour of your time for an appointment 
and discussion regarding the scores.  Please indicate your willingness to participate in the survey by 
indicating three possible times for an appointment. 
 
No, I am not willing / able to participate in the survey. 
 
Yes, I am willing to participate in the survey by reading through an information document  
(approximately 30 pages) and rating the two alternatives. 
 
- three suitable dates and times for appointments are (before end of June 2005): 
 
________________________ ; _______________________  or  ______________________ 
 
- my preferred e-mail address :  __________________________________________ 
 
Please return via e-mail to:    willemdl@elsenburg.com 
 
Your participation will be highly appreciated 
Kind regards, 
 
WJ de Lange  
(Agricultural Economist) 
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Invitations to: 
 
Name Institution e-mail 
Stefano Farolfi Centre for Environmental Economics and 
Policy in Africa (CEEPA) 
sfarolfi@postino.up.ac.za 
Mike Killick City of Cape Town Administration  Michael.Killick@capetown.gov.za 
Rodney Bishop City of Cape Town Administration Rodney.Bishop@capetown.gov.za 
Peter Bell City of Cape Town Administration Peter.Bell@capetwon.gov.za 
Helen Davies City of Cape Town Administration Helen.Davies@capetown.gov.za 
Ashwin Seetal Department of Water Affairs and Forestry seetala@dwaf.gov.za 
Frans Stofberg Department of Water Affairs and Forestry stofbef@dwaf.gov.za 
Gerrit van Zyl Department of Water Affairs and Forestry gerritvz@dwaf.gov.za 
Michael Singh Department of Water Affairs and Forestry singhm@dwaf.gov.za 
Mike Smart Department of Water Affairs and Forestry smartm@dwaf.gov.za 
Mike Shand Ninham Shand Consulting Mike.Shand@shands.co.za 
Mike Luger Ninham Shand Consulting MikeLuger@shands.co.za 
Stephan Kleynhans Ninham Shand Consulting Stephan.Kleynhans@shands.co.za 
Hans Beuster Ninham Shand Consulting Hans.Beuster@shands.co.za 
James Cullis Ninham Shand Consulting James.Cullis@shands.co.za 
Nico Rossouw Ninham Shand Consulting Nico.Rossouw@shands.co.za 
Ian Palmer Palmer Development Group ian@pdg.co.za 
Rolfe Eberhard Palmer Development Group rolfe@pdg.co.za 
Tim Mosdell Palmer Development Group tim@pdg.co.za 
Kas Hamman Cape Nature khamman@pgwc.gov.za 
Dean Impson Cape Nature impsond@cncjnk.wcape.gov.za 
W Roets Cape Nature wroets@pgwc.gov.za 
S. Buthele Cape Nature sbuthele@pawc.wcape.gov.za 
A Matoti DEAT amatoti@pgwc.gov.za 
Daan Louw OABS, University of the Orange Free State daan@oabs.co.za 
Andre Roux Department of Agriculture andrer@elsenburg.com 
Peter Keuck Department of Agriculture peterk@elsenburg.com 
Henk Cerfontein Department of Agriculture henkc@elsenburg.com 
Alison Joubert University of Cape Town ajoubert@stats.uct.ac.za 
Jenny Day University of Cape Town jday@botzoo.uct.ac.za 
Jane Turpie University of Cape Town jturpie@botzoo.uct.ac.za 
Bryan Davies University of Cape Town bdavies@botzoo.uct.ac.za 
Richard Fuggle University of Cape Town fuggle@enviro.uct.ac.za 
Richard Hill University of Cape Town hill@enviro.uct.ac.za 
Chales Boucher Stellenbosch University cb@sun.ac.za 
Sue Milton Stellenbosch University sjm@sun.ac.za 
Dave Pepler Stellenbosch University dp@sun.ac.za 
Kobus Jooste Stellenbosch University jfj@sun.ac.za 
Scotney Watts Stellenbosch University watts@sun.ac.za 
Albert vd Merwe Stellenbosch University avdm2@sun.ac.za 
Andre Gorgens Stellenbosch University andre.gorgens@shands.co.za 
Kobus du Plessis Stellenbosch University jadup@sun.ac.za 
JH vd Merwe Stellenbosch University jhvdm@sun.ac.za 
Bennie Schloms Stellenbosch University bhas@sun.ac.za 
Simon Becker Stellenbosch University sb3@sun.ac.za 
Johan de Beer CSIR-Environmentek jdebeer@csir.co.za 
Martin de Wit CSIR-Environmentek mdewit@csir.co.za 
Nicola King CSIR-Environmentek naking@csir.co.za 
Rowan le Roux CSIR-Environmentek rleroux@csir.co.za 
Tony Letsoalo CSIR-Environmentek aletsoalo@csir.co.za  
FH Kolbe TELKOM fhkolbe@telkomsa.net 
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Annexure 4:  Expert survey cover letter 
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Expert panel survey:  Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis on strategic 
bulk water resource management in the Western Cape 
 
 
What is the survey about? 
 
Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) is a decision support technique to assist in strategic and/or challenging decisions.  The 
technique plays a supporting role by structuring the decision-making process and to make uncertainties more tangible.  MCDA were 
used in water resource management in the Western Cape in numerous feasibility and pre-feasibility studies and the current research 
initiative build on this by refining the methodology with regard to time and spatial variables. 
 
The survey compares two long-term bulk water supply strategies (development paths) in terms of a selection of criteria.  Each 
development path must be scored as a package according to these criteria.  As an expert, base your scores on the important 
background information as well as personal expertise and experience.  The outcome of the survey will form part of a larger study on 
strategic choice in bulk water resource management in the Western Cape and will provide valuable information for decision makers 
in long-term water resource management. 
 
What must I do? 
 
Each invited expert will have to score two different long-term bulk water supply strategies according to selected criteria.  You should 
have received electronic copies of the following four documents: 
 
• The cover letter, which you are busy reading know is for orientation and instruction purposes. 
• The expert evaluation document - must be used to do the scoring of the two development paths. 
• The public survey cover letter – was part of a public survey  
• The public survey background information and questionnaire – should be complete not as member of the public but as your 
guesstimate of overall public preference regarding the two development paths. 
 
All the documents are self-explanatory.  However should you require additional information please contact the researcher at the 
following: 
E-mail: willemdl@elsenburg.com 
Tel:  021 - 8085203 
 
What happens after completing the questionnaire? 
 
Please return both the “expert evaluation document” and the “public survey background information and questionnaire” to the 
researcher via e-mail.  The researcher will pay each expert a visit to discuss the document and to rectify possible problems. 
 
After confirmation of the score sheet of each expert, the researcher will analyse the data and report (via e-mail) to the expert group 
within one month after completing of the last appointment.  The aggregated scores and weights of the two development paths will 
then be open for discussion.  After possible alternations, the scores will be finalised and used the broader study.  
 
Thank you for your time effort to participate in this study. 
Kind regards, 
 
WJ de Lange  
(Agricultural Economist) 
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Annexure 5:  Expert survey follow-up letter 
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May 2005 
 
 
Expert panel survey:  Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis on strategic 
bulk water resource management in the Western Cape
  
 
 
Dear Prof, Dr, Mr, Me 
 
You were one of 18 experts who participated in an expert panel survey regarding bulk water supply 
management in the Western Cape.  Each of you have completed the two questionnaires and met with the 
researcher to discuss your most important comments. 
 
The need was identified to communicate the outcome of the expert panel survey in the form of a “report 
back” of the main comments on the survey.  We have compiled such a document where all comments 
mentioned in the meetings are included.  The idea is to show to the rest of the panel what the other 
respondents have commented on.  Please feel free to make additional comments or changes regarding the 
comments and your scores where you feel suitable.  (Please indicate such changes clearly.)   
Attached to this e-mail you will find two documents.   
 
The first entitled “Expert Comments(24May).doc” is the background information document with all the 
comments from the different respondents.  The second document entitled “Copy of Survey 
results(19May).xls” is a spreadsheet of preliminary data. 
 
Two weeks are allowed (until 9 June) for comments from where we will close this opportunity and do the 
final analysis.  
 
 
Once again thank you for your time and effort to participate in this study. 
Kind regards, 
 
WJ de Lange  
(Agricultural Economist) 
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Annexure 6:  Expert survey questionnaire 
 
It was decided that all comments will be handled anonymously.  
 
Expert Panel Survey: 
Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis on Water User Preference in the Western Cape 
 
Orientation and instructions 
 
The aim of this document is to enable a selected panel of experts from different disciplines to 
evaluate two alternative long-term water management development paths (DPs) for the Western 
Cape.  The document presents some general background information from where the scoring 
process starts.  The document is organised in five main criteria groups that will be used to evaluate 
the two different long-term water management strategies (development paths).  Each main criteria 
group is divided into smaller sub-criteria (see the tree diagram).   To keep the process as simple as 
possible, each of the five sections starts with a small table for the evaluation (scoring) of each of the 
development paths.  Please read the information provided in each section before attempting to 
complete the score sheet. 
 
All experts are asked to score each development path in terms of the given criteria.  The scoring 
commences as follows: 
 
Each section starts with a table containing the criteria that need to be scored for that section.  Read 
the background information provided in the section, and then make use of the table at the beginning 
of the section to give your personal score for each development path.  Scores should be based on 
your judgement of the given information, personal experience regarding the criteria, area of 
expertise and subjective value judgements.  Note that Criteria Group 5 is covered by a public 
survey, and no scoring of public acceptance will, therefore, be done in this document.  We did 
include the original public survey as a separate document.  Please complete that survey, not as 
member of the public, but as your guesstimate of public preference regarding the two development 
paths. 
 
PLEASE FEEL FREE TO COMMENT ON ANY ASPECT OF THE DOCUMENT – INDICATE 
YOUR COMMENTS BY USING THE REVIEW FUNCTION IN MS WORD.  
 
TREE DIAGRAM OF CRITERIA: 
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Criteria group 4: 
Socio-economic 
aspects 
Criteria group 1:
Water balance
Criteria group 2: 
Financial aspects 
Criteria group 3: 
Environmental 
aspects 
Criteria group 5: 
Public acceptance
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INTRODUCTION 
 
For the public survey, the public responded on their perception  - i.e. their response is not totally a 
function of the information provided. 
 
The Western Cape experienced a dry 2004 season, implying a problem of water resource scarcity.  
The biggest domestic user in the area is the City of Cape Town (CCT), which receives its water 
from mainly rural areas outside the municipal boundaries of the area.  Resource scarcity implies 
increased competition and in this case increased competition/tension between rural and urban users.  
Various management strategies could be employed to engage the situation with demand 
management campaigns currently in the news.  However, demand management strategies alone will 
not suffice and some forms of supply (capacity expansion) strategies will have to be implemented.  
Authorities faced with such a complex issue currently face a fundamental choice between two long-
term development paths to secure the long-term water supply in the Western Cape.  They must 
either choose A) the “cheapest” option possible over the short-term and reverse the negative long-
term effects of it at a later stage, or B) accept significantly higher water tariffs at an earlier stage, 
but ensure an important reduction in the long-term negative impact on society and the environment.   
 
Both development paths contain different combinations of known supply schemes.  It is important 
to note that the focus is NOT on individual schemes (because such an exercise has already been 
done), but on the development path as a whole.  Each development path has its own strong and 
weak points, and water service providers face a major challenge in deciding which one to 
implement.  The process of multi-criteria decision analysis is employed to aid in this regard.  It is a 
logical and systematic way to compare the two paths by using a selection of key criteria.  The 
challenge is to identify what the impact of each path will be in terms of the key criteria and to 
evaluate the legitimacy of each impact.  It is, therefore, extremely important to evaluate the two 
development paths as packages and not merely as the sum of individual schemes. 
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GENERAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
The study area is in the Western Cape province of South Africa, with the focus on the CCT and all 
rural areas sharing its water resources with the CCT (see to Figure 1).  These areas include the 
irrigation districts of Malmesbury, Drakenstein and Helderberg.  The deciduous producing areas of 
Groenland, Villiersdorp, Grabouw and Vygeboom are also included. 
 
 
Figure 1:  An indication of rural areas sharing with the CCT 
Source:  (Western Cape Department of Agriculture, 2004) 
 
The main bulk-water supply system in the area is indicated in Figure 2.  Some details on various 
individual schemes are found in Table 1. 
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Figure 2:  The Western Cape water supply infrastructure 
Source: (Shand et al., 2003) 
 
Table 1:  The main existing and new water supply schemes supplying the Western Cape  
Scheme Gross 
Capacity 
(Mm3) 
Net System 
1:50 Year 
Yield 
(Mm3/a) 
Owner User 
Palmiet 
Kogelberg 
Rockview 
 
(17) 
(17) 
 
22 
 
DWAF; 
ESKOM 
 
CCT; ESKOM 
Upper Steenbras  32 
Lower Steenbras  34 
40 CCT CCT 
Wemmershoek 59 54 CCT CCT; Drakenstein 
Voëlvlei 172 105 DWAF CCT; West Coast; 
Irrigators 
Theewaterskloof 480 219 DWAF CCT; 
Stellenbosch; 
Irrigators 
TOTAL EXISTING 811 440   
Berg River Project: 
Dam  
Supplement 
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56 
25 
 
TCTA7 
CCT; Irrigators; 
Overberg 
TOTAL 938 521   
                                                
7
 Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority. 
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 Source:  (Shand et al., 2003) 
 
The following table (Table 2) presents the two suggested development paths (DPs).  However, it is 
important to note that such a suggested layout is not “cast in concrete” and could be changed as new 
information becomes available.  It does, however, represent two legitimate alternatives for long-
term bulk-water supply development in the Western Cape. 
 
Table 2:  Development Paths A and B 
 
Source:  (De Lange, 2004a; Enright, 2005; Khan, 2004; Killick, 2004; Kleynhans, 2004; Louw, 
2004; Shand, 2003; Sparks, 2003a; Van Zyl, 2004b) 
 
The difference between “yield” and “capacity” was explained 
 
The notation : million cubic metre (m3) or m3 * 106 instead of Mkl is proposed. 
 
Numerous other alternatives are available before desalination.  However, one should not see DP B 
as merely “desalination” – the two DP’s represent two different ways of long-term water 
management – the two DP’s is making this difference more tangible (desalination could be replaced 
with recycling or any other “greener and more expensive” – ito direct costs) option! 
 
DP A does not contain major surface schemes – the environmental impacts associated with surface 
schemes could therefore be ignored and more focused be placed environmental effects of 
underground schemes.  Mitchells pass could be an option and Eerste river is unlikely to become a 
reality.  However, few big surface schemes are left for development and much uncertainty regarding 
impacts of groundwater schemes exists. 
 
Development Path A represents the “conventional” development path to supply future bulk-water 
needs.  The scheme assumes all bulk-water supply schemes up to 2004 (including water demand 
management schemes such as water restrictions, leakage repair, pressure control and user 
education).  All technical specifications of the Berg River Project (BWP), Voëlvlei Dam, Lourens 
River, Table Mountain Group Aquifer, Cape Flats aquifer, Eerste River scheme and desalination are 
also assumed.  “Expensive” alternatives such as desalination of seawater or recycling to potable 
standard will become a reality only in 2028. 
 
Development Path B is a proposed alternative to Development Path A.  This development path 
implements “expensive” bulk-water supply options at an earlier stage compared to Development 
Path A.  This development path challenges current decision-making methodologies, as well as cost-
Development Path  A Development Path  B 
Water scheme Implementation 
year 
Scheme 
capacity 
(million 
kilolitres) 
Total storage 
capacity in the 
Western Cape 
(million kilolitres) 
Water scheme Implementatio
n year  
Scheme 
capacity 
(million 
kilolitres) 
Total storage 
capacity in the 
Western Cape 
(million kilolitres) 
Current water supply 
infrastructure 
2004  
440 
Current water 
supply infrastructure 
2004  
440 
Berg River Project 2006 81 521 Berg River project 2006 81 521 
Voëlvlei scheme Phase I 2013 35 
556 
Desalination Plant 1 2012 65 
50? 586 
Lourens River diversion 2016 19 575 - - - - 
Table Mountain Group 
aquifer 
2018 70 
rather 50 645 
Desalination Plant 2 2020 65 
 50? 651 
Cape Flats Aquifer 2026 19 664 - - - - 
Eerste River scheme 2027 80? 
672 
Desalination Plant 3 2027 65 
50? 716 
Desalination Plant 1 2028 60 737 - - - - 
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estimation methodologies by questioning the relative cost of desalination compared to alternatives if 
all costs could be quantified and included in the equation. 
 
The main difference between A and B is the timing of desalination as an alternative supply option.  
Development Path B makes use of desalination much earlier (2012 opposed to 2028).   
 
Each development path will now be discussed in terms of the four main criteria groups. 
 
 
 
CRITERIA GROUP 1: WATER BALANCE 
 
Read through the section before completing the score sheet, below.  Note that the scores of each 
sub-criteria group should add up to 100.   
 
The scores do not need to add up to 100 – it could be the case that both A and B score poorly/good 
in a specific criteria.  If the scores add to 100 , only the relative difference between the DPs’ should 
be scored.  If the scores do not add up to 100, it could be weighted at a later stage. 
 
 
 Description DP  A DP  B 
1.1)  Confidence in yield 
(Level of confidence in the accuracy 
of yield estimations.) 
Climate change impact rainfall/run-off and, therefore 
confidence in yield 
 
100 = totally confident in yield 
estimations 
0 = no confidence at all in yield 
estimations 
 
 
  
= 
100 
1.2)  Timing 
(Timing of the schemes and the 
ability to supply the demand of water 
in such a way that no significant 
surplus or shortages occur.) 
100 = demand and supply are matched 
perfectly 
0 = a total miss-match between demand 
and supply resulting in times of severe 
shortages and surpluses. 
   
= 
100 
 
DP A has more robust technology compared to DP B, which has greater sensitivity with regard to 
technological developments.  DP B has greater potential in rerms of efficiency gains with regard to 
technological development. 
 
Numerous technical challenges with regard to implementation of desalination were mentioned.  
However, one should not allow technical challenges and logistics to dominate the decision-making 
process – “doing the right thing in a wrong/sub-optimal way” is preferable to “doing the wrong 
thing in the right way”.  I.e. the implementation order of decision-making criteria in long-term 
water management has important sustainability impacts.  -- First, apply sustainability criteria to 
determine WHAT to do (the “right thing”) then apply efficiency criteria to determine HOW to do it 
(“doing it the right way”) 
 
Desalinisation tariffs should be smoothed out over time. 
 
1.1 Confidence in yield 
 
Numerous uncertainties exist regarding confidence in yield estimations for Development Path A.  
Environmental impacts associated with bulk-water supply mining such as the Table Mountain 
Group aquifer contributes to such uncertainties.  The existence of some controversy regarding in-
stream flow requirements adds to uncertainty regarding confidence in the yield.  Little uncertainty 
exists with regard to the yield of the desalination process because it could be seen as a water 
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production process.  A probably less known fact is that more than twenty desalination plants of a 
patented South African design are already operational in South Africa and in the rest of the world 
(see Table 3).  The contractor has also completed numerous international projects, and it should be 
clear that capacity exists locally to successfully construct and manage desalination technology on a 
commercial scale. 
 
The Breede WMA has huge potential water surplus that could be utilised in Berg WMA.  However, 
such gains are estimated at a maximum 19Mkl. 
 
Table 3:  Projects installed by a leading South African desalination contractor 
Year Project Client Country Feed water Permeate quality Average 
capacity 
Mkl/a 
1995 Bitterfontein West Coast Water board South Africa Brackish water Potable water 197 
1997 Kenton-on-Sea Albany Water Board South Africa Sea water Potable water 480-528 
1998 Sobhengu Lodge Gooderson Leisure South Africa Sea water Potable water 24 
1998 Robben Island Department of Public Works South Africa Sea water Potable water 264-312 
1998 Cairo Intech Egypt Sea water Potable water 9.6-12 
1998 Spoornet South African Railways South Africa Brackish water Potable water 19.2-24 
1998 Moorreesburg Private South Africa Brackish water Potable water 19.2-24 
1998 Witsand Private South Africa Sea water Potable water 12 
1998 Kanon Kanon Hotel Resort South Africa Brackish water Potable water 19.2-24 
1998 Cape Town Harbour-
Boat 
Santa Monica South Africa Sea water Potable water 2.4 
1998 Palm Beach Florida Palm Beach Country Club USA Brackish water Irrigation 1920 
1998 Kangaroo Island South Australian Water Australia Sea water Potable water 250 
1999 United Utilities 
Australia 
United Utilities Australia Australia Industrial effluent Heavy process feed 
water 
12000 
1999 Aqua Services Private Namibia Brackish water Potable water 48 
1999 Silverhill Nursery Nursery South Africa Borehole Potable water / 
irrigation 
24 
1999 Kazakhstan Aktau Caspian Seawater 
Development  
Kazakhstan Sea water / Brackish 
water 
Potable water 4704 
2000 RAMA Rao/TEAM India Brackish water Potable water 30-70 
2001 Bedok (HCAP) Hitachi Chemical Asia 
Pacific 
Singapore Industrial effluent Process water 920 
2002 Loyang (HCAP) Hitachi Chemical Asia 
Pacific 
Singapore Industrial effluent Process water 850 
2003 Port of Singapore 
Authority 
 Singapore Sea water Potable water 1200 
2004 Abu-Dhabi, UAE  UAE Sea water Potable water 400 
2004 PUB, Newater  Singapore Sea water Potable water 300 
2004 Kanonberg Private South Africa Brackish water Potable water 90 
2004 D Jack Private South Africa Brackish water Potable water 20 
2004 HH Dairies Private   Potable water 30 
2004 Derrick Muller Private South Africa Brackish water Potable water 25 
2004 BradCam Private South Africa Brackish water Potable water 25 
2004 John Braithwaite Private South Africa Brackish water Potable water 25 
2004 Fraser Thompson Private South Africa Brackish water Potable water 25 
2004 Worcester Farms Private South Africa Brackish water Potable water 500 
2004 AM Rossouw Trust Private South Africa Brackish water Potable water 500 
2004 JS Jordaan Boerdery Private South Africa Brackish water Potable water 600 
2005 T Coombs Private South Africa Brackish water Potable water 20 
2005 Tsunami GrahamTek Maldives Sea water Potable water 1500 
Source:  confidential 
 
1.2 Timing 
 
Timing refers to the ability of the development path not only to supply the growing demand for 
water, but also to minimise surplus capacity.  With regard to timing, the following could be seen as 
some of the more important determinants of the growth in demand: 
 
• Seasonal variation 
• Population growth 
• Economic growth 
• Higher living standards 
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The influence of political interference on demand was noted. 
 
The challenge is to match water supply to demand as closely as possible at all times.  Figure 3 
indicates the expected long-term water demand for the study area.  The agricultural demand is 
limited to the registered water use rights for this sector, while urban demand was conservatively 
estimated at 2 percent per year. 
The potential of ground-water for agricultural supply was mentioned.  On the demand side, 
potentially 20Mkl was suggested for future growth in demand.  
 
Long-term urban and agricultural demand for the CCT cervice area
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Figure 3:  Long-term urban and agricultural demand expectations in the CCT 
Source:  (Killick, 2004; Sparks, 2003a; Sparks, 2003b) 
 
If the yield expansion schedules of both development paths are plotted against the urban and 
agricultural demand in Figure 3, Figure 4 will be obtained.  It should be clear that Development 
Path A yields a significantly larger surplus/shortage capacity (476Mkl/year) compared with B 
(54Mkl/year).  In other words, Development Path B could match supply and demand better in the 
long and short-term compared with Development Path A (also refer to Figure 5).  This was 
expected because the incremental increases in total capacity for Development Path B are smaller 
compared with A and one should remember that with desalination capacity expansion is modular 
with the added benefit of turning off the plant when it is not needed. 
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Figure 4:  Relative surplus/deficit of development paths A and B in terms of LT demand 
Source:  (De Lange, 2004a) 
 
 
Figure 5:  Surplus/shortage comparison between development paths A and B 
Source:  (De Lange, 2004a) 
 
Please return to the beginning of this section and complete the score sheet before 
proceeding to the following section. 
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CRITERIA GROUP 2: FINANCIAL ASPECTS 
 
Read through the section before completing the score sheet, below. 
 
 Description DP  A DP  B 
2.1)  Direct cost (URV) 
(The Unit Reference Value (URV) is 
the discounted capital and 
maintenance cost of a scheme over 
the life-time of the project.  It does 
not include the long-term socio-
economic and environmental 
impacts.) 
The difference between direct, in-
direct and total costs was emphasized.  
 
100 = the direct cost of the development path  
is affordable. 
0 = the direct cost of the development path is 
totally unacceptable and too expensive 
   
 
= 100 
2.2)  Confidence in total cost 
estimates 
(Level of confidence in the accuracy 
of the cost estimations.) 
100 = totally confident that cost estimations 
will match the total cost of the development 
path 
0 = absolutely no confidence in cost 
estimations 
   
= 100 
2.3)  Tariff changes necessary to 
maintain services 
(The relative changes in water tariffs 
necessary to enable water service 
providers to maintain a safe level of 
assurance of supply to water users.) 
100 = no impacts on tariffs 
0 = unacceptably high increases on tariff 
structure 
   
= 100 
 
It was mentioned that desalination has hidden costs : energy, brine disposal, blending.  This is the 
so-called indirect cost – refer to the measurement problem. 
 
The rich often manage their finances in a “better” way compared to the poor – biggest savings in 
rich areas.  However one could argue that water savings in rich areas is due to a higher elasticity of 
demand in such areas and due to “better” financial management. 
 
The importance of politics in tariff determination was mentioned. 
 
2.1. Unit Reference Value (URV) 
 
Table 4:  Average URV for development paths A and B (constant 2004 values) 
 
Year Scheme URV Year Scheme URV
2006 Berg River Project R 1.35 2006 Berg River Project R 1.35
2013 Voëlvlei scheme, Phase 1 R 0.53 2013 Desalination Plant 1 R 7.73
2016 Lourens river diversion R 0.46   -   -
2018 Table Mountain Group Aquifer R 1.00 2020 Desalination Plant 2 R 7.73
2026 Cape Flats Aquifer R 1.13   -   -
2027 Eerste River Scheme R 1.06   -   -
2028 Desalination Plant 1 R 7.73 2027 Desalination Plant 3 R 7.73
2034 Desalination Plant 2 R 7.73 2033 Desalination Plant 4 R 7.73
2039 Desalination Plant 3 R 7.73 2038 Desalination Plant 5 R 7.73
2044 Desalination Plant 4 R 7.73 2043 Desalination Plant 6 R 7.73
2048 Desalination Plant 5 R 7.73 2047 Desalination Plant 7 R 7.73
R 1.89 R 6.14
R 4.02 R 6.93Average URV up to 2049
Average URV up to 2028
Average URV up to 2049
Development Path A Development Path B
Average URV up to 2028
 
Source:  (De Lange, 2004; Kleynhans, 2002) 
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Since 2002, a strong appreciation in the Rand against the US dollar (see Figure 6) as well as new 
advances in reverse osmosis technology have led to an approximate 30% decrease in direct cost 
estimations for desalination by means of reverse osmosis.  (However, we did not include this 
reduction in our cost estimations.)  Claims have been made by numerous suppliers of URVs from as 
little as R5.28 to R6.89 per cubic metre of produced water.  Such reductions have been made 
possible by significant reductions in the pre-treatment costs of raw feed water.  The new technology 
makes use of flow distributors and electromagnetic fields to prevent the need for chemical 
conditioning of raw feed water, resulting in “cleaner” brine effluents.  The use of flow distributors 
expels gasses from the feed water while under pressure creating micro bubbles that actively scour 
the reverse osmosis membranes preventing foulants from settling.  Electric and magnetic fields are 
used to disorientate the steric formation of active crystal growth, subsequently separating the 
chemical bonds and preventing foulants from building up on the surface of the membranes.  Such 
technologies greatly enhance the life expectancy of the membranes, thereby reducing the 
maintenance cost of the plant. 
 
 
Figure 6:  ZAR Rand / US Dollar exchange rate 
Source:  (De Lange, 2004a) 
 
The question was asked – for how long will the Rand maintain its level. 
 
 
2.2. Confidence in cost estimation 
 
The total cost of a scheme consists of direct and indirect costs.  Current cost estimation 
methodologies are unable to confidently estimate the indirect cost (long-term socio-economic and 
environmental impacts) of a particular scheme resulting in some uncertainty regarding the 
legitimacy of total cost estimations.  Schemes including the Lourens, Voelvlei, Eerste, TMGA and 
Cape Flats aquifers typically contain relatively more long-term impacts and it may therefore be 
possible that such schemes tend to be underestimated in terms of total cost, while schemes with 
smaller indirect costs (such as in the case of desalination) tend to be reported more accurately.  
Although the direct cost estimate for Development Path A is lower than B, the confidence in such 
estimation is lower compared to B because desalination could be seen as a water production process 
that contains less uncertainty regarding long-term cost estimations – it could therefore, be possible 
that B is less expensive in terms of total cost estimations. 
 
The argument of energy requirement for desalination was raised.   
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2.3. Tariff changes 
 
The development paths will affect the water tariff structure differently.  Although the determination 
of water tariffs is often more politically motivated and budget related, the fact remains that A will 
be cheaper in terms of water tariffs than B.  Figure 7 presents the relative difference in tariffs per 
kilolitre between the two developments paths.  The sudden increases are evident because supply 
schemes in the two development paths are not perfectly synchronised due to differences in the yield 
of various schemes.  It should be clear that the difference decreases over time and stabilise between 
10 and 13 percent suggesting that Development Path A will stay less expensive compared to B in 
terms of water tariffs. 
Technological development in desalination technology could have efficiency gains and cost 
decreasing effects. 
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Figure 7:  Theoretical average price of domestic water in the CCT 
Source:  (De Lange, 2004a) 
 
Figure 8 translates the 10 to 13 percent difference to Rand per kiloliter and suggests that the 
difference would stabilise at R1.55/kl,  implying that water from Development Path A will stay 
cheaper compared to B.  The question that could be asked is – what is the real cost of having 
cheaper water from A compared to B? 
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Figure 8:  Relative cost saving of Development Path A over B (R/kl) 
 138 
Source:  (De Lange, 2004a) 
 
Figure 9 presents the relative difference between the two development paths in terms of the 
percentage change of each on CCT domestic water tariffs over time.  Development Path B opts for 
desalination in 2012 with an estimated 19.6 percent increase in domestic water tariffs; while 
Development Path A opts for Voëlvlei phase 1 with an estimated 0.8 percent increase in tariffs.  
Figure 9 also shows that when A opts for desalination in 2028, Development Path B will opt for its 
third plant, resulting in A having a bigger impact on tariffs compared to B.  However, this does not 
mean that B will be less expensive than A (refer back to Figure 8). 
 
Figure 9:  Theoretical percentage increase in CCT domestic water tariffs 
Source:  (De Lange, 2004a) 
 
It should be clear that Development Path A postpones desalination for as long as possible and that 
A is cheaper compared with B in terms of increases in water tariffs.  However, Development Path A 
does contains numerous unaccounted-for environmental and socio-economic costs (criteria 4 will 
discuss this issue in more detail).  It should also be noted that water tariffs are not the only costs 
associated with the development paths and it is not certain that B will be more expensive if all costs 
could be accounted for. 
 
Table 5 summarises the financial criteria of the two development paths.   
 
Table 5:  Financial criteria for development paths A and B 
 Development Path A Development Path B 
Unit Reference Value (URV) Significantly lower compared 
to B, but the difference 
decreases over time.  The 
average URV up to 2028 = 
R1.89/kl 
Average URV up to 2049 = 
R4.02/kl 
Significantly higher compared 
to A 
Average URV up to 2028 = 
R6.14/kl 
Average URV up to 2049 = 
R6.93/kl 
Confidence in total cost 
estimates 
Lower confidence in accuracy 
of cost estimations because of a 
bigger portion of poorly-
measurable long-term negative 
High confidence because 
desalination could almost be 
seen as a production process 
with fewer uncertain costs 
Theoretical % increase in CCT domestic water tariffs
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impacts 
Tariff changes necessary to 
maintain service 
Initially only small increases 
are expected with the first few 
supply schemes, but a 
significant increase is expected 
when desalination becomes a 
reality 
Initially a high increase in 
tariffs is expected. 
 
 
Please return to the beginning of this section and complete the score sheet before 
proceeding to the following section. 
 
 
CRITERIA GROUP 3: ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS 
 
Read through the section before completing the score sheet, below. 
 
The importance of the creation of additional storage capacity was mentioned.  However, it was also 
mentioned that already too many dams have been constructed in the BWMA. 
 
Development Path A is more flexible compared to Development Path B because A has more storage 
capacity.  This contradict a previous comment on p. 4 
 
 Description DP 
A 
DP B 
In-stream flow requirements 
Rivers need a minimum flow to 
maintain the ecological functioning of 
the system 
Off-steam dam needs long winter to 
fill. 
100 = enhance the average yearly flow 
0 = severely negative impact on average flow 
The word “severely” could have been left 
out.   
 
What is the impacts on average flow ?  
However, WHAT is average flow? 
 
   
= 
100 
Waste disposal 
Rivers play an important role in 
transporting and diluting pollutants 
Water quality will become issue 
before water availability. 
100 = enhance the average water quality – 
increase effective waste disposal 
0 = severely negative impact on water 
quality 
   
= 
100 
Groundwater re-charge 
Underground-water resources need to 
be re-charged to ensure supply 
(boreholes) 
Borehole pumping could enhance 
groundwater recharge and have 
negative impact on groundwater 
discharge. 
100 = enhance ground-water recharge tempo 
0 = severely negative impact on ground-
water recharge tempo 
   
= 
100 
Flood and erosion control 
Flood and erosion control are 
important to maintain soil fertility; 
erosion increases silting of storage 
dams and, therefore, decreases the 
storage capacity. 
Constant flows have negative 
impacts: establish aliens. 
100 = enhance flood and erosion control 
0 = severely negative impacts on flood and 
erosion control 
   
 
= 
100 
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Loss in biodiversity 
Biodiversity is a key aspect of 
sustaining a functional ecosystem and 
also a functioning society  
The risk of double counting was 
mentioned here. 
100 = enhance biodiversity 
0 = severe loss in biodiversity 
   
= 
100 
 
Bias against DP A ito questions asked.  However by noting that bulk of additional supply 
developments will be allocated to city – implies re-allocation – justify criteria and argument. 
 
Energy for desalination = 10MW for 21.9Mkl/a – the question was asked whether this is a 
significant amount of energy. 
 
Perceived values of decision makers influence their choices or decisions, with optimal decision-
making requiring the full valuation of the different costs and benefits of the options under 
consideration.  The different values associated with environmental impacts range from tangible 
consumptive and non-consumptive use values, to less tangible values, such as option and existence 
values.  The estimation of environmental values in monetary terms will certainly promote and 
justify conservation actions at public policy and decision-making level; it does, however, remain a 
controversial topic.  The quantification of such effects proved to be extremely complex and messy 
and should be seen as a study on its own; however, Table 6 does give an indication of the expected 
impact of the two development paths in terms of selected criteria.  
 
Table 6:  Expected environmental impact of Development Paths A and B 
 
One respondent strongly disagreed with this table.  Reasons for such response is still awaited. 
 
Criteria Development Path A Development Path B 
In-stream flow requirements Higher risk of non-compliance Lower risk of non-
compliance 
Waste disposal Smaller dilution effect 
compared to DP B 
No negative impacts on 
current dilution effects 
Groundwater re-charge 
 
Potential negative effect on 
recharge tempo 
It was mentioned that DP A 
would have negative impact on 
dis-charge tempo and positive 
effect on recharge – creating an 
underground dam when you 
pump 
No effect 
Flood and erosion control Increased control because of 
more dams 
Current level of control 
is maintained 
Impact on biodiversity Negative Little/No-effect 
(positive) 
 
 
It was noted that more than natural flow of water is not necessarily better.  Differential between 
summer and winter flows needed for species for breeding ; migrating ext – if regulated – no more 
cue - impact 
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It is important to note that negative environmental impacts of the current water supply system in the 
Western Cape should be ignored in the comparison between development paths A and B.  It should 
also be noted that neither of the development paths would have negative environmental impacts 
upstream from any new bulk-water scheme.  All potentially negative impacts are, therefore, 
associated with down-stream effects such as in-stream flow requirements, waste disposal and 
dilution effects, flood and erosion control and estuary bio-diversity.   
 
As mentioned, Development Path A will allocate more water to urban areas compared with 
Development Path B.  Development Path A could, therefore, have more potential negative impacts 
on the environment because a further decrease in the already regulated in-stream flows will not 
enhance river bio-diversity.  An exact estimation of negative environmental impacts is not as 
important here as the relative difference between the two development paths.  The discussion will 
follow this notion. 
 
As mentioned, Development Path A will allocate more water to urban areas compared with 
Development Path B.  Development Path A could therefore have more potential negative impacts 
on the environment because a further decrease in the already regulated in-stream flows will not 
enhance river bio-diversity.  An exact estimation of negative environmental impacts is not as 
important here as the relative difference between the two development paths.  The discussion will 
follow this notion.   
 
In-stream flow requirements safeguard the ecological functioning of catchments8 and, therefore, the 
long-term supply of water to all users.  Development Path A allocates more water away from 
catchments compared to Development Path B and it could, therefore, result in less water for in-
stream flow requirements.  Dilution effects and waste disposal also need a minimum level of flow 
to avoid causing a biohazard.  Again, Development Path A could have a weaker dilution effect 
because of possible lower levels of in-stream flow.  The same argument could be followed for 
groundwater recharge.  In-stream storage dams are prone to silting but could be used for flood and 
erosion control purposes.  In this regard, Development Path A is better off compared with B.  
However, the study area is not prone to dangerous floods Biodiversity and in-stream flows are 
directly related, and it is, therefore, expected that Development Path A could have a negative impact 
on biodiversity, whereas Development Path B will have little or no-effect.  
The Cape Flats is prone to yearly flooding because of relatively shallow water table.  – pumping of 
“greywater-polluted water” from aquifer could lower the water table and supplement supply. 
 
Lastly, some facts are offered to clarify possible uncertainties regarding the potential negative 
effects of brine disposal associated with desalination plants.  Although some countries do not 
recognise brine TDS (total dissolved solids) as a pollutant (Del Bene et al., 1994), high salinities 
can impact ocean biota if the necessary precautions are not in place.  Hecht (Hecht and Deacon, 
1996) investigated the potential effects of brine discharge in the Atlantic  and advised with regard to 
the following (Hecht and Deacon, 1996):  
 
TDS concentration is an indication of the relative efficiency of the desalination technology 
employed - higher concentrations of TDS in the brine indicate a more efficient technology (more 
fresh water from the same volume of seawater).  However, a high TDS increases brine densities to 
levels significantly higher than ambient seawater, resulting in a tendency for the effluent to sink to 
the sea floor.  Benthic (floor) marine organisms are, therefore, at greater risk to saline exposure for 
prolonged periods if the brine is not diluted quickly.  The rate of dilution is therefore important to 
                                                
8
 Including (Boucher (Boucher, 2004):  1) habitat diversity in the river; 2) appropriate water quality; 3) an appropriate riparian zone; 4) free passage 
between different habitats; 5) connectivity with the floodplain; 6) near-natural temperature regimes; and 7) appropriate natural variation in flow 
regimes. 
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minimise the area impacted by the discharge.  Hecht (Hecht and Deacon, 1996) advised the disposal 
of brine via submerged vertical effluent pipes or surface discharge in the surf zone to promote rapid 
dilution of the discharge.  It should be noted that reverse osmosis has a lower recovery rate (40 to 
45 percent of the intake) compared to various distillation processes (recovery rates of 80-85 
percent) resulting in a less concentrated brine that will, therefore, pose a smaller risk of salinity 
exposure. 
 
Temperature deviations as well as chemical additives could pose some risk for the marine 
environment if the necessary precautions are not taken.  Although reverse osmosis has no 
temperature elevations (as in the case of distillation technologies), the brine usually contains small 
quantities of anti-scalant (sulphuric acid) and biocide process chemicals.  Although these 
components either break down or are bio-degradable, they may alter the chemical composition of 
the brine concentrate.  The de-scaling action of sulphuric acid decreases the pH of the brine from 
8.4 (seawater) to 5.8.  Such decreases severely alter the properties of the brine when compared to 
natural seawater.  Once again, it should be noted that new technological advances such as the use of 
flow distributors and electromagnetic fields in reverse osmosis technology lessen the need for 
chemical additions to raw feed water resulting in “cleaner” brine effluents.  If the latest reverse 
osmosis technologies could be employed in the CCT area, the risk of negative environmental 
impacts of brine disposal would be negligible.  As new reverse osmosis technologies exclude the 
use of pre-treatment chemicals, the potential effect posed by chemical additives is also removed.  
Disturbance of sediment and destruction of benthic organisms should be avoided if an upward 
angled discharged port is adopted.  Any effects would be further alleviated if the effluent were 
discharged into zones of high natural mixing, such as the surf zone. 
 
Please return to the beginning of this section and complete the score sheet before proceeding to the 
following section. 
 143 
CRITERIA GROUP 4: SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS 
 
Read through the section before completing the score sheet, below. 
 
 Description DP  A DP  B 
4.1)  Dependency on natural rainfall. 
The relative dependency of schemes on 
natural rainfall to maintain the supply; it 
does not help if the storage capacity exists, 
but it does not rain. 
This criterion could be under “Water 
balance” 
100 = decrease the 
dependency on natural 
rainfall 
0 = increase the dependency 
on natural rainfall 
   
 
= 
100 
4.2)  Volume of water allocated from rural 
to urban areas 
The volume of water that will be allocated 
from rural to urban areas if the 
development paths are followed. 
This criterion is the cause for impacts on 
agriculture and the economy ect. – not a 
criterion? 
100 = no additional water 
allocated to urban areas 
0 = extreme re-allocations 
from rural to urban areas 
   
 
= 
100 
4.3)  Impact on agricultural production and 
employment 
The impact on the volume of agricultural 
production (foodstuffs and fibres and the 
impact on permanent and seasonal labour). 
It was mentioned that water is not the most 
important production factor in agric.  
However, little sense in arguing on the 
relative importance of water as production 
factor – a whole bunch of factors is 
important – fact is that water has inelastic 
agric. demand! 
100 = enhance agricultural 
production and employment 
0 = severely negative impact 
on production and 
employment 
   
 
 
= 
100 
4.4)  Impact on the rest of the economy. 
All sectors (agriculture, industry and 
services) of an economy have an impact on 
one another, the agricultural sector being 
one of the sectors that has a significant 
impact on the rest of the economy. 
100 = positive impact on the 
rest of the economy  
0 = negative impact on the 
rest of the economy 
 
   
 
 
= 
100 
4.5)  Urbanisation 
Migration from rural to urban areas places 
more pressure on urban infrastructure. 
100=decrease urbanisation 
0=increase urbanisation  
   
= 
100 
4.6  Recreation and tourism. 
The extent to which the natural 
environment supports the tourism industry. 
100=support recreation and 
tourism  
0=severe negative impact on 
recreation and tourism 
   
= 
100 
 
It was mentioned that the current agric allocation would not be affected with future schemes – it is 
also unlikely that new schemes will be affordable to irrigation farmers.  So what is meant with “re-
allocation”?  If the fact that by building schemes in rural areas imply the allocation of water to 
urban areas, it is a different story.   
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Socio-economic influences include all direct and indirect, as well as short and long-term, influences 
applicable to social welfare and society as a whole.  Such influences are typically difficult to 
quantify because of their diverse nature.  It is expected that most of the criticism against this study 
will be concentrated in this section. 
 
4.1 Dependency on natural rainfall 
 
Carry-over capacities in dams are dependent on natural rainfall.  There is no point in creating 
additional storage capacity if the average rainfall does not qualify such expanded capacity - the 
potential impacts of global warming add to this uncertainty.  Development Path B is less dependent 
on natural rainfall because seawater desalination could be seen as a water production process with 
the sea as an unlimited supply of water.  It could therefore be argued that B will ensure a higher 
level of assurance of supply compared with A.  It should be noted that the above-mentioned 
difference is extremely small given the fact that the biggest contribution to capacity expansion in A 
comes from underground sources (still dependent on natural rainfall).   
 
The energy argument regarding desalination was mentioned again. 
 
 
4.2 Volume of water allocated from rural areas to urban areas 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the CCT receives more than half of its water supply from outside 
its municipal boundaries.  This brings rural uses into competition with urban use and presents a new 
complex dimension to the already complicated water management decision-making environment.  
Water availability is important for the development of any region and it is expected that 
Development Path A will re-allocate a greater volume of water from rural areas to urban areas 
because more supply schemes will be built in rural areas with the aim of providing for urban 
demand.  Development Path B does not include the construction of additional water supply schemes 
(apart from the BWP) in rural areas because desalination will make use of seawater and not rural 
water supplies.  The difference in the volumes allocated from rural areas has numerous socio-
economic (and also environmental) effects, which will be discussed below.   
 
 
To facilitate an illustration of the impact a re-allocation of water to urban areas will have, a 
theoretical 20 percent volumetric water restriction is assumed on rural water users in competition 
with the CCT.  Such a restriction is not equal to the volume Development Path A will re-allocate, 
but could give a broad indication of the kind of impacts to be expected of such a reallocation.  The 
rural areas affected by the restriction are (see also Figure 1): 
• Berg River irrigation area (including Malmesbury, Piketberg, Wolseley, Tulbagh, Paarl, 
Franschhoek and Cape Town) 
• Eerste River irrigation area (including the Stellenbosch and Helderberg areas) 
• Theewaterskloof irrigation area (including Villiersdorp, Vygeboom and Groenland areas) 
 
The following discussion attempts to display the complexities associated with such a restriction.  It 
is by no means exhaustive but should serve as a point of departure (and motivation) for further and 
more specialised studies. 
 
4.3 Impact on agricultural production 
 
The agricultural sector has strong impacts (multiplier effect) on the rest of the Western Cape 
economy, and therefore, it would seem logical to use the impact of water re-allocations on the 
agricultural sector as a point of departure.   
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The relative importance of water for the agricultural sector is directly related to the importance of 
agriculture in the Western Cape because of the relative low demand-elasticity of water in 
agricultural use.  If the relative importance of agriculture in the Western Cape is understood, some 
insight will be gained into the relative impact of allocating water from rural to urban areas.   
 
The Western Cape agricultural sector could be counted as the largest in terms of gross farm income 
in South Africa, with horticulture by far the biggest contributor towards gross farming income in the 
province (see Table 7 and Figure 10).  As such, the focus in this study on irrigated agriculture 
(viticulture and the deciduous industries) within the Western Cape could be justified.    
 
Table 7:  Breakdown of gross farming income per industry 
  R 1,000 
Province Field crops Horticulture Animals 
Animal 
products Other products Total 
Western Cape 1,236,449 5,960,849 1,595,016 1,585,005 275,994 10,653,313 
South Africa 16,476,933 14,197,267 14,546,912 6,675,706 1,074,396 52,971,210 
Source:  (STATSSA, 2004) 
Figure 10:  Industry breakdown of gross farm income in the Western Cape 
Source:  (STATSSA, 2004b) 
 
 
The registered water use rights in the study area (refer back to Figure 1) are indicated in Table 8, 
with the registered hectares under irrigation indicated in Table 9. 
 
Table 8:  Registered water use rights in selected areas (million kilo litres) 
 
Capped (Max 
legal use not 
fully developed) 
(Mkl)
Present max 
unrestricted use 
(Mkl)
Bankhoek IB 2 2
Upper Berg IB (Includes Wemmershoek Exchange) 59 49
Lower Berg River IB 18 18
Vyeboom 13 13
Zonderend IB 32 32
Directly pumped from THW Dam 2 2
Stellenbosch IB 12 10
Helderberg IB 12 8
Lower Eerste River 3 3
150 134
27 EersteR
BergR79
46 THW
Agric registered (Mkl)
 
Source:  (De Lange, 2004a; STATSSA, 2004b; Van Zyl, 2004b) 
 
 
Industry breakdown of gross farm income: 
Western Cape
Horticulture 
55%
Other 
products
3% Field crops 
12%
Animal 
products 
15%
Animals 
15%
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Table 9:  Listed hectares under irrigation in study-selected areas 
 Wine grapes 
(ha) 
Table grapes 
(ha) 
Deciduous fruit9 
(ha) 
Eerste River irrigation 
area10 
16582 72 1461 
Berg River irrigation 
area11 
31763 4313 7336 
Theewaterskloof 
irrigation area12 
0 5 14860 
Total 48345 4390 23657 
Source:  (De Lange, 2004a; STATSSA, 2004b; Van Zyl, 2004b) 
 
Crop-water-yield relationships, as well as expected impact on labour, need to be established to 
estimate the impact of restrictions in the study area.  This proved to be a challenge given the diverse 
crop and cultivar portfolios of irrigation farmers in the study area.  The Western Cape produces 42 
percent of the total horticultural production in South Africa and horticulture (deciduous and 
viticulture) makes up 56 percent of the total Western Cape gross farm income.  The study area 
represents roughly 44 percent of the Western Cape deciduous and viticulture industries in terms of 
irrigated hectares (De Lange, 2004a; DFPT, 2003; Western Cape Department of Agriculture, 2004). 
 
Although some research had been done (Beukes, 1999; Piaget and Lategan, 1986; Scheepers et al., 
1991) on crop-yield-water relationships in South Africa, a lack of norms is still evident.  Most of 
this research was done on wine grapes in the Western Cape, with no South African research done on 
crop-yield-water relationships on deciduous fruit, vegetables and citrus.  A need for such research is 
evident.  The fact that wine grapes could, in contrast to most deciduous fruit, be produced under 
sub-optimal irrigation practices, such as supplemental and deficit irrigation or even dry-land 
conditions, makes the relative abundance of research into yield-water relationships done on wine 
grapes somewhat ironic (Louw and van Schalkwyk, 2001).  Water stress during the production 
season of deciduous fruit can reduce both quantity and quality sufficiently to include severe 
negative economic consequences, and research on this topic would, therefore, seem viable 
(Bourbon-Levtley, 2004; Malan, 2004).  The crop-water relationship of wine grapes (Scheepers et 
al., 1991) was adapted for deciduous fruit and table grapes.  Table 10 indicates some of the 
assumptions regarding hectares planted, yield per hectare, and price per ton as well as the estimated 
gross value per crop/cultivar for selected areas.  The assumptions were used to calculate the impact 
of a 20 percent water restriction in the study area. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
9
 Peaches, plums, prunes, apricots, apples, pears and nectarines. 
10
 Stellenbosch and Helderberg 
11
 Piketberg, Wolseley, Tulbagh, Berg, Franschhoek and Cape Town. 
12
 Groenland (Elgin, Grabouw), Villiersdorp and Vygeboom. 
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 Table 10:  Assumed impact of water restrictions for wine and deciduous fruit industries in the study area 
 
ha t/ha R/t Total value ha t/ha R/t Total value ha t/ha R/t Total value
Cabernet Sauvignon 2303 4.0 R 5,416.00 R 49,855,016.58 3303.16 4.7 R 5,416.00 R 84,645,927.42 4119.08 5.0 R 5,416.00 R 111,546,116.22
Cinsaut 635.51 8.7 R 2,548.33 R 14,061,282.86 1196.98 7.9 R 2,548.33 R 24,221,169.32 302.33 10.7 R 2,548.33 R 8,209,188.26
Merlot 908.654 5.9 R 5,169.33 R 27,857,330.56 1362.981 7.0 R 5,169.33 R 49,580,936.96 2142.796 7.1 R 5,169.33 R 78,460,554.88
Pinotage 1809.685 8.3 R 4,383.00 R 65,550,131.82 1358.971 9.7 R 4,383.00 R 57,510,964.71 1522.867 8.7 R 4,383.00 R 57,820,163.45
Shiraz 1579.044 4.4 R 5,170.67 R 35,864,860.86 1805.868 5.6 R 5,170.67 R 52,485,162.24 2119.932 5.1 R 5,170.67 R 55,401,004.59
Cabernet Franc 44.115 1.1 R 5,098.67 R 242,793.41 187.705 5.5 R 5,098.67 R 5,266,749.31 432.5 3.3 R 5,098.67 R 7,265,125.82
Ruby Cabernet 126.65 6.9 R 3,610.67 R 3,163,810.56 238.102 8.2 R 3,610.67 R 7,065,843.58 68.391 9.0 R 3,610.67 R 2,214,667.39
Colombar 452.066 14.0 R 1,099.00 R 6,936,283.55 628.482 15.7 R 1,099.00 R 10,820,602.34 110.26 11.4 R 1,099.00 R 1,387,256.71
Semillion 121.634 6.0 R 2,080.00 R 1,523,446.08 208.373 11.7 R 2,080.00 R 5,060,939.52 139.58 8.5 R 2,080.00 R 2,478,827.52
Cape Riesling 97.992 6.3 R 1,341.67 R 831,862.85 442.325 8.4 R 1,341.67 R 5,012,506.92 129.295 8.2 R 1,341.67 R 1,429,097.72
Sauvignon Blanc 951.177 4.5 R 3,363.67 R 14,523,532.30 999.078 7.3 R 3,363.67 R 24,418,686.17 2196.603 6.0 R 3,363.67 R 44,687,791.68
Chenin Blanc 3942.3 8.1 R 1,652.67 R 52,841,663.27 3845.675 8.8 R 1,652.67 R 55,647,415.30 1913.175 9.0 R 1,652.67 R 28,525,145.66
Chardonnay 722.412 7.7 R 3,104.67 R 17,169,381.03 1063.551 8.1 R 3,104.67 R 26,663,038.78 1076.929 8.2 R 3,104.67 R 27,269,016.93
W eisser Riesling 30.4 7.2 R 2,486.00 R 541,351.36 93.44 4.9 R 2,486.00 R 1,143,604.75 84.16 8.2 R 2,486.00 R 1,718,790.57
13724.639 R 290,962,747.08 16734.691 R 409,543,547.31 16357.898 R 428,412,747.39
Malmesbury Paarl Stellenbosch
 
 
ha t/ha R/t Total value ha t/ha R/t Total value ha t/ha R/t Total value
Groenland (THW) 7595 45 R 3,100 R 1,059,502,500 1755 40 R 3,070 R 215,514,000 12 23 R 5,188 R 1,431,750
Villiersdorp/Vygeboom (THW) 3495 45 R 3,100 R 487,552,500 929 40 R 3,070 R 114,081,200 61 23 R 5,188 R 7,278,063
Piketberg (Berg) 384 45 R 3,100 R 53,568,000 244 40 R 3,070 R 29,963,200 208 23 R 5,188 R 24,817,000
Somerset-Wes (Eerste) 143 45 R 3,100 R 19,948,500 255 40 R 3,070 R 31,314,000 19 23 R 5,188 R 2,266,938
Wolseley/Tulbagh (Berg) 69 45 R 3,100 R 9,625,500 1182 40 R 3,070 R 145,149,600 159 23 R 5,188 R 18,970,688
Bergriver (Berg) 55 45 R 3,100 R 7,672,500 306 40 R 3,070 R 37,576,800 67 23 R 5,188 R 7,993,938
Stellenbosch (Eerste) 34 45 R 3,100 R 4,743,000 223 40 R 3,070 R 27,384,400 1 23 R 5,188 R 119,313
Franschhoek (Berg) 16 45 R 3,100 R 2,232,000 52 40 R 3,070 R 6,385,600 2 23 R 5,188 R 238,625
Cape town (Berg) 8 45 R 3,100 R 1,116,000 8 40 R 3,070 R 982,400 18 23 R 5,188 R 2,147,625
Total 11799 R 1,645,960,500 4954 R 608,351,200 547 R 65,263,938
THW 11090 R 1,547,055,000 2684 R 329,595,200 73 R 8,709,813
Eerste 177 R 24,691,500 478 R 58,698,400 20 R 2,386,250
Berg 532 R 74,214,000 1792 R 220,057,600 454 R 54,167,875
Total 11799 R 1,645,960,500 4954 R 608,351,200 547 R 65,263,938
Total
ha t/ha R/t Total value ha t/ha R/t Total value ha t/ha R/t Total value
Groenland (THW) 22 20 R 4,700 R 2,068,000 36 30 R 5,425 R 5,859,000 476 21 R 4,860 R 48,580,560 R 1,332,955,810
Villiersdorp/Vygeboom (THW) 38 20 R 4,700 R 3,572,000 297 30 R 5,425 R 48,336,750 144 21 R 4,860 R 14,696,640 R 675,517,153
Piketberg (Berg) 105 20 R 4,700 R 9,870,000 406 30 R 5,425 R 66,076,500 72 21 R 4,860 R 7,348,320 R 191,643,020
Somerset-Wes (Eerste) 2 20 R 4,700 R 188,000 9 30 R 5,425 R 1,464,750 157 21 R 4,860 R 16,023,420 R 71,205,608
Wolseley/Tulbagh (Berg) 146 20 R 4,700 R 13,724,000 1610 30 R 5,425 R 262,027,500 623 21 R 4,860 R 63,583,380 R 513,080,668
Bergriver (Berg) 157 20 R 4,700 R 14,758,000 130 30 R 5,425 R 21,157,500 908 21 R 4,860 R 92,670,480 R 181,829,218
Stellenbosch (Eerste) 30 20 R 4,700 R 2,820,000 42 30 R 5,425 R 6,835,500 546 21 R 4,860 R 55,724,760 R 97,626,973
Franschhoek (Berg) 14 20 R 4,700 R 1,316,000 72 30 R 5,425 R 11,718,000 289 21 R 4,860 R 29,495,340 R 51,385,565
Cape town (Berg) 1 20 R 4,700 R 94,000 12 30 R 5,425 R 1,953,000 13 21 R 4,860 R 1,326,780 R 7,619,805
Total 515 R 48,410,000 2614 R 425,428,500 3228 R 329,449,680 R 3,122,863,818
THW 60 R 5,640,000 333 R 54,195,750 620 R 63,277,200 R 2,008,472,963
Eerste 32 R 3,008,000 51 R 8,300,250 703 R 71,748,180 R 168,832,580
Berg 423 R 39,762,000 2230 R 362,932,500 1905 R 194,424,300 R 945,558,275
Total 515 R 48,410,000 2614 R 425,428,500 3228 R 329,449,680 R 3,122,863,818
Plums&PrunesPeachesNectarines
ApricotsPearsApples
 
 
Table grapes Total(Deciduous + Table grapes)
ha t/ha R/t Total value
Groenland (THW) 5 19 R 4,451 R 422,859 R 1,333,378,669
Villiersdorp/Vygeboom (THW) 0 19 R 4,451 R 0 R 675,517,153
Piketberg (Berg) 1158 19 R 4,451 R 97,934,202 R 289,577,222
Somerset-Wes (Eerste) 1 19 R 4,451 R 84,572 R 71,290,179
Wolseley/Tulbagh (Berg) 62 19 R 4,451 R 5,243,455 R 518,324,122
Bergriver (Berg) 3090 19 R 4,451 R 261,327,017 R 443,156,234
Stellenbosch (Eerste) 71 19 R 4,451 R 6,004,601 R 103,631,574
Franschhoek (Berg) 0 19 R 4,451 R 0 R 51,385,565
Cape town (Berg) 3 19 R 4,451 R 253,716 R 7,873,521
Total 4390 R 371,270,422 R 3,494,134,239
THW 5 R 422,859 R 2,008,895,822
Eerste 72 R 6,089,173 R 174,921,753
Berg 4313 R 364,758,389 R 1,310,316,664
Total 4390 R 371,270,422 R 3,494,134,239
 
 
 
 
Source:  (Agricultural Research Council  - Infruitec/Nietvoorbij, 1999; Beukes and Weber, 1982; 
Beukes, 1999; De Lange, 2004a; DFPT, 2003; Green, 1985; Louw, 2001; Louw, 2004; Louw and 
van Schalkwyk, 2001; SAWIS, 2004a; SAWIS, 2004d; Van Zyl, 2004a; Van Zyl, 2004b; 
WESGRO, 2004) 
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Crop-water-yield relationships are complex and bound to a localised context, with inter-crop 
variation complicating the situation further.  It is therefore extremely difficult to present a complete 
and accurate estimation of yield relationships for the study area.  Some assumptions were called for 
and Figure 11 indicates the assumed crop-water-yield relationships that were adopted from Louw 
and van Schalkwyk (Louw and van Schalkwyk, 2001).  Calculations are based on secondary data 
obtained from a literature survey and it should be clear that further research is needed in this regard.   
 
Impact of irrigation on dry-land production of wine-, table grapes and deciduous 
fruit in the Western Cape
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Figure 11:  Assumed crop-water-yield relationship 
 
Source:  (Beukes, 1999; De Lange, 2004a; DFPT, 2003; Louw and van Schalkwyk, 2001; Malan, 
2004; SAWIS, 2002; SAWIS, 2004d; Scheepers et al., 1991; Van Zyl, 2004) 
 
Quality impacts was not accounted for. 
 
 
The following assumptions were made to construct the relationship: 
 
• Assume equal volumes with each irrigation.  (I.e. the irrigator irrigates a fixed volume of 
water with each application.) 
• Assume that six applications are 100 percent of the total number of applications and 
therefore 100 percent of the total volume irrigated in one irrigation season. 
• Assume the above-mentioned yield relationship to be under normal production conditions. 
 
Within Figure 11, dry-land production was assumed as the base yield (0 percent), with the 
percentage increase as shown for each incremental (17 percent) irrigation (Louw and van 
Schalkwyk, 2001).  A typical S-curve could be identified, with the most dramatic yield increase (81 
percent above dry land) taking place within 50 percent of the optimum irrigation schedule from 
where a typical diminishing return in yield sets in.   
 
An approximate 2% drop in yield could be associated with a 20% water restriction (given 100% of 
the optimum irrigation level) (Louw and van Schalkwyk, 2001).  Apart from this, Beukes and 
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Weber (Beukes and Weber, 1982) associate a 5% decrease in yield (apples) with a 20% stress on 
the optimum irrigation schedule while  Goode (Goode, 1971) mentioned a 9% (apples) decrease in 
yield with a 20% increase in water stress.  Malan (Malan, 2004) and Bourbon-Levtley (Bourbon-
Levtley, 2004) mention a 7% (deciduous in general in the Berg Irrigation area) drop associated with 
a 20% restriction from the optimum irrigation schedule.  It was, therefore, assumed that a 20% 
water restriction will have a 5% decrease in the average yield.  Such an assumption certainly is 
debatable given the vast number of management strategies irrigation farmers could follow to 
minimise the impact of a 20% restriction.  
 
Table 11 translates Table 10 with respect to the above-mentioned assumptions into the expected 
theoretical impact on total gross margin for the study area.  The impact of a restriction should be 
clear. 
 
Table 11:  Expected decrease in production associated with a 20 percent water restriction in the 
study area 
Wine industry Table grape industry Deciduous fruit industry Total
Gross margin (without restriction) R 1,128,919,042 R 371,270,422 R 3,122,863,818
Gross margin (with restriction) R 1,072,473,090 R 352,706,900 R 2,966,720,627
Difference R 56,445,952 R 18,563,521 R 156,143,191 R 231,152,664
  
Sources:  (Abbott, 2001; Beukes and Weber, 1982; Beukes, 1999; De Lange, 2004a; DFPT, 2003; 
Green, 1985; Louw and van Schalkwyk, 2001; SAWIS, 2002; SAWIS, 2004a; SAWIS, 2004b; 
SAWIS, 2004c; SAWIS, 2004d; Scheepers et al., 1991; STATSSA, 2004a; STATSSA, 2004b; Van 
Zyl, 2004) 
 
This table was verified. 
 
The above-mentioned argument regarding the impact of a 20% restriction creates an expectation 
regarding the impacts of a restriction.  It could, however, be over simplistic because if restrictions 
become the norm rather than the exemption, this situation could lead to structural changes with a 
movement from deciduous fruit to more drought resistant crops like wine grapes or even cash crops, 
which are most flexible in terms of water restrictions (De Lange, 2004b). 
 
  
4.4 Impact on employment in agriculture 
 
The above-mentioned influences on production will have spin-off effects for employment, as well 
as for other sectors in the economy.  The following sections focus on structural changes resulting 
from ongoing (permanent) water restrictions and the expected impact on employment, urbanisation, 
tourism and the rest of the economy. 
 
In general, agriculture is more sensitive regarding employment in reaction to water restrictions than 
to other sectors.  This is due to in-elastic demand characteristics of irrigation water in the 
production process.  Louw and van Schalkwyk conducted detailed research on the economic impact 
of ongoing water restrictions (structural changes) in the Berg River irrigation area (Louw and van 
Schalkwyk, 2001).  They made use of two scenarios in their study.  The first allowed trading of 
water use rights and the second did not.  Although their study showed that a trade scenario could be 
advantageous in some circumstances, the assumption of no-trade will be used in this document, as 
the market for tradable water use rights is not very active in the study area.  Their study could be 
seen as a legitimate estimation of the relative impact of water restrictions on the current study area.  
 
 
Figure 12 presents the theoretical impact of water restrictions on permanent labour in the long-term.  
As restrictions intensify to a 40 percent restriction, the permanent labour force decreases from 5200 
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in the base analysis (being an unrestricted situation) to approximately 4600 (representing a decrease 
of 11.5 percent).  Figure 12 shows that a 20 percent water restriction will result in a 4,8 percent 
decrease in permanent employment (given the no-trade scenario for water use rights). 
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Figure 12: Decline in the permanent labour force during water restrictions 
Source:  (Louw and van Schalkwyk, 2001) 
 
The situation with regard to casual farm workers could be even worse (see Figure 13).  The casual 
labour force declines from approximately 111 000 workers (with approximately 345 000 
dependents) in the base analysis to just under 90 000 workers (representing a decrease of 18,9 
percent) in the event of a 40 percent restriction (under the no-trade scenario).  The associated 
decrease for a 20 percent restriction is estimated at 5,4 percent.  Each of these workers earn an 
average cash wage of approximately R 2835 to R 5000 per season (STATSSA, 2004a), resulting in 
a loss in income of approximately R 82M per annum.   
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Figure 13:  Decline in the casual labour force during water restrictions 
Source:  (Louw and van Schalkwyk, 2001) 
 
The combined impact of job losses could decrease the general welfare of the communities in the 
Western Cape because most of this income is spent in the local economy.  According to Table 12, 
the average cash remuneration of full-time farm labourers in the Western Cape is approximately R 
14269 per annum (R 1189 per month), being the second highest (after Gauteng) in South Africa.  
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Therefore, for every 100 permanent farm workers losing their jobs, approximately R 1.4 million 
less will be spent in the local economy. 
 
Table 12:  Agricultural employment and employee remuneration per province 
  
Source:  (STATSSA, 2004) 
 
If the figures in Table 12 are broken down, it will be found that the Western Cape deciduous 
industry alone employs approximately 104439 labourers (permanent and seasonal), with 417756 
dependants (DFPT, 2003), while the Western Cape wine industry employs approximately 3500 
cellar personnel and 345000 farm labourers (including dependants) (SAWIS, 2004d).  To 
compensate for double counting, the following will be assumed for the sum of labourers in the 
study area: 
Permanent 
labour 43166 
Seasonal labour 50798 
Dependants 181146 
Total 275110 
 
According to Table 13, a 20% water restriction could result in a decrease in income of 
approximately R 36.5 million (permanent and seasonal labour) in the study area.  This would have 
multiplier effects on other sectors in the Western Cape economy.  The unemployed would have to 
be accommodated elsewhere, which would fuel urbanisation and could overstrain RDP initiatives of 
the Government even faster.  A market for water use rights could delay these employment impacts, 
as more water could be made available through trade of water use rights (Louw and van Schalkwyk, 
2001).  However, such a measure should be seen as a demand management approach. 
 
Table 13:  Theoretical impact of 20 percent restriction on the number of labourers in the study area 
No restriction 20% restriction Difference Income loss
Permanent labour 43166 41091 2075 R 29,612,984
Seasonal labour 50798 48052 2746 R 7,785,515
Dependants 181146 172437 8709
Total 275110 261580 13530 R 37,398,499
 
Source:  (De Lange, 2004; DFPT, 2003; SAWIS, 2004; STATSSA, 2004) 
 
Table 14 indicates the combined impact on production and the loss in household expenditure as a 
result of a 20 percent water restriction in the study area.  In monetary terms, an estimated income 
loss of approximately R38 million could be expected for a 20 percent water restriction in the study 
area. 
 
Both the production and income losses are presented in Table 14 with the estimated total loss in 
production and income equal to R268 million. 
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Table 14:  Expected losses in production (producer prices) and labour income associated with a 20 
percent water restriction 
 Source:  (De Lange, 2004; DFPT, 2003; SAWIS, 2004) 
 
 
The above-mentioned argument should demonstrate some of the impacts associated with a re-
allocation (restriction) of water from rural to urban areas.  In terms of the two development paths, it 
should be clear that allocating more water to agriculture, Development Path A could have 
decreasing effects on the rural population in terms of loss of production and income.  Such negative 
impacts will be avoided with Development Path B. 
 
 
4.5 Impact on the rest of the economy (multipliers) 
 
The agricultural sectors affect the rest of the economy.  Economists have developed forward 
multipliers for different sectors and industries to quantify such effects.  The higher a multiplier the 
bigger the potential effects of the specific industry for the economy.  
 
Table 15:  Forward multipliers for selected industries/sectors in the Western Cape 
 
Industry/sector Forward multiplier 
Viticulture 10.73 
Deciduous fruit 10.90 
Forestry 7.00 
Mining  9.61 
Meat production 9.70 
Dairy production 9.77 
Animal feed production 10.36 
Other manufacturing 8.80 
Electricity and water 10.34 
Construction 2.92 
Trade 9.95 
Transport and 
communication 
10.30 
Services 9.88 
Source:  (Berning and Nowers, 2000; McDonald and Punt, 2001) 
 
Table 14 and Table 15 translate into Table 16 by indicating a rough estimation of the decrease in 
gross income for the Western Cape economy if a 20 percent re-allocation of water should apply in 
the study area.  It should be clear that substantial deviations will be found in practice, but such 
figures will only become certain AFTER the shock (water restrictions) has been implemented.  The 
aim of multipliers is to be pro-active and to provide decision makers with a rough estimation of the 
future consequences of certain bulk-water management strategies. 
 
 
 
 
 
Wine industry Table grape industry Deciduous fruit industry Total
Loss in production R 56,445,952 R 18,563,521 R 156,143,191 R 231,152,664
Loss in labour income R 9,132,466 R 3,003,417 R 25,262,616 R 37,398,499
R 268,551,163
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Table 16:  Estimated impacts on the rest of the Western Cape economy (2004) 
 
 
Industry
Decrease in gross 
farm income
Multiplier Gross income decreases for 
the Western Cape economy
Viticulture (Wine and Table)  , - ./ / 0 .1 , +2 3  / 2, +  4 / 1 .4 -  .3 1 , 2/ -
Deciduous fruit   - 3 . 1 +. 0 / 24 4  / 20   ., /  .0 3 / ., 4 / 2- 1
 ' + . - ' .3 3 1 2/ 1  ' .- / 3 .4  ' .1 ' , 2- 0
 
Source:  (Berning and Nowers, 2000; De Lange, 2004; Punt, 2005) 
 
Table 17 places the above-mentioned figures in context.  According to the figures, a 4.41 percent 
(R231,152,664 / R5,241,000,000) decrease in gross farm income could be expected if a 20 percent 
water restriction is implemented in the study area.  Such a decrease represents a 2.94 percent 
(R2,596,812,412 / R88,303,000,000) decrease in the gross geographic product for the province as a 
whole. 
 
Table 17:  Key provincial statistics: Western Cape 
 
Source:  (Statistics South Africa, 2005) 
 
It could, therefore, be argued that Development Path A will have a negative effect on agriculture 
and on the Western Cape economy as a whole.  Development Path B is more expensive in terms of 
water tariffs, but it will save on production losses. 
 
4.6 Urbanisation 
 
A certain minimum population is necessary to maintain economic functionality in rural areas.  
Development Path A does not support maintaining the rural population to the same extent as B 
because A enhances urbanisation through increased unemployment in the irrigated agricultural 
sector (as result of possible decreases in production because of water restrictions).  Increased 
urbanisation results in numerous other problems for urban areas, including increased water demand, 
electricity and housing. 
 
4.7 Recreation and tourism 
 
Tourism is the single biggest industry in the world and the Western Cape is no exception.  
Recreation and tourism depend on the maintenance of sustainable water eco-systems with many of 
the natural attractions in rural areas related to water resources.  If such water resources are re-
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allocated to urban areas, it could be expected that rural amenities associated with water resources 
will decrease.  The Western Cape has a 28 percent share of the South African tourist market, with a 
total of R 9304 million (10.54 percent of Western Cape GDP) being spent by tourists in the 
province.  Overseas tourist spending could be seen as a derivative from investment in agriculture.  
According to WESGRO (WESGRO, 2004), 43 percent of all foreign tourists visiting South Africa 
visit the winelands and the wine industry, contributing more than R 3500 million (3.96 percent of 
Western Cape GDP) annually to the tourism industry. 
 
Please return to the beginning of this section and complete the score sheet before 
proceeding to the following section. 
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CRITERIA WEIGHTS 
 
The last section allocates weights to each main criteria group and the associated sub-criteria.  Each 
weight indicates the relative importance of the criteria.  If necessary, refer to the tree diagram of the 
criteria at the beginning of the document.  The following table is an example of randomly chosen 
weights of the completed weight allocation procedure.  
 
EXAMPLE: 
M ain  criteria M ain criteria  
w eigh t
S ub-criteria : S ub-criteria  
w eigh t
C o nfiden ce  in  yie ld 30
T im ing  (ab ility to  supp ly the  d em and) 70
100
U R V 30
C o nfiden ce  in  to ta l cos t estim ates 20
T ariff changes  n ecessary to  m a in ta in  serv ice 50
100
E xpec ted  im pac ts  on  a vera ge flow 25
W aste  d isp osa l and  d ilu tion  e ffect 25
G rou nd w ate r recha rge . 20
F lood  and  e ros ion  con tro l 5
Loss o f B iod ive rs ity 25
100
D e pendency on  n a tu ra l ra in fa ll 10
V o lum e o f w ate r a lloca ted  from  ru ra l to  u rban  a reas 20
Im pa cts on  agricu ltu ra l p roduc tion 20
Im pa cts on  em ploym ent in  agricu ltu re 20
M u ltip lie rs 10
U rban isa tion 10
R e crea tion  and  tourism 10
100
100
W ater ba lance 9
F inanc ia l aspec ts 25
P ub lic  acce p tan ce 18
S o cio -e conom ic  a spec ts 28
E nv ironm enta l asp ects 20
 
 
PLEASE ALLOCATE APPROPRIATE WEIGHTS TO THE CRITERIA BY COMPLETING THE 
FOLLOWING TABLE: 
Note that we are indeed aware of the subjective nature of the weight allocation procedure and that 
the stated weights will be used merely as a point of departure for a negotiation process determining 
the final weights.  Please note that all weights will be made available to all experts for discussion in 
order to obtain a final set.  Your weight should be based on your interpretation of the relative 
importance of the particular main or sub-criteria in the decision-making process.  
 
Main criteria Main criteria weight Sub-criteria: Sub-criteria 
weight 
Confidence in yield  70 
Timing (ability to supply the demand)  30 
Water balance  
  100 
URV  30 
Confidence in total cost estimates  40 
Tariff changes necessary to maintain service  30 
Financial aspects  
  100 
Expected impacts on average flow  25 
Waste disposal and dilution effect   20 
Ground-water recharge.  15 
Flood and erosion control  15 
Loss of Biodiversity  25 
Environmental aspects  
  
100 
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Dependency on natural rainfall  40 
Volume of water allocated from rural to urban areas  10 
Impacts on agricultural production  10 
Impacts on employment in agriculture  10 
Multipliers  10 
Urbanisation  10 
Recreation and tourism  10 
Socio-economic aspects   
  100 
  
Public acceptance A more paternalistic 
view could be 
assumed. 
Water tariffs is 
mainly a issues of 
balancing the budget.  
 
 
100 
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FINAL COMMENTS 
 
Please feel free to make ANY comments: 
 
Page 5 refers to “mining” - continuous depletion of a groundwater resource.  This is rarely 
practiced, and would not be the intention if TMGA were developed.  The aim would be to abstract 
on a sustainable basis – not mine the resource.  However, one could ask the question WHAT is a 
sustainable basis? 
 
Page 6 – The agric demand limited to registered water use rights.  Is this valid?  I think you are only 
accounting for surface water in this case.  Groundwater could continue to be developed by 
agriculture over time – add approx 20Mkl. 
 
Confidence in R/$ exchange is very uncertain – does this not impact severely on the cost estimation 
for desalination?  However, exchange rate impact prices of imported parts – RSA does have 
capacity to produce all RO technology locally.  Economists expect that R will stabilize at R5-R7 
against the $ . . . 
 
Criteria Group 3 and 4 is unfair way of handling?  In many cases, the only option is to assign a 
score of zero for option A because the criterion is not applicable to option B.  The bias inclusion of 
criteria that will force a poor score for A and have no impact on B.  This forces a “severe” zero 
score for A when in reality the impacts could be limited if managed correctly.  However, the reality 
is uncertain – propose alternatives? It was noted that careful consideration and motivation is needed 
for each criteria. 
 
Development Path B neglects the negative impacts of utilising “dirty energy”.  Desalination would 
only be environmentally friendly if such technology makes use of clean energy.  However one 
should not see DP B as “desalination” – the two DP’s represent two different ways of long-term 
water management – the two DP’s is making this difference more tangible (he mentioned that we 
could replace desalination with recycling or any other “greener and more expensive – ito direct 
costs) option! 
 
Bias in favour of DP B – in terms of the questions and criteria.  However, previous studies were 
biased towards A ? – balancing the view? 
 
The importance of climate change on the water balance has been noted. 
 
The impact of “sediment hungry” water from dams – have bigger erosion potential on the recovery 
distance was noted. 
 
It was noted that desalinisation must be considered for implementation sooner rather than later and 
the option of linking it to other development options such as energy production must be considered 
as this will have an impact on the costs.   

A bias in the analysis is represented in my opinion by the assumption made on the need for re-
allocation of water from rural to urban areas in Strategy A and the consequent socio-economic 
impacts. If we look at table 2, the total storage capacity at year 2028 in the Western Cape is 737 
million kilo-litres per year for the Development Path A and  716 million kilo-litres per year for the 
Development Path B. It means that an equivalent available yield corresponds to the two alternatives 
at the same year.  It is clear that strategy A would ask for a transfer of water from rural to urban 
areas, whereas strategy B would “produce” water directly in the urban area. But this does not mean, 
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if I understand your figures, that a reduction of water availability occurs in the rural areas in 
strategy A because the improved capacity of storage exists in this strategy too (440 -> 737 million 
Kl/year). The eventual shortage in rural areas if this strategy is chosen depends, in my opinion, on 
the higher sensitivity of Development Path A to rainfall (climate) than Development Path B.  
 
Generally speaking, one has the impression that if the technology is available and reliable, 
Development Path B is the better option, as results also from my score (43.9 option A; 56.1 option 
B making the hypothesis that both alternatives have the same public acceptance). I have the 
impression that certain costs associated with Development Path B have not been considered or are 
underestimated (potential breakdowns of the plants and relative environmental/financial 
consequences, uncertainties in the long-term functioning of these structures, etc.). 
 
Some assumptions in the document seem to be quite “heavy” and not enough explained. For 
instance, why was urban demand growth was estimated at 2 percent/year? The same for the 
productivity of water in the agricultural sector and the use of multipliers. 
 
 
 
Please return the completed questionnaire via e-mail to: 
 
willemdl@elsenburg.com 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
